

LIFE AND FINITE INDIVIDUALITY.

TWO SYMPOSIA:

I. By J. S. HALDANE, D'ARCY WENTWORTH THOMPSON, P. CHALMERS MITCHELL, and L. T. HOBHOUSE.

II. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, G. F. STOUT, and VISCOUNT HALDANE.

Edited for the Aristotelian Society *with an Introduction.*

By H. WILDON CARR.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE two Symposia which are combined in this volume were written independently of one another for discussions at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association, held in London on July 6th and 7th, 1918. The papers, as originally issued to members for the discussions, are published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XVIII. They are republished in response to a generally expressed desire that they should be available in the form of a special volume, and in order that the reply of the opener of each Symposium to the criticisms of the later papers, which initiated the general discussion at the meeting, may be included.

The two Symposia were contributed without any idea of their being combined under one title in one volume. The unity expressed in the title "Life and Finite Individuality" is an afterthought. It seemed, however, to those who took part in the two discussions, that, in a quite definite sense, each problem was complementary to and threw light upon the other. The problems are, of course, approached each from its own particular standpoint, yet they are closely allied, for it is impossible, even in thought, to dissociate the problem of the true nature of finite individuality from the problem of the true nature of life.

The purpose of the Aristotelian Society Symposium is to bring together opposite, divergent, and diverse answers to some vital question of philosophical controversy in a definite manner. The opening paper is designed to state a thesis, and the second paper an antithesis, and these are followed by other points of view. The first paper is therefore written first, and submitted to those who are invited to make reply to it or to criticise it.

The Symposium, "Are Physical, Biological, and Psychological Categories Irreducible?" was suggested by two recent books, each dealing with the author's own experimental research, which appeared to throw new light on the nature of the phenomenon of life, and to indicate new directions in which theory of life must seek formulation. At the same time, they seemed to raise a distinct issue, and also to illustrate divergent tendencies.

The first book is Dr. J. S. Haldane's *Organism and Environment.** This contains an account by Dr. Haldane of his experiments in connexion with a research into the physiology of breathing, experiments of extreme delicacy and considerable diversity, all of which he contended demonstrated to the point of absolute conviction that life is not the phenomenon of a functional process dependent on, and conditioned by, structure, brought about by the synthesis of material constituents. Wherever and in whatever form we meet life, its distinctive characteristic, he contended, is that a normal constant is maintained amidst a disturbing environment, and to this function structure is always and altogether subservient. He argued that this proves conclusively that mechanistic interpretation, which means the defining of life in terms of physical structure, is impossible.

The second book is Professor D'Arcy W. Thompson's *Growth and Form.*† This is a minute and careful study of the morphology of organisms. The argument leads to the conclusion that all interpretation of living forms of life, inasmuch as it implies explanation of structure by adaptability to function, is necessarily mechanistic. While leaving the problem of life itself, in its actual nature and origin, outside or beyond the region of scientific investigation, the author contends that, in all manifestations of life in organic forms, "purpose" can

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* Yale University Press, 1917.

† Cambridge University Press, 1917.

be and must be interpreted in terms of mechanism, or, rather, that purpose and mechanism are not different facts demanding different interpretations, but one and the same fact regarded from different standpoints.

The Symposium, "Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" was suggested by Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison's book on *The Idea of God*,* and the terms of the question are a quotation from that book. The chapter in which the passage occurs is devoted to a criticism of Professor Bernard Bosanquet's doctrine, expounded in his Gifford Lectures, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*.† The Symposium raises a fundamental metaphysical problem and also a logical problem of some complexity. The metaphysical problem concerns the nature of the finite subject of experience. Is it no more than externally related to other subjects on the same level of self-existence, or is it inherently dependent on more ultimate wholes? The logical problem concerns the subject of the judgment. Can the subject of experience in his individuality be the ultimate subject of a proposition, or is all predication ultimately of reality or the absolute? Is the categorical form of judgment always resolvable into the hypothetical?

The problem in the second Symposium is not therefore merely analogous to that in the first; it is, in fact, identical with it when taken in its concrete and universal form. In the first the argument turns on the question, Are we to regard function as prior to structure and structure as dependent on function, or *vice versâ?* In the second the argument is concerned with the status of the individual. Has the finite individual a substantive existence, in external relation to other finite individuals, and can we conceive all such substantive

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* *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, by A. Seth Pringle-Pattison; Clarendon Press, 1917.

† *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, by B. Bosanquet, Macmillan and Co., 1912.

individuals in external relation to God? Or, is the finite individual adjectival in his nature, dependent on his internal relation to higher forms of reality? Is reality one in the qualitative sense, the whole manifesting itself in the individual parts?

It will be seen, therefore, that, in the second Symposium, we are discussing in regard to monadic relations the same problem which in the first Symposium we are discussing in regard to atomic relations. Can we, by exhaustive knowledge of the constitution of an organism, discover the source and ground of the living process it undergoes? Can we, by exhaustive knowledge of an individual subject of experience, discover the source and ground of his individual nature?

A main purpose in the arrangement of these Symposia, and in combining physical and biological with metaphysical problems, is to break down the false distinction between science and philosophy. It is a distinction of modern origin, emphasised in the great era of scientific discovery which is the outstanding feature of the nineteenth century. It is based on the idea that there is a clear demarcation between fact and theory. Science is supposed to be concerned with fact, and to pursue a method which involves observation, experiment, and description in pure and absolute simplicity, and to eschew theory and hypothesis in so far as these are intellectual speculations which transcend the particular facts of experience. It leaves to philosophy the discussion of first principles and ultimate data, which it tends to regard as an unsubstantial realm in which there can be no certain knowledge. Philosophy, also, has been only too ready to accept the distinction, hoping thereby to disencumber itself of practical, mundane, economical concerns. The well-known instance is Hegel's gibe at the "makers of philosophical instruments." The modern concept of philosophy is bringing us to the recognition that this divorce between science and philosophy is wholly unnatural. Observation and description

are not science. Without hypothesis and theory science cannot move, and is without expression. The great Newton, who placed the maxim, *Hypotheses non fingo*, at the head of his *Principia*, and supposed he was laying the sure foundation of all future science in simply describing what he observed, could he revisit us, would find mathematicians describing his description of the universal framework as the Newtonian hypothesis—and not implying thereby either dishonour or discredit. There is but one reality—our present life, which carries in it its history, and is making itself. We may abstract special aspects of it, and justify, on practical and economical grounds, the clear-cut divisions of the special sciences, but there is one identical object, however we present it, whether in the manifoldness of physics or in the unity of metaphysics—life, the essential nature of which is history, not unchangeable, immobile, matter.

The scope and limits of the volume do not permit of including the criticisms from other standpoints which were made at the general discussions of the Symposia. I can only put on record that at the discussion of the first Symposium the standpoint of mathematics and physics was represented by Professor A. N. Whitehead and Professor J. W. Nicholson: of neurology by Dr. Leslie Mackenzie and Dr. G. F. Goldsbrough; and of biology by Mr. Brierley.

Mr. Arthur J. Balfour presided and took part in the discussion of the second Symposium. The standpoint of modern philosophical realism was represented by Professor S. Alexander and that of pragmatism by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller.

H. Wildon Carr.

SYMPOSIUM: ARE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES IRREDUCIBLE?

By J. S. Haldane, D'Arcy W. Thompson, P. Chalmers Mitchell and L. T. Hobhouse.

I.—*By* J. S. Haldane.

The subject of this discussion, as I understand it, is whether the general conceptions or "categories" ordinarily used in interpreting physical, biological and psychological phenomena are essentially different and irreconcilable with one another. In approaching this question, I think we must carefully distinguish between the conceptions, or, as I should prefer to say, working hypotheses, which we commonly use in interpreting reality, and that reality itself. The discussion applies to our working hypotheses or categories; and I propose to maintain that our ordinary working conceptions of what we regard as physical, biological and psychological phenomena are not only different, but irreducible to one another.

I will deal first with the difference between physical and biological interpretations of experience. The theory which aims at interpreting the phenomena of life as nothing but physical and chemical phenomena, accompanied, it may be, by consciousness, is generally known as the mechanistic theory of life. The theory which, on the contrary, interprets biological phenomena in terms of a special conception based on the observation of life itself may be called the biological theory.

Of these opposing theories each seeks to interpret the same facts in its own way, and the one way is completely different from the other. But there is also an intermediate theory—that known as vitalism. The vitalists accept as true, so far as it

goes, the physical and chemical interpretation of the phenomena connected with living organisms, but maintain that in living organisms we must in addition assume the existence of something quite distinct which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions. This something has been called "vital force," "the vital principle," or, to use Driesch's expression, "entelechy." So long as the vitalists confine themselves to merely pointing out the deficiences of the purely mechanistic theory, the evidence which they bring forward is so strong that it seems to me to be unanswerable. When, however, they try to define vitalism on its positive side the result is quite indefinite. The something which was supposed to interfere from without in the physical and chemical reactions can always be shown by experiment to be dependent on what were admitted to be physical and chemical conditions, though there is no explanation of how these conditions bring about the actual results. Vitalism thus represents no clearly definable working hypothesis, and for this reason I do not propose to consider it further. Similar objections apply to the corresponding animistic theory in psychology.

I shall now try to present shortly the mechanistic argument and what seem to me its fatally weak points. The conception of a living organism as a mechanism is in some respects quite natural and very useful. We can, for instance, understand up to a certain point the movements of the limbs if we regard the bones as levers acted on by the contractions of the muscles. It is equally natural to seek for corresponding mechanical explanations of the contraction of muscle; and though definite progress in this direction has hitherto been limited I feel confident that we are on the eve of such progress. When we turn to any other form of bodily activity we find similarly that physical and chemical explanations will carry us a long step forwards. Thus, the chemistry of the blood enables us to see exactly how oxygen is carried from the lungs to the tissues, and carbon dioxide is carried from the tissues to the lungs; the

chemistry of the digestive secretions enables us to understand the chemical changes in digestion ; and the structure of the eye and the laws of optics show us how an image is formed on the retina. At first sight, therefore, it seems justifiable to assume that, if our knowledge of the chemistry and physics of the living body were sufficiently complete, we could explain completely all the phenomena occurring in living organisms.

It used often to be stated confidently that the development of physiology shows a continuous advance towards a mechanical explanation of life; and this statement is at present widely accepted. It is certainly true that physical and chemical explanations are being profitably applied to more and more of the phenomena associated with life. It is, however, equally true that more and more of these phenomena are being found to be quite insusceptible of the simple mechanical explanations which were formerly given of them. Fifty years ago many physiological processes which, from a physical and chemical standpoint, are now seen to be extremely complex and obscure, were regarded as quite simple. I need only refer to such activities as the oxidative processes in living tissues, the processes of secretion and absorption, or reflex action. There is a prevalent idea that the progress of chemistry, and particularly of physical chemistry, has furnished explanations of these processes. This is most certainly not the case. What physical chemistry has helped us to do is to obtain measures of the processes in the living body ; but the results of the measurements have been to show with ever-increasing clearness that the processes in the living body do not correspond with our conceptions of those in non-living structures, and that we are not remotely in sight of mechanical explanations of the former.

As an example, I need only take the case of the exquisitely thin and delicate living membrane which separates the blood in the lung capillaries from the air in the alveoli or air-cells of the lungs. A short time ago it was assumed that this membrane

plays only the passive part which we regard a non-living membrane as playing, and allows oxygen to diffuse through just as a non-living membrane would. On applying accurate methods of measurement we found that, whenever there is need for an extra supply of oxygen, as, for instance, during muscular exertion, the membrane assumes an active *rôle* and pushes oxygen inwards, without regard to the mechanical laws of diffusion. In this respect the alveolar epithelium acts just like epithelium of the swim-bladder, or that of the kidney or any other gland, or the alimentary canal. The progress of physical chemistry is enabling us to distinguish sharply between physiolcgical activity and the processes occurring in non-living structures; and the establishment of the distinction is sweeping away the easy-going mechanistic explanations which became current during the latter half of last century.

On the whole, there is no evidence of real progress towards a mechanistic explanation of life; and those physiologists who still believe that the mechanistic line of attack is the right one are compelled to justify their belief on general philosophical grounds. We ought, they say, to advance from the simple to the complex; from the sure and familiar ground of physics and chemistry to the unknown ground of biology. Practically speaking, they argue that life *must* be a mechanical process, although at present we cannot understand the mechanism.

Now, I wish to go straight to the point, and explain why, as it seems to me, life cannot be regarded as a mechanical process. A living organism differs in this respect from any mechanism which we can construct or conceive, that it forms itself and keeps itself in working order and activity. Bearing this in mind, let us look again at the various apparent mechanisms previously referred to. The bones and muscles involved in limb-movements have not only developed into the particular arrangement which renders them efficient, but from hour to hour and day to day nutritive activities are occurring in them which keep this arrangement intact. More-

over, the actual movements are, apart altogether from conscious interference, guided and controlled at every point. These are facts which the mechanical explanation does not account for.

When we look closely into the changes occurring in a muscle doing muscular work we see that reproduction of the muscular substance is an integral part of these changes. The wonderfully beautiful balance of chemical composition which enables the blood to perform correctly its work in carrying oxygen and carbon dioxide depends no less evidently on constant and minute regulation. The formation and liberation of the digestive ferments is likewise minutely regulated; and the same is true of the exact form and optical properties of the refractive structures of the eye. Moreover, the whole of these wonderfully delicately balanced mechanisms have originally developed from a single cell containing no trace of the future structures.

It is thus evident that, although we find within the living body many phenomena which, so long as we do not look closely, can be interpreted satisfactorily as physical and chemical mechanism, there are side by side other phenomena for which the possibility of such interpretation seems to be absent. The mechanists assume that the bodily mechanisms are so constructed as to maintain, repair, and reproduce themselves. In the long process of natural selection, mechanisms of this sort have, they suggest, been evolved gradually.

Let us examine this hypothesis. When we state an event in mechanical terms we state it as a necessary result of certain simple properties of separate parts which interact in the event. Thus, it is through the interaction of rigid bones of a certain configuration with contractile muscles attached to them at certain points that we explain the movements of a limb. Similarly, it is in terms of the interaction of oxygen molecules with the molecules of hæmoglobin

and other substances in blood that we explain the taking up of oxygen by venous blood. The essence of the explanation or re-statement of the event is that after due investigation we have assumed that the parts interacting in the event have certain simple and definite properties, so that they always react in the same way under the same conditions. For a mechanical explanation the reacting parts must first be given. Unless an arrangement of parts with definite properties is given it is meaningless to speak of mechanical explanation.

To postulate the existence of a self-producing or self-maintaining mechanism is, thus, to postulate something to which no meaning can be attached. Meaningless terms are sometimes used by physiologists; but there is none so absolutely meaningless as the expression "mechanism of reproduction." Any mechanism there may be in the parent organism is absent in the process of reproduction, and must reconstitute itself at each generation, since the parent organism is reproduced from a mere tiny speck of its own body. There can be no "mechanism" of reproduction. The idea of a mechanism which is constantly maintaining or reproducing its own structure is self-contradictory. A mechanism which reproduced itself would be a mechanism without parts, and, therefore, not a mechanism.

Let us try to get nearer to what the self-reproduction and self-maintenance of an organism implies. Perhaps, the clearest analogy in the inorganic world to the reproduction of an organism is the reproduction of a crystal. By increasing the external pressure, or adding heat, we can cause a crystal of ice to waste away by melting. If, however, we remove the pressure, or the heat, the crystal re-forms and grows to its former size. We can also, with proper precautions, cool water to below the freezing-point without any ice forming. But if to the supercooled water we add the smallest crystal of ice it rapidly grows into a larger crystal, just as the germ of an organism grows. The molecules of water possess the property

of attracting one another in such a way as to produce mutual orientation or arrangement, in which they take up more space than when they were present as a mere mobile crowd in the liquid state; and in the starting of the process of orientation some initial hindrance has to be overcome, so that crystallisation occurs far more readily if it is given a start. We must assume that each molecule possesses the property of so attracting each other molecule as to produce the mutual orientation if there is no hindrance from pressure or from the molecular agitation due to heat, or from other causes. An organism maintains itself through a balance between constant loss and gain, whereas the crystal of water seems at first sight not to change except by growth or melting away. When we look closer, however, we find that the crystal has a vapour pressure. It is, therefore, constantly giving off, and must be equally constantly taking up, water-molecules from its environment. Hence, in this respect also, it resembles an organism.

Where the resemblance fails is that the arrangement of the molecules in the crystal is mere repetition, whereas in the organism there is individual variety of detail, and yet perfectly definite and specific unity of plan. For the formation of the crystal it is necessary that each molecule of water should have the property of tending to orientate itself to any other in a certain definite manner. Mere central forces of attraction do not explain the formation of a crystal from molecules or of a molecule from atoms. Similarly, in the development of an organism we seem bound to assume that the germ has the property of tending to orientate towards itself certain surrounding molecules in the specific arrangement of the fully developed organism, and that these surrounding molecules have corresponding properties.

It may be pointed out that this is no explanation. Nor is it meant to be an explanation. It is a mere general statement of what appear to be the facts of observation. In mechanical

physics we have become accustomed to think of molecules or atoms as quite simple things with easily definable properties, such as mass, extension, and central forces of attraction. For biology, the properties which must be assumed in a unit of living structure are enormously more complex, and are only capable at present of statement in general terms. It is solely from previous actual observation that we can predict how the living structure will behave, and we can only do so if the environment is about the same as in the previous observation.

Practically, therefore, we must look upon organism and environment as one interconnected whole, which, as a matter of empirical fact, tends to maintain itself, just as a crystal and its mother-liquor do, or a molecule and the solution in which it has formed. From no elementary mechanical principles can we deduce the behaviour of even the molecule of water in crystallisation; and similarly, from no elementary physical or chemical principles can we deduce the behaviour of the organism. It is owing to this empirical fact that the ordinary working hypotheses of physics and chemistry are irreconcilable with those of biology.

The tacit assumption is often made that in mechanical physics we reach a definition of the ultimate reality of which the visible world consists. For many practical purposes this definition, it is true, suffices. But even in connection with heat, light, and electricity, the definition is insufficient. In chemistry it breaks down still more, and in biology the breakdown is complete. Like pure mathematics, mechanical physics is only an abstract science. We can use it for certain practical purposes, but it tells us only a very little about reality, and in only a very imperfect form.

Let me illustrate my meaning by reference to the kinetic theory of gases—a subject which has been specially engaging me lately. For the kinetic theory of gases, a gas is an assembly of molecules kept in motion by heat, with the necessary consequence that each molecule, whatever its mass may be, possesses

on an average the same amount of kinetic energy. Hence, an equal number of gas molecules will always produce the same bombardment pressure at the same temperature, and from this pressure we obtain an absolute scale of temperature. In this way we can predict from the theory the three well-known "gas-laws," called, after their discoverers, Boyle's, Charles's and Avogadro's laws. These laws are embodied in the equation $PV = RT$, where P = pressure, V = volume, T = absolute temperature, and R is a constant for each gas, but varies for different gases in inverse proportion to their molecular weights.

Now, it is evident that this equation can only hold good if molecules are regarded as points with mass, but without extension. Some mathematical physicists have clung tenaciously to this idea and to the equation. There we must leave them, because we are not dealing with mathematical figments, but with reality in so far as it is revealed to us in experience. As a matter of fact, the equation $PV = RT$ has only the appearance of holding within certain limits of temperature and pressure. If the temperature falls or the pressure increases sufficiently, the value of PV becomes greater than RT, because the volume of the molecules themselves begins to count. Hence, if we call v the volume occupied by the molecules, we must alter the equation to $P(V-v) = RT$.

If the molecules were simply indifferent to one another, so that they merely repelled one another on contact, we should now have an equation expressing the behaviour of a gaseous substance. But, as a matter of fact, even the amended equation does not express the behaviour of actual gases, for, with sufficient cooling, gases condense to liquids. The molecules attract one another, and with cooling their kinetic energy is reduced progressively so that on an average a constantly increasing proportion of them must be within their mutual spheres of attraction, like the bodies in a solar system, and hence exercise no external pressure. We must, therefore, alter the significance of P, so that it means, not external, but

intermolecular pressure. We can, then, as I have elsewhere endeavoured to show, not only extend the gas-laws to liquids, but by means of them predict with great accuracy a very large number of facts.

There remain other facts, however, which we cannot predict, for with sufficient further fall of temperature a liquefied gas crystallises. It doing so it may, like water or molten iron, increase in bulk. Now, the simple assumptions on which the kinetic theory of gases and liquids is based are insufficient to explain the phenomena of crystallisation, with the accompanying abrupt change of volume and of other properties. We must, therefore, assume, not merely that the molecules attract one another in the directions joining their centres, after the manner of gravitation, but that they tend to assume a definite position, pole to pole, in relation to one another, and actually assume this position as soon as their mutual movements, due to heat, are insufficient to prevent them from doing so. The liquid thus crystallises at a perfectly definite temperature, unless its enormous intermolecular pressure is sensibly increased by added external pressure.

This shows us that when we look closely at actual molecules we are forced to the conclusion that the tendency to take specific form or arrangement is always present in molecules, and, therefore, in what we call matter. We cannot sum up the properties of molecules in the conceptions of mass, extension, and central forces proportional to mass, in accordance with the fundamental physical conceptions of Newton. The actual properties of molecules can only be expressed in terms of their potential orientations to various other kinds of molecules; and, when we pass beyond the comparatively simple empirical facts relating to crystallisation, when we consider also the limitless empirical facts of chemistry, we can see that the physical conceptions of extension and central forces connecting masses are nothing but imperfect representations of reality, however useful these imperfect representations may be within

certain limits. The reality is far more than these conceptions can express.

From yet another point of view the abstract mechanical conception of a molecule is unreal. We now possess abundant evidence that molecules, just like crystals or other gross molecular aggregates, are in a state of constant decomposition and recomposition. So far may this process go in very dilute solutions of what are distinguished as electrolytes, that for all practical purposes their molecules hardly exist as such, and only the dissociated fragments are present. Thus, a very dilute solution of sodium chloride or hydrochloric acid contains, practically speaking, only the ions formed by the dissolution of the molecules of sodium chloride or hydrochloric acid. I need, perhaps, hardly refer in detail to the very great significance of the conception of ionisation first introduced by Faraday, and the manner in which this conception has developed until it has transformed the whole outlook of both chemistry and physics. It is now evident that not merely gross aggregates, but also molecules and atoms, are in a state of constant decomposition, recomposition, and internal action. Their mass and extension appear to be nothing but an expression of this action; and, if so, the distinction between matter and energy, or between structure and its activity, becomes only an imperfect representation of the actual world.

There are, thus, no real grounds for the contention that life must, in ultimate analysis, be capable of interpretation as a mechanical process. We must base our working conception of life on actual observation of living organisms, and certainly not on mechanical conceptions. Even from the purely physical standpoint, these are no longer adequate, but only provisional working hypotheses, useful for certain limited practical purposes, like the gas laws in either their original or amended form.

Empirical observations with regard to the behaviour of living organisms point clearly to the conclusion that in each detail of organic structure, composition, environment, and

activity there is a manifestation or expression of the life of the organism regarded as a whole which tends to persist. It is this manifestation which distinguishes biological phenomena; and, through all the temporary variations of structure, activity, composition and environment, it can be traced more and more clearly with every year of advance in biological investigation. We can trace it through the ordinary metabolic phenomena in living organisms, as well as through the phenomena of senescence, death, and reproduction. As it seems to me, it is only through the central working hypothesis or category of life that we can bring unity and intelligibility into the group of phenomena with which biology deals; and it is because the biological working hypothesis is for the present absent in our ordinary conceptions of physical and chemical phenomena that we must treat physical and biological categories as radically different. The popular and completely natural distinction between the living and non-living is thus wholly justified on the ground that biological observations cannot be expressed or described in terms of ordinary physical working hypotheses. For a more detailed discussion of this position in the light of the empirical facts of physiology I may, perhaps, refer to my recent book, *Organism and Environment.*

I must now pass to the question whether biological and psychological categories must also be treated as different. To this question it seems to me that there are still clearer reasons for returning an affirmative answer.

When we examine the organic wholeness and persistency which shows itself in the life of an organism we see at once that life is limited on all sides by what we can only interpret as physical and chemical conditions. If the oxygen percentage in the air breathed falls low enough, or the external temperature rises or falls sufficiently, life no longer dominates the phenomena. In every direction we see similar limitations. A plant may be regarded as the type of what appears to be

a mere organism. It is very sensitive to changes in its environment, and is helpless against numerous accidental changes, though human foresight can often quite easily guard it. A conscious organism is distinguished by the manner in which it overcomes these hindrances. It is aware of, and avoids, neutralises, or even takes advantage of them. It adapts its behaviour in such a manner as to maintain itself in the presence of what is outside the mere organic unity of its life. But in so doing the organism shows itself to be more than a mere organism; it includes within the unity of its life what seemed to be independent. In other words, the biological interpretation of the phenomena of organisms is only a partial interpretation, just as the physical interpretation is a still more partial interpretation.

The reaction between a conscious organism and its environment is wholly different from the immediacy of what we interpret as physical or physiological reaction. In physical or physiological reaction one object reacts directly with another in space, but only in space; the reaction is immediate or "blind." Into conscious reaction, both the actual past and the potential future enter directly also. Objects of consciousness determine directly and are determined directly by past and future, as well as simultaneous, objects of consciousness. A psychological object is thus in dynamic relation with other objects surrounding it, not merely in space, but also in time. It has therefore an element of timelessness, inasmuch as it is in direct relation not only with present, but also with future and past objects. It represents action at a distance, not only in space, but also in time.

The physical world which we seem to see so plainly around us is reality as it appears in our consciousness. It is a reality of objects of consciousness, the constant presence of which guides all our conscious actions. What guides us is our *knowledge* of objects. This knowledge is there and constantly active, though the objects as physical or biological objects are

out of sight or contact, so that their immediate influence is entirely absent.

It has already been pointed out that the world of mathematical physics is a very imperfect presentation of reality, and that in the biological world much more of reality is presented. In the world of psychology still more of reality comes before us. The real world is not merely a physical or biological world, but also a *known* world. In identifying it as a known world we are making use of an additional category or working hypothesis. What makes this necessary is simply the nature of the empirical facts. A world which is not a known world means as little to us as a world in which the equation $PV = RT$ holds good absolutely, or a world of atoms indifferent to one another. Such worlds are ideal figments of our imagination, though the figments are very useful for certain limited purposes. In judging of the nature of reality we have no right to exclude the facts which emerge in either biological or psychological observation. It would be just as reasonable to exclude from physics or chemistry all the facts relating to ionisation. Conscious activity is a part of our objective universe, and must be taken account of in our judgments of reality.

Consciousness has been looked upon as a mere accompaniment of physical and chemical changes in nerve-cells. As has been already pointed out, the active changes within the living body cannot be interpreted as mere physical and chemical changes.

An alternative view is that conscious activity is a subjective accompaniment of what we interpret as vital activity. To me it seems clear that this view is not possible. Vital activity is "blind." This means that the organic unity which we can always identify in vital or biological activity is immediate in character. An unconscious organism adapts itself to new conditions, but only through a process which appears to be essentially as blind as the action of gravitation. In the process

of reproduction the germ might seem as if it were realising a conscious plan of the fully developed organism. Embryological investigation indicates, however, that each step in development is the immediate outcome of the conditions existing at the moment. If these conditions are abnormal the development will also be abnormal, so that all sorts of monstrosities are possible. It is true that for a mere organism the past lives on in the present, and there is a sense in which we can speak of organic memory. But we might equally describe this organic persistency as of the same nature as inertia. It does not present the character of conscious memory.

In perception and conscious reaction to it we are in contact with phenomena which we cannot interpret in terms of either physical or biological conceptions. An object which has been perceived is present to, and directly influences, both future and past objects of perception, so that their influence on conscious action is altered. When Faraday pointed out the existence of ions in solutions he made a discovery which has gradually exercised a more and more wide-spread influence on scientific and practical activity, and has at the same time given a new significance to previous discoveries. In every new act of perception, however unimportant, there is a similar influence on the reactions to future, present and past perceptions. To what we regard as mere organism the past is simply a dead weight on the present, and the present on the future, just as in the case of what we regard as mere physical existence.

It has been assumed widely that, while we can directly perceive physical or biological phenomena, we cannot perceive psychological phenomena directly, since they have no "objective" existence, and are only subjective accompaniments hidden behind, and possibly determining, objective physical and physiological changes. This assumption is baseless. The objective behaviour of a conscious organism or person is quite distinct from that of an unconscious organism, although at the lowest stages of consciousness the distinction may be so

faintly marked that we are left in doubt, just as at the lowest stages of life we can hardly distinguish the living from the non-living. When we perceive a person it is most certainly a person, and not a mere organism, that we perceive. It is only by a process of abstraction from the full objective reality that we can regard him as a mere organism. The doctor or physiologist is constantly performing with great pains this act of abstraction, and the engineer or economist performs a still more violent act of abstraction when he regards the man as a motor or working unit, or as a weight to be carried. By a similar effort we can abstract from the objective reality of what is beautiful.

It is, of course, only by interpretation of our experience that we perceive psychological phenomena. But exactly the same is true of biological and physical phenomena. The physical realities which seem to lie so clear and solid in front of us are only bundles of interpretations in the light of previous and co-existing and anticipated experiences, all determining the existing experience. Even if, following Hume, we seek to disentangle the sensations forming the crude basis of these interpretations, we are no better off. The simplest sensation carries interpretation with it, as Kant showed. The "objective" world is nothing but the world as interpreted in knowledge, and the physical or biological worlds are only abstractions from this objective world. Not only when we are observing psychological phenomena in other persons, but when we are studying natural phenomena of all kinds, is our world a psychological or spiritual world. Perhaps, we realise this best when the progress of experimental science leads to a reconsideration of fundamental physical interpretations which, like those of mass, energy, or unchangeable atoms, have been employed without question for long periods. We have to go back to what was in the minds of those who established these interpretations.

I will now try to summarise the argument of this paper

When we make use of physical categories, we are employing simplified maxims or principles which, on account of their simplicity, are very convenient for purposes of prediction, but which can only be used over a limited extent of our experience without gross error. When we attempt to apply them to biological or psychological phenomena, the error becomes apparent; we cannot express biological or psychological experience in terms of physical conceptions. In other words, we cannot reduce biological and psychological to physical categories.

Similarly, in biology we are also employing relatively simplified maxims which enable us to predict another large class of phenomena, but which cannot be applied to what we distinguish as psychological phenomena without gross error. Hence we cannot reduce psychological to biological categories.

We may ask why, in interpreting the physical world, we make use of schematised conceptions which biological and even physical and chemical observations prove to be untenable. The reality behind atoms and molecules, for instance, is evidently far more than the schematised atoms and molecules of ordinary physics and chemistry. The answer is that for a large number of purposes the schematised conceptions are practically sufficient, and give us a short cut without which we should be helpless in practical affairs, since we have not the data for framing more adequate conceptions correctly. For biological phenomena the schematised physical conceptions are insufficient practically; and we must, therefore, make use of special biological conceptions, the relation of which to the physical conceptions must for the present remain more or less obscure for lack of data. It is the same as regards the relation of psychological to biological conceptions. For certain ordinary practical purposes we treat the biological and physical worlds as objective and independent of our knowledge of them; but this is only a convenient figment.

From the point of view of each individual science there is a conflict of categories or fundamental hypotheses with those of

other sciences; but from the wider standpoint of philosophy these categories are only provisional working hypotheses. The world of our experience is a spiritual world, as already pointed out above; and this being so we must regard categories as only forms which the riches of this spiritual world pass through in the course of their ever fuller manifestation.

SYMPOSIUM: ARE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES IRREDUCIBLE?

II.—*By* D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson.

The great astronomers have given us a "Mécanique Céleste," and the great physiologists have sketched for us a "Mécanique Humaine." The one was drawn, by Newton and Laplace, to a strict mathematical scale; the other, more complex and specific, is traced with a freer hand, on lines laid down by the physicists and by the chemists. If neither gives us a consummate and ultimate explanation of things, or even a complete *ratio efficiendi* of the working of its particular machine, both alike give us an admirable *ratio cogitandi*; they serve the purpose of ordering our thoughts, of correlating our knowledge, of anticipating phenomena, of climbing slowly but steadily (not without many a false step here and there) up the pathway of discovery.

But now Dr. Haldane throws down a challenge to the naturalist, and in particular to the physiologist; for he tells us, in effect, that we have mixed up alien concepts, that in applying the "mechanical" laws of chemistry and physics to living things we have confused our categories, and that "biological observations cannot be expressed or described in the terms of ordinary physical working hypotheses."

It is with some reluctance, I confess, that I enter on this discussion. The naturalist has his hands full of relatively simple problems; he approaches them in his own way, he solves, or tries to solve them, by his own accustomed methods. But he is afraid, generally speaking, of the larger problems which lie beyond; and his fear may be justified, or at all events pardoned,

or at least condoned. When we speak of Life itself, we know that we speak of a great mystery. We seem to have stepped unbidden upon holy ground. Ignorance beclouds our thoughts, traditional beliefs disturb our minds, and ineradicable preconceptions interfere with our endeavours to ratiocinate. We confess our ignorance, we admit our failure, we seek refuge in "intuition," or we are lost in wonderment. Yet now and then we take our courage in both hands, lay aside our comfortable intuitions, endeavour to face the facts, acknowledge our difficulties, and open to review and criticism our half-formulated creeds.

If these things are to be discussed at all, let me at least attempt to narrow the great issue. Dr. Haldane sets out to prove that, for the three several sciences, or disciplines, of physics, biology and psychology, the general conceptions with which we should approach them, the categories by which it behoves us to interpret them, are essentially different, incompatible, irreconcilable, irreducible. At once and willingly, I grant the point as regards psychology. That matter and mind are incommensurables seems to my judgment so obvious that it needs no argument and risks no serious denial. It involves, doubtless, an uncomfortable dualism, an awkward breach in the continuity of our thinking. I must leave it at that; and be content to state rather than to defend my dualistic attitude. Biology, then, for the present, I take to mean the study of the forms, whether gross or molecular, assumed by matter in the fabric of living things, and all the changes, processes, activities associated therewith, so far (and it seems to me a long, long way) as we can study them apart from consciousness, or "conscious reactions." I am not without some lurking fear that I may here be charged with a *petitio principii*. Professor Ward has told us (for instance) that "if we begin from the material side we must keep to this side all through; if Matter is to explain Life at all, it must explain all life." And the converse

is also maintained by many; that if a psychical element be admitted in Life at all, it must be admitted in all life; if by means of it we interpret the behaviour of some living things, so must we explain them all; if some actions of living things, then all actions; in short that, apart from psychology, there is no biology at all.* Howsoever this may be, in the meanwhile Dr. Haldane spares me the trouble of deciding. I am applying myself to his brief; and he discriminates very explicitly between the psychological and "biological" categories, declaring that "the reaction between a conscious organism and its environment is wholly different from the immediacy of what we interpret as physical, or [even as] physiological reaction."

In another very important way Dr. Haldane himself narrows our issue, by setting wholly aside that "intermediate theory" of "vitalism" which lies (as he says) between the physical or mechanistic interpretation and what he designates, κατ' ἐξοχήν, as the "biological theory." That is to say, he will have no dealings with any of those who "accept as true, so far as it goes, the physical and chemical interpretation of the phenomena connected with living organisms, but maintain that in living organisms we must in addition assume the existence of something quite distinct, which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions."† Such views seem, in Dr. Haldane's judgment, to be neither fish, fowl, nor good red herring. "Vitalism," he says "represents no clearly definable working hypothesis, and for this reason I do not propose to consider it further." I am not sure that I understand him. But I take him to mean that vitalism is but a perverted mechanism,

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* So, for instance, Dr. James Ward says, in *Heredity and Memory*, "We find then no ground for separating organic life from psychical life; for us all life is experience, etc."

† I fear that Dr. Hobhouse is introducing something quite indistinguishable from the ordinary hypothesis of vitalism as, described above, when he speaks of a living being as a "psychophysical whole" containing elements—"forces if you will"—which hold its parts together and correlate their action.

a theory which would still explain the whole in terms of its parts, and which merely superadds to the known (and seemingly inadequate) parts of the mechanism a new, nondescript kind of part, to wit, entelechy. At all events from our immediate discussion the hypotheses of the vitalists are withheld, and they trouble us no more.

I take it that all this clears away many things from our immediate field of debate; among other things, that it sets aside that subconscious or unconscious memory, that "Mneme," to which Hering introduced us some 50 years ago, which Samuel Butler has so subtly analysed, and which Dr. Ward has of late so warmly championed. I part with it with regret; almost the first little paper I ever wrote—I wrote it well-nigh forty years ago, when I was a Cambridge undergraduate—was an attempt to expound and to advocate that fascinating but (as I think now) that elusive and slippery doctrine.

There is still a lion in our path, and it is a formidable one; for it is nothing less than the great metaphysical concept of Reality. This lion, however, is chained. For Dr. Haldane, at the very outset of his paper, tells us that "we must carefully distinguish between the conceptions, or, as I should prefer to say, working hypotheses, which we commonly use in interpreting reality, and that reality itself." And then he immediately assures us that this "discussion applies to our working hypotheses or categories." Reality, it is true, appears again, and yet again, in Dr. Haldane's paper; and now and then we begin to be afraid of it, and once at least it seems to "straddle quite across the whole breadth of the way." Dr. Haldane makes much of the fact that, "like pure mathematics," mechanical physics "tells us only a very little about reality, and in only a very imperfect form." (I might demur, and demur strongly, to the inclusion of pure mathematics, but let that pass.) He denounces the "tacit assumption that in mechanical physics we reach a definition of the ultimate reality of which the visible

world consists"; he shows that the definition is insufficient; he then, this being so, has no difficulty in maintaining that the same insufficiency extends also to chemistry and to biology. I do not question it. I accept the metaphysical position. I have no quarrel with metaphysics: I have no wish in the world to contend that the great concept of ultimate Reality is but a toothless lion, or, worse still, a chimæra with a lion's head. *But*, it belongs to the metaphysicians, and in our present argument it is chained. We are to deal with working concepts, or working hypotheses or categories, with the interpretation of "phenomena," and not with ultimate reality. It is here, precisely on this narrow ground, that we have to consider whether or no the same working hypotheses or categories will avail us both in physical and in biological science, and all metaphysical speculation is out of bounds.

And yet, after all, we must not too hastily exclude Reality from our scope, as we have dismissed vitalism; for our lion is brought upon the stage, he has a speaking part in the play, and "let not him that plays the lion pare his nails, for they shall hang out for the lion's claws." The concept of Reality is not something wholly outside of our phenomena, but they themselves are part, though it may be a small part, of it; and all our group of sciences, physical, chemical, and biological, strive to interpret those "bits of reality" which are within their reach and appropriate to their categories. Pure physics, essentially quantitative, deals with such concepts, or such aspects of matter, as extension and mass; chemistry, essentially qualitative, deals with matter analysed and distinguished according to its kind. Chemistry, therefore, makes a nearer approach to, or seems to give a somewhat closer insight into, reality than physics does; they are successive approximations to reality. The physical hypotheses are intended to deal with very general characters of reality, and they have the abstract form and character appropriate to that purpose. Chemical hypotheses and certain of those of applied physics apply to things, to

kinds of matter or forms of energy and modes of force, which are regarded as specific ; and, hence, they are necessarily less abstract and less general, more direct and more specific.

It is obvious that biology, when we include under it *all* the phenomena attendant upon or associated with life, goes further still. But our particular question is, whether biology regarded under certain definite limitations, to wit, a biology apart from the manifestations of consciousness, need necessarily involve a higher range of categories, incommensurate with mechanism. And so, while metaphysical speculation is undoubtedly out of bounds for the time being, I am prepared to agree that in a fuller treatment of the theme the nature of reality *might* be found to be at the bottom of the whole case ; and especially if it be conceded that reality is a something which can be dealt with piece-meal, and whose "pieces" or several aspects can be analysed into *grades*.

But now let me come at last to discuss, with all possible brevity, Dr. Haldane's attitude to the "mechanistic hypothesis." He gives us, by the way, so slight an inkling for the moment of his own "biological hypothesis," that I find little to say about it in the way of Yea or Nay. The main question is, Is it required at all ?

To begin with, I am inclined to demur to Dr. Haldane's *general* treatment of the "mechanistic theory." He talks about the "easy-going mechanistic explanations, which became current during the latter half of last century." There may be some ground here and there for the aspersion ; but the phrase sounds to me prejudicial. Rough and ready indeed seem to us the first mechanistic theories of Descartes ; but even they were not "easy-going. Generations of "mechanistic" physiologists have tried, by no easy road, to use, as Dr. Haldane himself has done, every stepping-stone that advancing physics and advancing chemistry supply towards an elucidation of the bodily mechanism. Where is it, precisely, that they have failed ? And

where is it (I do not know) that an alternative method has yet succeeded better? Upon my word, Dr. Haldane gives us no clear and sharp answer to either question. He tells us, on the one hand, that it is natural to seek for "a mechanical explanation of the contraction of muscle, and though definite progress in this direction has hitherto been limited, I feel confident that we are on the eve of such progress." "Good," one is apt to say, "he is evidently sound in his appreciation of the efforts of the orthodox physiologist." Yet, on the next page one reads, "on the whole, there is no evidence of real progress towards a mechanistic explanation of life." It may be that the apparent contradiction is removed by the last two little words, and that Dr. Haldane would welcome a mechanistic explanation of isolated phenomena, though he does not recognise, or countenance, or even anticipate, its possible extension to the whole. But we have already seen that we have nothing to do with "the whole," for not only the great metaphysical concepts but also the great problems of psychology are ruled out; and, surely, the contraction of a muscle is a fair sample of the unconscious and non-psychological problems of physiology.

If we can progress, and progress continually, in our biological studies towards a physico-chemical explanation of such phenomena, can we reasonably say that the categories of these physical sciences are alien to or irreducible with our own? And as for "easy-going explanations," I venture to think that the "easy-going" attitude is on the part of those who, when they come to a perplexing and entangled problem, one (for instance) where chemistry and physics are manifestly concerned, and when their knowledge of these subjects does not suffice to solve it, would too readily abandon the ship, and pray to the *deus ex machina* of a new philosophy.

And lastly, for that matter, the phrase would seem to suggest that the physicist himself deals with "easy-going mechanical explanations." Now, not only do I think that this is not the case, but it seems to me that a study of some

of the commonest and homeliest of natural phenomena would teach us that it is by no means so. In many cases the mechanism involved is yet unknown; in others it has been only recently elucidated; in all it is and has been the subject of anxious care and hard thinking. The formation of dew, of mist and fog, of rain itself, are all instances which come quickly to my mind, and satisfy me in my contention that easy-going mechanical hypotheses will never do, will never last long, but give place in due time to infinitely more refined explanations, without, however, ever leaving the old level of concepts, the established class of physical categories.

Dr. Haldane's chief illustration is drawn from the phenomena of respiration, a part of physiology where he is peculiarly at home. He tells us that here, for instance, we have a series of phenomena quite insusceptible of the simple mechanical explanations which were formerly given of them. I do not wonder: the same is true, word for word, of a multitude of phenomena in ordinary physics and ordinary chemistry; is not "solution," for instance, a very different thing to the modern chemist from what it was much less than fifty years ago? Fifty years ago many physiological processes which, from a physical and chemical standpoint, are now seen to be extremely complex and even obscure, were regarded as quite simple. Again, word for word, this is true of chemistry and of physics; for instance, the whole of modern physical chemistry goes to show how inadequate were the loose non-mathematical ideas of a previous generation of chemists.

Dr. Haldane's crucial instance (or that which I take to be so) lies in the phenomenon of "regulation," whereby the passage of oxygen through the living membrane of the lung is increased when the needs of the organism become greater; "wherever there is need for an extra supply of oxygen, as for instance, during muscular exertion, the membrane assumes an active *rôle*, and pushes oxygen inwards without regard to the mechanical laws of diffusion." I am shy of entertaining, and

shyer still of expressing, a doubt regarding Dr. Haldane's physiology. But I do venture to think that, in our admittedly incomplete knowledge of the phenomenon, this statement seems a trifle too specific. More oxygen undoubtedly goes through, but are we certain that it is pushed through, rather than pulled? And in any case, if it be pushed to the one side, it must surely be first pulled from the other. I fail to see that we are here transcending the powers of mechanism. Many a machine is constructed to oil itself the more copiously when it works the faster, and the printing-press, as we urge it to put out more newspapers on the one side, pulls in more blank paper on the other. These illustrations are crude, admittedly, as are all instances drawn from machines constructed by the hands and designed by the mind of man. But in nature herself, if we look at her larger handiwork, self-regulation and self-maintenance become paramount attributes and characteristics of her machines. The solar system, *qua* mechanism, is the perfect specimen, the very type and norm, of a self-maintaining, self-regulating mechanism; and so also, grade after grade, are its dependent mechanisms, such as the world-wide currents of the atmosphere and of the sea.

Let me try to choose with greater care a case which shall illustrate the temporary inadequacy of a mechanical explanation, and the successful mastery of the problem by the elaboration of new hypotheses, or the discovery of new "laws."

The phenomenon of "sedimentation," by which sand and mud settle to the bottom of the sea, is at first sight one of the simplest of mechanical phenomena. The particles gravitate to the bottom, by virtue of their greater density; while doing so and after doing so they are disturbed by currents and other motions of the fluid; the small and light ones are carried on, the large and heavy are left behind; the finest particles settle down at last in the calm centre of an eddy or at the termination

of the stream. It is by dint of this explanation, so far as it goes, that we may map out roughly the currents of a shallow sea by charting the distribution of the muds, sands and gravels on its floor. But it is found that this is by no means the whole story, and that it fails in the light of a closer study of the experimental facts. It is a "working hypothesis" which, by itself, will not do. And now Dr. Joly has shown that the phenomenon is far more complex than we had thought: that it is qualitative as well as quantitative; that chemistry is involved; that complicated surface-actions have to be considered, and that ionisation enters the field. Apart from ordinary chemical action, decomposition or disintegration of any kind, the little particles will be influenced in their fall by the "valency" of the chemical salts dissolved in the surrounding fluid; and they will fall at very different rates in solutions of equal density, but of different kinds. And the new hypotheses are, for the present at least, adequate to the case: they bring our experiments into harmony, and enable us to foresee their results. It is just another illustration of the fact that science not only "flows," like everything else, but flows in *waves*. A subject is obscure to-day, when we know little of it; it is easy to-morrow, when we have learned more: but we have only to wait awhile and learn yet more, and we feel ignorant again.

I lay stress upon this illustration. I think it safe and fair to assert that it is very much on all fours with Dr. Haldane's case. A certain physical explanation of a physical phenomenon is found to be inadequate; a mechanical explanation, simple and for a long while acceptable to all, is no longer satisfying. But a wise man finds a certain key at his girdle, a new key of the old bunch, and unlocks the gate, and pursues his journey. I draw the simple lesson that, when a closed gate confronts us in our way, we had better wait and search for a key, and that we should be very loath indeed to forsake the pathway for the open fields.

But a very curious thing to me is that, while Dr. Haldane shows so great a readiness to break away from the old road, to abandon the old working hypotheses, and to devise new categories for the biologist, yet at times he seems to say precisely what I would have him say, and to accept just the lesson, or at least a part of the lesson, which I think the foregoing illustration is fitted to teach. For, on p. 25, he says that, when Faraday pointed out the existence of ions in solutions, he made a discovery which has gradually exercised a more and more widespread influence on scientific and practical activity, and has at the same time given a new significance to previous discoveries. Precisely so; and who is he that should set bounds to such an influence, or who should despair of other such discoveries? They give, indeed, a new significance to our old knowledge, but they do not depart one bit from the old pathway; they refine and improve the old categories; they create new ones perhaps, but these new ones are of the same nature and are commensurate with the old; the *general* and fundamental working hypothesis is unchanged, save that it is better spelled, and is somehow found to be more convincing and satisfactory than before.

Dr. Haldane lays stress upon several points which he asserts to stand in open contradiction to our concept of a mechanism. He says, for instance, that "a living organism differs in this respect from any mechanism which we can construct or conceive, that it forms itself, and keeps itself in working order and activity." We might, I think, show not un-usefully that many a machine improves, up to a certain point, as it goes along. The ship finds herself, as Kipling says. My typewriter works more easily and writes better than when it was brand-new; bearings work easier, springs are slightly and advantageously relaxed, the thing is decidedly in better "working order." A spade sharpens itself as we dig with it, as "iron sharpeneth iron." All this is very true "up to a certain point," and surely of the body the same restriction

holds. It is, alas, not true at all that the body "keeps itself in working order and activity." I am old enough to be assured of the contrary. Like all other machines, the bodily machine grows old, and wears out, and works itself done.

Again, Dr. Haldane tells us (for example) that "the existence of a self-producing or self-maintaining mechanism" is something to which no meaning can be attached, for the idea of "a mechanism which is constantly maintaining or reproducing its own structure is self-contradictory," and this is all expanded into the assertion that "a mechanism which reproduced itself would be a machine without parts, and therefore not a mechanism"; and, again, that "in each detail of organic structure, composition, environment and activity there is an expression of the life of the organism regarded as a whole which tends to persist." The parent organism is, indeed, "reproduced from a mere tiny speck of its own body," but that tiny speck does not stand alone, to live of itself, to work out its own destiny, and to make or to *maintain itself*. When the parent tissues have ceased to nourish it, it is not left alone. All the forces of nature impinge and react upon it; together they nourish it; they mould and conform it; the sun shines upon it; the air bathes it; it is a mechanism, but only part of a greater mechanism, and the mechanism of which it is a portion is the world.

The fact is, that the whole argument, as Dr. Haldane puts it, together with a few of the other points by which he strives to show the inadequacy of mechanical explanations, is not a very novel one; I seem to have read the same thing, or just the same sort of thing, in Driesch, and in Bergson too, and in the books of many other of those who shrink from mechanism, and introduce those very concepts of vitalism, those more or less shadowy entelechies, which Dr. Haldane for his part rejects and repudiates. The alleged phenomena of self-production, self-maintenance, and self-regulation are the common currency of those who, finding the mechanistic theory

difficult and unsatisfactory, are content to postulate a something "which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions."

After specifying many important points wherein the growth of the organism is comparable to that of a crystal, Dr. Haldane tells us that "where the resemblance fails is that the arrangement of the molecules of the crystal is mere repetition, whereas in the organism there is individual variety of detail, and yet perfectly definite and specific unity of plan." Let me take another illustration, crude perhaps, but not cruder than that of the crystal. Imagine a bowl of soap-suds, into which you blow. The simple mechanism consists, apparently, of a bowl of water and a stream of air; in truth it is more complicated than that, but it is exquisitely simple after all. But whether or no, in a few moments it develops into a very wonderful thing—a mass of froth, a shapely heap of very beautiful bubbles. The resultant whole is a very elaborate and a very perfect thing; and in no single bubble of it all is there a single free surface, or point or line or surface of contact, which is not absolutely definite, and (what is more) which our present knowledge cannot satisfactorily explain. There is "perfectly definite and specific unity of plan." Moreover, there is almost infinite "individual variety of detail"; for no two bubbles are precisely the same, and repeat the experiment, and no single bubble in the first corresponds individually to a single bubble in the second. Pour a little of the water into another dish, and the whole complex structure will reproduce itself—or rather it can be made to reproduce itself. For again we must blow; the forces are not inherent in the soapy water (any more than the forces of growth and reproduction are all inherent in the protoplasm); the system is a larger system—it is a portion of the world.

Let me say before I leave Dr. Haldane's paper, and say in perfectly frank and candid words, that I find him difficult to

understand, and that for this I am not inclined to shoulder all the blame. I find it hard to reach a clear definition of all his terms, and hard even, in some cases, to follow the thread of his argument. I shall be disappointed, but I shall not be wholly surprised, if he tell me that I have failed to follow him and that he and I are talking about different things. Let me try once more to reach his standpoint, and, if possible, to meet his argument.

One of my chief difficulties arises, I think, from the fact that, on the one hand, Dr. Haldane talks of a distinction between "physical" and "biological" categories, as though this were, by the nature of things, the one place in which to look for a sharp distinction. One is hereby invited, to all appearance, to interpret "physical" by physico-chemical or even "inorganic" science, and to draw our one and only essential contrast (in this portion of our subject) between the study of the living and the study of the dead. But, on the other hand, Dr. Haldane recurs again and again to the special department of chemistry, he draws some of his chief illustrations from it, and it is plain that he recognises to the full the undoubted fact that its categories include much more than is contained in the working hypotheses of ordinary physics. In short, there is a gap between the categories of physics and of chemistry, whatever there may be or may not be between these sciences and biology. Yet, while there is a categorical difference between our present-day physics and chemistry, it may be admitted that this difference is not of the first order of magnitude; it is even a possible and a plausible anticipation to look forward to a day when this breach of categories may be removed, for not a little has already been done to narrow it. At present, the "working hypotheses" of chemistry and physics are manifestly different, and "for practical purposes" they will always, in all probability, remain so. Were, however, the transmutation of the well-known elements to become an accomplished experimental fact, were we to succeed at last in reducing the qualitative

differences of chemistry to differences in the number and arrangement of qualitatively similar elements (such as electrons), and to find them obeying a single set of rules, then the distinction would have disappeared, and we should have in truth reduced the categories of chemistry to the "simpler categories" of physics. Dr. Haldane must be fully awake to the possibility; I take it, therefore, that he does recognise the narrowness of the gulf between these two sciences, and that it is a much wider gulf which he sees between them both and the science of organisms—even of the "non-conscious" organism. Still, he does not tell us as clearly as one would like how he recognises it, or of what nature he believes it to be.

Nor does Dr. Haldane define what he really means by the "working hypotheses or categories of biology," and I remain in some doubt as to what they precisely are. That they are very ill-defined in general is pretty obvious to me; and it is precisely to Dr. Haldane, and it is just for the purposes of such a discussion as this, that we might look for a new and clear expression of them. For the "ordinary naturalist," the ordinary student of beast and bird, specific difference, if not all in all, is the cardinal concept; for all he cares, for all he sometimes knows, the tissue and the cell are concepts which might never have been devised. The comparative anatomist or the morphologist deals with larger units, and cares little about the difference between a blackbird and a thrush, a robin and a wren. The physiologist deals with still larger groups; the cell and the tissue are his especial themes, and most (though of course not all) of the lessons which he learns are lessons common to and taught by the study of a very few "types," such as man, the rabbit, and the frog. The working hypotheses of (say) the ornithologist are certainly not mechanical, they are very largely teleological; the ordinary working hypotheses of the physiologist are, in the great majority of cases, distinctly mechanical, and include and practically coincide with those of the physicist and the chemist.

And here we may at least note in passing that there is one common concept or working hypothesis of the biologist, which occupies a very peculiar position; it is the working hypothesis of heredity, regarded as a definite impulse, or "force," leading to hereditary transmission. It is an everyday statement of the morphologist that this or that structure, often apparently functionless, is "due to heredity"; it is prefigured as a kind of "Mneme"; it is (commonly at least) a purely vitalistic hypothesis. I for my part look forward, in faith and hope, to the ultimate reduction of the phenomena of heredity to much simpler categories, to explanations based on mechanical lines, and on the peculiar and strict limitations which physical and mathematical laws set to what are at first sight the endless and unlimited possibilities of variation. Yet this is but an opinion, and it may be maintained by others that heredity is an independent concept, *sui generis*, indispensable to the biologist; that it is a phenomenon, or group of phenomena, within a category all its own; and that the special science which deals with it has at least found, in Mendel, its Kepler, and only waits for its Newton.

I take it that it is in the main of biology as it is considered, or as it ought to be regarded, by the physiologist that Dr. Haldane speaks, not forgetting those formal, or morphological, or histological, and of course also embryological, problems of the tissues and of the cell with which the physiologist's work is interconnected. It must be largely for his own use and guidance as a physiologist that Dr. Haldane seeks for a definition of the biological category or categories, and it is from his own experience as a physiologist that he maintains them to be irreducible to the physical. I hope to learn from this discussion, but I do not yet easily or fully comprehend, precisely where he stands.

I can understand clearly enough a cardinal distinction between the categories of teleology and of mechanical causation;

though even here there are not lacking certain risks of confusion, as in the case, for instance, of the man-made machine. But I do not think somehow that this cardinal distinction, between a final and an efficient cause, is what Dr. Haldane asserts to lie between the phenomena of the living and of the dead; it would be so easy to say so if it were![*] Moreover, in one or two places, Dr. Haldane seems actually to reject it, as, for instance, where he not only denies that the phenomena of the reproducing germ are such "as if it were realising a conscious plan of the fully developed organism,"—a theory which, by the way, or something extremely like it, certain embryologists have actually upheld,—but, on the contrary, tells us that "embryological investigation indicates that each step in development is the outcome of the conditions existing at the moment." Here surely is the "efficient cause," and the description looks very like a "mechanical" one to me.

I am led, then, to suppose that Dr. Haldane demands for the living organism, or for "living matter," some difference, as compared with dead matter, which endows it with wholly novel properties and capacities, now limited by, but anon transcending, the physical conditions, and conferring peculiar potentialities, such as those of self-regulation and the rest. If this be so, new categories are indeed required; but in what sense, or why, are we to look upon them as permanently and necessarily irreducible to those of physical science? If they be irreducible, they are (for the time being) mysteries;[†] our current theories and explanations crumble and vanish

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* Dr. Hobhouse faces this cardinal distinction, boldly raises an hypothesis upon it, and expresses the same in the plainest of words. "We now suggest," he says, "that the organic system is in a general sense purposive, *i.e.*, at least conational, becoming purposive in its higher removes. The purposive and the mechanical, on the other hand, remain fundamentally distinct categories."

† And mysteries they emphatically would be, if attached to or intrinsic in them were the least tinge of conation, such as Dr. Hobhouse suggests.

away: and we need another Archimedes, another Galileo, another Newton, to discover the elementary laws, and to write the *Principia*, of biology.

But even were these new categories necessary in the present, in order to avoid confusion and error and to amend our *rationes cogitandi*, it would still have to be proved that they were something more than a mere present help, and that they were for ever irreducible to the categories of physics. And such categories may not be "mechanical" in the ordinary sense, but may yet be mechanical in an extended sense. For mechanism is not a stationary concept but a growing one. What it meant to Aristotle is not what it means to us. Chemistry has opened our eyes, and electricity (for instance) has strained them to keep the nature and significance of a "mechanism" in view.

And that Dr. Haldane recognises a "continuum" in the grades of mechanism, a succession of advancing categories, is indicated to my mind by a certain paragraph which at first sight perplexed me mightily. On page 18 he says, "From no elementary mechanical principles can we deduce the behaviour of even the molecule of water in crystallisation; and similarly, from no elementary physical or chemical principles can we deduce the behaviour of the organism. It is owing to this empirical fact that the ordinary working hypotheses of physics and chemistry are irreconcilable with those of biology."

I do not quite follow the statement about the behaviour of the molecule in crystallisation. I should have thought that the labours of the mathematical crystallographers, all they have taught us about the partitioning of space, the methods of close-packing, the large but strictly limited range of possible crystalline forms, etc., all the labours, in short, of Kelvin, Fedorow, Schoenfliess, Tutton, the Braggs and others, had vastly increased our knowledge, and helped our deductions, as to the behaviour of the molecule of water in crystallisation. Whether or no,

it is certainly more than a matter of *elementary* mechanics, but it is reconcilable with the most general and fundamental principles which the physicist and the mathematician lay down. Can it be that Dr. Haldane is here only emphasising the poverty of our *elementary* mechanical principles, and of the *ordinary* working hypotheses of physics and chemistry, and again of the ordinary working hypotheses of biology? If this be so, then, in this particular, he and I are not far apart. There is a principle of "economy," doubtless, in science, as I am told there is even in theology; there are exoteric and esoteric doctrines even in the concrete sciences, there are categories sometimes to be considered and sometimes silently passed by—as every teacher of elementary students knows. The simpler setting consists of those "schematised conceptions" of which Dr. Haldane speaks, and which are "practically sufficient for a large number of purposes." But behind these lie many more recondite concepts and hypotheses; and on these the working chemist or physicist knows that he can draw at need, without fear or risk of outstepping the fundamental categories of physical science.

And now to summarise my own position, so far as in a few words I can.

I believe that the material body of a living thing (apart from consciousness) is a mechanism. I see no other way of investigating in detail its material structure, its form and its activities. I know no way of studying its material aspect otherwise than by the help of physical and chemical methods, and of the mathematical laws on which these sciences rest in their turn. I set out provided with the physical concepts of matter and of energy, and the mathematical concept of force. I know that change of form in a concrete material body involves the movements of matter, and that the movements of matter are to be symbolically ascribed to the action of force, and actually to the transference of energy. The body consists

of matter: it is set in a material world; it has its store of energy within, it has its share in the great store of energy without. It is a part of a physical system: I study it, as well as its environment, according to the working hypotheses, or categories, of physical science, with all my might and without either hesitation or fear. It is its physical or material phenomena, admittedly, that I am studying. What more, outside of psychology and outside of metaphysics, can I do?

There is one thing more that strengthens in a high degree my belief in the applicability of physical methods to the organism and in the community of principles in the two classes of machines. And that is the simple but most instructive fact that, while the biologist has been trying to learn of the physicist, the physicist has also found his own science vastly enriched through the labours of the physiologist and by a study of the phenomena of the living body. That identical phenomenon of osmosis, which Dr. Haldane finds so difficult to understand as it is exemplified in the human body, was actually introduced (under its modern aspect) to the physicist by a botanist, who drew the lesson from his plants. And no small number of corollaries, experimental and theoretical, to Pfeffer's original discoveries have found their way into the sciences of physics and chemistry from the same biological starting-point. Furthermore, we all know that one at least of the great men for whom is claimed the first enunciation of the principle of the conservation of energy was a physiologist, who had learned his physics from the study of the physiological machine; and I am inclined to think that to that great physiological physicist the judgment of history is more and more freely ascribing the credit of this epoch-making discovery. I think the fact of the obvious benefit to both sides of the interchange of ideas, this reaction and interaction between mechanical physiology and ordinary physics, one with another, goes far to convince us that the processes are fundamentally identical, and that the

mechanical hypothesis is not applied to the organism falsely or in vain.

Again, choosing rather the morphological side than the physiological side of the common field of biology, I would illustrate my own position by such few facts as these: When I regard the minute and simple organisms, whether unicellular or multicellular, I see among their multitudinous forms a large number which are easily described and classified in physical terms. They consist, for the most part, of tiny spheres, of tiny cylinders, and these latter are capped by portions of tiny spheres; others again are, so to speak, wavy or beaded cylinders—we call them "unduloids,"—and others, closely related to these, are shortened unduloids with spherical bases, exactly like the Florence flask that a glass-blower so easily blows. In short, every one of these figures is most easily reproduced by the glass-blower, and for the simple reason that, like his molten glass, they have assumed the known and well-understood configurations of a fluid film, or fluid surface, according to the simple mathematical conception of "surfaces of minimal area," under this or that simple condition of restraint. The words which describe, or the so-called "laws which govern," a soap-bubble describe and "govern" them. Precisely analogous principles evidently extend, the general law of surfaces of minimal area evidently applies, to other less simple but equally minute organic configurations, including spirals or helicoids of various kinds. Without the mathematical or physical concept I am lost or mystified in considering them, and in classifying this mazy congeries of forms; by the help of it, my observations are co-ordinated and my facts "explained." And, mark you, this "explanation" is not a mere matter of nomenclature, a mere symbolic terminology, or juggling with words. It presupposes a definite acquaintance with somewhat abstruse laws of statics, and the definite assertion that the precise conditions under which the results and consequences of

these laws are displayed are common to the living and to the dead. And if it be only in the minuter living things and minute parts of living things that they are openly displayed, a simple and adequate reason is at hand. For it is only in them, by reason of their little mass and relatively extensive surface, that the force of gravity is overwhelmed by the molecular forces immediately concerned. If there be a few such forms, and they are very few indeed, to which the same principles do not obviously apply, I wait in patient expectancy for more light, but I do not hurry to exchange my old lantern for a new.

Let us take a little multicellular organism, and let us by no means be ashamed to choose a simple one; for it is an essential part of the method of physical science, and of mathematics itself, to deal with simple, even simplified, cases, and thereby to avoid a confusion of issues, a conflict of causes. How does the first cell divide? In what way, or under what sort of configurations, do its products of division divide again? Generations of microscopists have depicted and described the configurations of the subdividing cell without ever dreaming that they were aught else than a specific biological phenomenon. But Berthold and Errera and others have shown, or helped to show, that they are, point for point, line for line, and surface for surface, capable of interpretation by the same mathematico-physical principles—that they are neither more nor less than exquisite illustrations of fluid surfaces in complete or partial equilibrium. I can take an imaginary discoidal mass of liquid, represented by a circle, and inquire on purely mathematical principles how, were it to divide into drops or fragments and the fragments to remain in contact, the partitions between them, the cell-walls, would be arranged, and in what order of succession they would appear. The question is not a very easy one; it involves no little calculation, and the result is more complicated than one might perhaps expect. Yet it is a literal fact that, when we have sought and found a little organism of just such a simple,

flattened, discoid form, and when we have watched its first little cell divide and divide again, the resultant configuration, complicated as it is, and the successive stages in their orderly succession as they severally appear, agree in every essential particular with the scheme which our physico-mathematical principles had enabled us to foretell.

Dr. Haldane has referred you to a book of his; may I say that I have written a book too? And in it, from beginning to end, I have sought to show that the phenomena of Growth and of Form in organisms are phenomena to which the working hypotheses, or categories, of physico-mathematical science strictly, and even adequately, apply. They are not the same physico-mathematical laws, by any means, that apply to and explain the crystal. But the difference between them is not a difference between physics and biology, between the living and the dead; it is merely the simpler difference, or series of differences, between the solid crystal and the drop of water, between the symmetry of a solid and the symmetry of a liquid drop or liquid film, between the condition of equilibrium (or minimum potential energy) in a growing system whose particles, as in the fluid drop, are mobile, and one whose particles, as in the growing crystal, fall one after another, and once for all, into their places, and are free to move no more. That is, in itself, a very important difference; it leads by simple steps to many very important results; it reminds us of several important things—among others that "this too, too solid flesh" of ours is not a solid at all, and that (apart from our teeth and our bones) even the contours of our own bodies are not those of solid bodies, but of elastic membranes or fluid films.*

The material structure of our bodies, like those of all other organisms, is styled a fabric, and is regarded by many or most

* In short, the analogy of the crystal is essentially illegitimate, and that of the froth is legitimate.

students of biology as a mechanism. One may be, I hold, a consistent "mechanist" without being by any means a "mere materialist." I am neither afraid nor ashamed to uphold (to the great length that I have gone) a mechanical theory of the organism and its activities, or rather of its reactions with the outer world. I do not admit that in doing so we degrade our conceptions, or belittle our notions, of the organism. The mechanical concept is no base one at all. The earth itself and the sea, the earth with her slowly changing face, and the sea multitudinous with all its tides and currents and great and little waves, constitute a mechanism; the heavens themselves, the sun and moon and all the little stars, are a glorious mechanism. The whole material aspect of the universe is a mechanism; we know not how it has its being, but we know that it lives and moves obedient to everlasting laws; and the same *Benedicite Dominum* is addressed to the Showers and Dew and to the Winds of God as to all that move in the waters and all that move in the air, and to all Beasts and Cattle, and unto the Children of Men.

Yet a word, ere I am done, about the teleological side of our phenomena, or about our interpretation thereof. I am no friend to that aspect of teleology which professes (or presumes) to find an end or purpose in this structure, this action, or in that. It is but a petty "teleology," a poor philosophy, an unsafe attempt on the part of science, to seek to find a "final cause" in every isolated detail—in the shape of a leaf or the coloration of an egg-shell.

But with this subject, and especially with some of the grosser exaggerations to which the method has led, I have dealt sufficiently in my book. As a heuristic method, that of the final cause was much in vogue in physics in the days of Euler and of Maupertuis, and in the hands even of Leibniz himself; it has been abandoned by the physicists long ago. I do not think it is to be commended in biology, and the old

Baconian arguments are, to my mind, its proper condemnation still. It gives too often the easy answer to those who are only seeking after a sign. It is full of traps set for the unwary and baited for the credulous. It attracts us to the particular case, and blinds us to the general. It "angers me," like Hotspur, and I would argue with it (if I could) as Hotspur with Owen Glendower.

Yet there is a higher and broader teleology, which is a vastly different thing. It is involved in our faith that the world itself is good, and that for good and not evil do the parts of its vast machinery act and interact among themselves, in ways of which we have often little understanding, and in things that we see as through a glass darkly—if at all. If we get one little glimpse of it better than another, I think it is again through mathematics. For there is a profound and lasting lesson (I have quoted it before) in what Colin Maclaurin said, after studying the cell of the bee, that "whatsoever is most beautiful and regular is also found to be most useful and excellent." At least let us recognise, if we venture to apply ourselves to the teleological argument at all, that teleology never stands alone, but that the final and the efficient causes are combined, or to be construed, together. It is difficult to serve two masters, but it is also difficult in this case to understand that the Master is One. There is a certain castle among the famous castles of Touraine, and in it a great artist fashioned a staircase—a marvel, a very jewel of a stair. Round the central newel of the staircase wind side by side two separate stairs; the climber by the one stair sees nothing of those who pass or cross him on the other; there is no passage-way between—*until you come out at the top.* So is it, I suppose, with the teleological and the mechanical categories; and my path lies by way of these last. I know that there is another ladder towards reality, but I am contented with my own. I have been told that Galileo and Newton were at the building of it; and I am heartened by the sight of great names scribbled on the wall.

But last, and last of all, let me repeat again that in the concepts of matter and of energy, whether quantitative or qualitative, the Whole is not enshrined, and that mechanism is but one aspect of the world. These are the proper categories of objective science, but they are no more; the physicist is, *ipso facto*, a mechanist, but he is not by implication a materialist; nor is the biologist of necessity a materialist, even though he may study nothing but mechanism in the material fabric and the bodily activities of the organism.

It is not merely that in dust we had our first beginnings and that to dust we shall at last return. Our bodies are dust all the while, as is the grass that withers and the flower that fades; and the laws by which our bodies are governed are the laws by which earth and dust are ruled. To this same purport the greatest of the Schoolmen, the Angelic Doctor, spoke (in words which I set in the forefront of my book), telling us across seven hundred years, that, inasmuch as the material and corporeal forms of the body *non excedant virtutem et ordinem et facultatem principiorum agentium in natura, nulla videtur necessitas eorum originem in principia reducere altiora.* And so also a greater than he spoke, saying Earth to earth, and dust to dust. But there is a something that is not dust at all, though as in all things else it is found therein; something that is the Order of the Cosmos and the Beauty of the World; that lives in all things living, and dwells in the mind and soul of man; something not fulfilled in physics, which vivifies the dust and makes the dry bones live. You may call it what you please, but it is always the same. You may call it Entelechy, you may call it the Harmony of the World; you may call it the *Élan vital*, you may call it the Breath of Life. Or, you may call it, as it is called in the Story-book of Creation, and in the hearts of men,—you may call it the Spirit of God.

SYMPOSIUM: ARE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES IRREDUCIBLE?

III.—*By* P. Chalmers Mitchell.

The question set for our symposium presents one aspect of an enduring dispute. Thore have been, are, and always will be, dispositions reluctant to picture a universe unsustained by creative will. "Creative will" assumes many phases, philosophically indifferent. It may be presented as God or gods, entelechy, or vital spark, but is something beyond prediction or control, the subject of observation, not of experiment. Belief in it is an expression at once of man's humility and of man's pride; an admission of the limits of our intelligence, and a soothing exaltation of what is beyond our intelligence. There have been, are, and always will be, dispositions reluctant to picture a universe any part of which is not a possible subject of prediction, control and experiment. A part, continually increasing, of the universe has been subjected to prediction, control and experiment, and, although each accession of human power has revealed a wider horizon of the unknown, many reject the idea that the unknown is different in kind from the known.

The assumptions necessary to the logical completion of either view are enormous and familiar. The second view is plainly hopeless; inasmuch as success in the intensive or extensive investigation of any bit of nature always discovers new difficulties, always extends rather than contracts the problem, the naturalist, for so, as a matter of temporary convenience, I may call him, is a ready prey for the gibing supernaturalist. His carrot dangles from a pole fixed to his own forehead, and like the donkey in the story, however fast he may run, he never reaches his objective. But the supernaturalist is in little better case; he has a craving for the incarnation of his principle, observing it in

time and place, now in the plains of India, now in Galilee, now in the secreting epithelium of the lungs, and in due course, to the great content of the naturalist, bumps up against the evidence.

I believe that the naturalist and the supernaturalist are the exhibitors of two dispositions, and that there is as little chance of coming to a just decision between them, did an impartial judge exist, as there would be in the cases of the agorophobic eel, which, when disturbed, dashes into a drain-pipe, and the claustrophobic mackerel which dashes into the open.

The wording of the problem I am invited to discuss forms a trap for the unwary, and, indeed, might have been designed to land even so small a philosophical fish as myself, and to show how a naturalist, gasping out his life in the rare metaphysical medium, assumes the hues of the supernaturalist. Let me restate the problem in terms that are more familiar to me. It becomes threefold. Is it possible, with our present knowledge, to explain or state the observed phenomena of mind in terms of the observed phenomena of anatomy and physiology, and the observed phenomena of biology in terms of those of physics? If it be not possible at present, is the trend of science towards such a set of syntheses? Do our observations discover differences in kind justifying the assertion that the syntheses are impossible?

To the first phase of the problem an answer can be given with assurance. At present, mind cannot be interpreted or stated in terms of anatomy and physiology, nor biology in terms of physics and chemistry. Let me insist, however, on the crude fact that mind cannot be interpreted without anatomy and physiology, nor life without chemistry and physics. We can make no observations on any mind or on any mental phenomenon isolated from and independent of structure and physiological function. Even God always speaks through His prophets. Logic and imagination clarify thought, but so also do cascara and bismuth. I cannot explain the reactions of protoplasm by

the properties of solutions and the qualities of chemical elements, but I cannot observe them apart from these properties and qualities. It is a commonplace of polemics that life escapes under the scalpel, that the protoplasm which the chemist analyses is dead. True; yet not only life, but blood escapes under the scalpel, and the protoplasm in dying has changed its chemical reaction.

To the second phase of the problem, the trend of science, it is difficult to give an answer uncoloured by disposition. For the answer must be interpretation, not mere observation. Some forty years ago, the categories of science were clear-cut and glittering abstractions; in physics what Dr. Haldane calls "mechanism" reigned; in biology function was believed to depend on structure; in psychology, instinct, intelligence, and emotion were thought to be independent of one another and of structure and function. None the less, there were confident naturalists who believed that biology could be explained in terms of mechanism, and psychology in terms of a function-structure complex. And even within the limits of these categories, progress was made towards synthesis. I need recall only illustrative examples. Many organic compounds have been made in the laboratory from inorganic materials; the attempt to evade this breaking down of the barrier between organic and inorganic by the suggestion that vital action was still involved, to wit, the vital action of the chemist in the laboratory, is only silly, for water is equally inorganic whether it be found in nature or synthesised in a laboratory. Many of the observed phenomena of living protoplasm have been copied by artificial non-living preparations. The fertilisation of the egg-cell, which seemed a supreme case of the action of life upon life, has been achieved by the action of an inorganic salt on the ovum. The direct dependence of psychological differences on differences in structure has been demonstrated at least in pathological cases, and indicated in comparative anatomy.

These are notable achievements; and, if the categories of science had remained unchanged, I should claim that an advance had been made in the direction of naturalistic monism,—an advance which had given the naturalists a sure entrance into forts that supernaturalists had asserted to be impregnable. But the categories have shifted, and the advance of knowledge has opened up new vistas of the unknown. I agree with Dr. Haldane that what he calls mechanism no longer satisfies the chemist and the physicist. I will go further, and say that we have learned to see, or to think that we see, function determining structure in biology, and, perhaps, even the mind creating its own organs in psychology. Yet, I do not share his apparent triumph. If what we call matter be energy that waxes and wanes, if we have to deal with ions rather than with molecules, if the material fabric of the universe be alert rather than inert, then the categories of physics and chemistry are moving towards the categories of biology. If we have to think of function as determining structure, then our conception of the process of evolution shifts from the hard conception of the origin of adaptations by selection of chance variation, shifts from it nearer to our observation of the triumphant ascent of life. And precisely as the categories of physics and of biology have become less mechanical, they seem to me to approach, not to recede from, the categories of psychology.

In another respect I agree with Dr. Haldane's presentment of his case, but dispute the conclusion towards which he seems to proceed. I agree that organic chemistry must be observed as chemistry of an organism rather than as chemistry in an organism. The subject of observation is a living organism, its parts in relation to the whole, acting as parts of the whole, the whole dominating and determining the parts. And so, in psychology, what is being observed is this or the other mental quality of a living body, the living body in reaction with a living and a non-living environment. We can, in a sense, study the inorganic isolated from the organic; we cannot study the

organic isolated from the inorganic. We can, in a sense, study the organic isolated from psychology, but not psychology isolated from the organic and the inorganic. In such a sense the working categories of physics, biology, and psychology, are different in kind. The properties of 1, 2, and 6, may, for convenience, be studied independently, and 1 can be studied without considering 2, and 2 without considering 6, but we cannot go far with 2 unless we realise that it is two ones, or with 6 unless we realise that it is six ones. I am disposed to believe that the properties of 1 must explain those of 2 and of 6, although in the case of 6 an apparently new factor, 3, has appeared. But I do not suppose that if we had only ones we could infer twos, or only ones and twos that we could infer three and sixes.

Even within what Dr. Haldane would agree to be mechanism, an apparent difference of categories is a matter of observation. It is convenient and necessary to observe watches and motor cars as wholes, and not as compounds of wheels and levers composed of metals and oils. The machine has qualities of its own, modes of influencing its parts and being influenced by them, which no doubt depend on the properties and qualities of the parts and constituents, but which in practice cannot be inferred from them. Two machines, built by the same mechanics from standardised parts to the same specification, behave differently as wholes, get different work out of their parts, react and adjust themselves differently. In a very practical sense there is a *deus ex machina*, and His level in the celestial hierarchy is inversely as the knowledge of the observer. These are commonplaces, and yet watches and motor cars are designed on strictly mechanistic principles. The simplest living organism is more complex than the most elaborate machine, and in every detail of its structure avoids the rigidity of mechanism. Clearly, it must be studied as an organism and not as a compound of certain chemical and physical properties. But this apparent difference in categories is certainly

an empirical convenience, and far from certainly a philosophical distinction. I must suppose it to be possible that if a human mind could retain and combine all the independent variables in a motor car, he would dethrone the god from the machine, and predict the conduct of the whole from knowledge of its parts without testing it practically. Yet, we take the easy, probably the inevitable way, even in the case of machinery, and observe. In biology, and still more in psychology, the easy way is the inevitable way. Unabashed, therefore, by Dr. Haldane's facts, which I am not concerned to dispute, I follow my disposition, and declare that the trend of science is towards synthesis of the categories.

There remains the last phase of the problem. I can see no ground for the tremendous assumption that the categories of physics, biology, and psychology are irreducible, if by the phrase more is meant than that it is convenient to observe the phenomena independently, in so far as independence is possible, and that, therefore, we can go a long way in observation whilst using different working hypotheses, laws, or generalisations for the three subjects. But in my own picture of the universe, the problem as set for us has only a dubious relation to reality. By reality I mean what can be explored but not exhausted, the bottomless well of surprises, that which appears to be outside us and from which the new is always coming into us. Our categories are arranged abstractions of what has come into us, simplified and codified in our endeavour to recreate the external world. In observation of the secreting epithelium of the lung we are nearer reality than in the physiologist's description and explanation of what he has observed; and the physiologist *qua* physiologist is nearer reality than when, as metaphysician, he abstracts his physiological abstractions. Lord Morley once described the universe as a "sovereign wonder of superhuman fixedness of law." In my picture of the world, man, and not the superhuman, is the maker of laws, categories or what it may please us to call our abstractions. He achieves fixedness only

inasmuch as he departs from reality. If observation were to cease, I do not doubt but that we should come to achieve a synthesis of our categories, a logically complete and completely anthropomorphic unity. I admit that the effort towards a logical and coherent arrangement of categories is an exciting pursuit. It is, however, the manufacture and worship of a graven image, and the temple of reality is a house not built with human hands. If the real goal be to answer the question, Are matter, life and mind different aspects of the same reality? then I am more encouraged by observation than by thought. The detection of the same element in a distant star and in the fabric of the brain, the analogies between the effect of a cylinder of oxygen on a dull flame, a torpid muscle and a dying mind, lead my imagination further towards a conception of the unity of reality than the subtlest rearrangement of categories. And I have a closer vision of the realness of reality given me by the surprises of matter than by the syntheses of thoughts. Perhaps, it is as well to add that I do not forget that matter is a thought of the individual as much as is a category. Yet, there are thoughts that are of the earth earthy, and thoughts that are of categories categorical. All the wonder and the hope and the new knowledge are in the earthy thoughts; all the failure and the despair in the metaphysical thoughts.

SYMPOSIUM: ARE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES IRREDUCIBLE?

IV.—*By* L. T. HOBHOUSE.

THE living body in general, and the human body in particular, obviously acts in some respects like a mechanism, while in other respects it appears to act differently. About the differences two questions may be raised. First, taking them at their face value, are they all of one kind, reducible to one formula, or of two or more kinds, such as the organic and the teleological? Secondly, are they to be taken at their face value, or are they to be regarded as mere appearances due to some subtle complexities of mechanism not yet adequately laid bare?

To answer these questions we must seek first a definition of the mechanical, the organic, and the teleological. We must, then, look at the actual behaviour of living beings, and ask to which of these they conform.

The term mechanism seems to have established itself in philosophy as antithetic to the term teleology. It is an odd usage, since a machine is as clearly something contrived with a purpose as anything can be. But perhaps it is the contrast between the purpose which contrived the machine and the blindness with which it acts that has given the term its currency. Be that as it may, the characteristics of mechanism can be seen in a man-made machine, if we look at the details of its action, readily enough, and they are these. In a machine, though all the parts are so compacted as normally to act in relation with one another so as to produce a certain joint result, yet each several part acts uniformly without relation to the rest in response to the forces operating upon it, whatever they may be. The chain of the bicycle is pulled by the teeth

of one wheel and pulls the teeth of the other wheel. Normally, in its complete fitting, this serves to propel the bicycle, but if either wheel is in some way out of gear it makes no difference to the chain. Pull it by hand, and the pull will be propagated along its links in just the same way, and will move the wheel into which it fits in just the same way. The action of the part does not depend on the action of any other part as such, but only on the pull or push affecting it, whatever the source of that pull or push may be. Similarly, the action of the part does not depend on any result accruing from the action. Given the pull or push, the action is just the same, whether the result is the normal one of propelling the bicycle, or is simply to whirl the hind-wheel round in the air, or to create a jam and a wreck. In a mechanical whole, then, each part acts uniformly in response to a given force independently of the condition of other parts,* and independently of the results of its action.

Part of the behaviour of living beings exhibits a similar independence. A reflex action, for example, like blinking, appears to be the response of a specific structure given uniformly to a specific stimulus. The blood flows along the arteries projected by an impulse from the heart, much as it might be forced along the dead arteries by a pump. Fluids and gases are interchanged through membranes of the body as outside the body they are interchanged by osmosis. In such processes the body appears to be acting mechanically, but, as Dr. Haldane has shown, when we come to look into each process more narrowly a divergence from the mechanical model appears. The interchange of gases and liquids in the living tissue does not

* So far as the past condition of other parts has gone to determine the push or pull upon the part considered, it is of course relevant to its action, but the simultaneous or future state of other parts is not relevant, and even the past state is not essentially so, as a pull or push from any other source will have the same effect. Briefly, the action of any one part does not depend on that of other parts as such.

correspond precisely to the diffusion in inanimate tissue. The reflex may be inhibited and varied in greater or less degree, and the variations are all in one direction. They are such as to serve the requirements of the entire body as a structure maintaining itself in and through changes. Thus, *e.g.*, the respiratory system works normally like a mechanism for the supply of oxygen and the elimination of carbon dioxide. But the needs of the organism frequently vary, more oxygen being required at one time and less at another, more carbon dioxide needing elimination now and less a little later on. The respiratory system shows a delicate responsiveness to these needs. Thus, on the face of the facts, it does not act like a bit of a machine, independently of the rest, but in some correlation with the living structure as a whole.

Now, it may be that this adjustment is in reality effected by a more subtle mechanism. We can in our machines introduce contrivances, like the gyroscope, which adapt their actions to the requirement of the whole going concern. The mechanical theory of life is that all adaptations in the living body are the work of such contrivances, so that, just as there is a gross mechanism of respiration in general, so there are subtler, more cunning, mechanisms which adapt variations in respiration to varying states of the body, but all by an indirect process which preserves the independence of each several part. The arrangement, it is suggested, is such that the force operating on the part does in general vary in consonance with the organic requirement. This is planned out beforehand. But there is no method by which the requirements arising here and now act directly on the part which serves them, *i.e.*, are themselves the forces stimulating the part. Now, the existence of such mechanisms is a question of fact, but for the moment we are concerned with the definitions suggested by a certain view of the facts, and worth clearing up even if it should turn out at the end that there is nothing in nature corresponding to them. The definition suggested by the facts, then, is that in organic

activity* the parts do not act quite independently of one another, but the requirements of the whole or, perhaps, of some other part are operating influences upon each part. The definition raises questions which I will return to later, but I would look first at certain other aspects of the activity of living beings.

I want to light my pipe, and feel, mechanically as we say, in my pocket for the match box. Then I remember that in this year, called of grace, 1918, matches are scarce, and I resign myself to the use of a clumsy spill, which I twist and turn about till a light is secured. There is here a little series of actions apparently determined by the end which they subserve. The expression is difficult because the end said to determine the acts does not exist when the act is performed, but the difficulty is, I think, removed if we so far alter the phrase as to say that not the end, but its own tendency to produce the end, brings each successive act about. The various acts form parts of a whole which, as a whole, has a certain culminating result, the lighted pipe, and their causative relations to this result are the true determinants of the acts. They are initiated, dropped, maintained, varied, combined,—all in such ways as from moment to moment tend to the result. Thus, the purposive act is caused, so to say, by its own effect or, more strictly, by its tendency to produce the effect, and this causation brings each step into an organic relation with the other steps that are equally necessary to the effect. It may be said that this is not an ultimate analysis. A particular movement, *e.g.*, a twist of the spill, is made because it will bring the flame into closer contact with the tobacco, but it is made by my will as a consequence of knowledge and expectations left by antecedent experience in my mind. The movement of the spill, then, is not determined

* The definition suggested is a definition of organic activity not of an organism or organic whole, which would require a somewhat more general formula. For our purpose, however, which is to contrast distinct modes of action, the definition, which indicates an essential character of organism, will be found convenient.

by its effect, nor even that of the hand by its effect, but both by my mind, its equipment, and the present trend of its impulse. True, it is within the mind that the real purpose lies, but here in its true home the essence of purpose will be found to be just what we have described. Ideas, perceptions, efforts, are taken up, pressed, discarded, varied, brought into relation in such a way as to serve the result, so that the purpose is an organisation of elements determined by relation to the effect which it produces, and if we look to the centre of this organisation, in the case instanced a desire, we find its very nature unstateable except by an inclusion of reference to the result. It is nothing if not an impulse towards an end. The tendency to bring something about does not merely determine but rather constitutes it.

Now, purposive activities, as we know them, rest on a central impulse of this type, and, certain obscure and abnormal cases apart, involve awareness of what we are doing and anticipation of what is coming. But an intelligent observer from another planet, knowing nothing of human organisation, would, I suggest, infer logically from the behaviour of human beings that here were curiously constructed bodies determined in many of their operations by that which comes out of those operations, though by what means he might not be able to tell. His conclusion would be that there was something in those beings which secures that their actions are conditioned by their own causal tendency, and are thus differentiated fundamentally from other actions which do not vary in accordance with any results that emerge from them, but are, so to say, complete in themselves.

We have, now, three definitions before us. A whole is mechanical when and in so far as its parts act uniformly in response to the forces operating on each of them, not varying in relation to the results of their action or to the state of other parts. A whole acts organically when and in so far as the operation of any part is varied in accordance with the

requirements of the whole as a self-maintaining structure. A whole acts purposively in so far as its acts are determined by their own tendency to produce results affecting the whole.

On analysis, I think the second of these definitions will be found to resolve itself into a case either of the first or of the third. How does the "requirement" of the organism operate upon the part? It may be that the "requirement" is to be interpreted as a certain physical condition falling short of the normal (or exceeding it). *E.g.*, the blood is insufficiently oxidised. The lack of oxidation may then act as a stimulus on a certain tissue such as the respiratory centre in the medulla, exciting it to an enhanced activity which redresses the balance. This is at bottom a mechanical explanation, and if all the recuperative and regenerative processes of the body can be so explained, then they are ultimately mechanical. On the other hand, it may be that the requirement of more oxygen is itself the stimulus exerting the tissue to an effort to supply it, *i.e.*, the action of the tissue is determined by relation to its result. The difficulty in this interpretation is that it seems to make the tissue a conscious being acting with a purpose. But it is clear from a review of actions that definite purpose is the most developed species of a genus called conation. In all conation the tendency of the act towards the result is a condition, but in the lowest forms of conation this tendency is obscurely reflected in consciousness and is indirect in action. In the lowest stages it is, perhaps, no more than a felt lack or uneasiness which stimulates whatever be the characteristic activity of an organism, or an organ, to a higher pitch. If this activity begins to give relief, it is maintained till relief is fully achieved, when the need vanishes and the effort with it. If it fails the activity is, perhaps, inhibited, giving place to another, or if there is no alternative, it is increased to a maximum fruitlessly till exhaustion ensues. All these modes of response are verifiable, as Jennings has shown, among the lowest known independent organisms, and it is

conceivable that something like them, or possibly some still lower grade of conation, should be found in cells of the metazoon. I would suggest, though I must leave it to others with more knowledge to apply and test the suggestion, that so far as the operation of organic parts appears to be dominated by the requirements of the organism, the operation is either due to a subtle mechanism or to a low grade of conation. If it is such that what we call the requirement of the organism expresses itself as a force operating by push or pull on the molecules of the partial structure it is a mechanism. If it is such as to cause an uneasiness in the part, and this uneasiness sets up an activity tending to remove it and continued or varied until the removal is effected, then the system is conational.* I doubt if there is another alternative. We have seen that the purposive system is organic in that its parts are essentially related to the whole which depends upon them. I now suggest that the organic system is in a general sense purposive, *i.e.*, at least conational, becoming purposive at its higher removes. The purposive and the mechanical, on the other hand, remain fundamentally distinct categories.

Whether anything exists in correspondence with the purposive category is, of course, another, and it is a harder, question. There are real and unreal difficulties. The real difficulty is to get a definite external test of purposive determination. Machines are made by the human mind and hand to execute human purposes. Though each part of such machines acts independently, yet the machine may be so contrived, by

* Observe that there is at bottom no question of the part acting without a stimulus, even if you will a force, impressed on it. The question is whether the requirement of the organism or of another part is itself such a stimulus, or whether things are so arranged that the physical condition giving rise to that requirement normally conveys a stimulus. In the apparent result the second method may be brought to coincide with the first in proportion to the delicacy of the mechanism and the power of providing for all the contingencies of varying requirements.

taking thought for contingencies, as to vary its action suitably to the varying requirements of the purpose which the maker had in view. The limit of such variability is that, however much the machine process may change, it must still be change from one uniform type-process to another. An indefinite number of types of required action may be foreseen and provided for, but they must all be types. Purpose, on the other hand, being *bona fide* guided by the relation of each particular act to its particular end, may be wholly individual. On behalf of the mechanical view, the reply might be made that the distinction if clear in principle is not applicable without ambiguity to actual behaviour. May not the living being be a machine devised to meet a vastly greater number of contingencies than any inanimate machine, but so devised that each contingency just supplies the necessary stimulus to the necessary parts to act in such a way as is consonant with the maintenance of the organism? On behalf of this view, there would not be lacking evidence of blindness and mechanical tendency in human, as in other animate, behaviour. Two things, however, must be said:—

(*a*) There seems no theoretical limit to the plasticity of human purpose. No range is too vast, no consideration too remote, no correlation too complex to affect our action if occasion calls. We are nowhere finally stopped, and it is this, not the absence of continuity in character, which is what we really mean by freedom.

(*b*) If this freedom of range could in any way be supposed to rest on a pre-established structure, so formed as always to act suitably to the required effect, yet without being determined by the actual relation of the given act here and now to the effect, it would postulate the operation of a creative mind of infinite scope, capable of foreseeing and providing for every detail of our individual lives. That such a structure should be the product of heredity is wildly impossible. Our evolution is from simpler and more general to more highly

organized and individualized activity, and can at best only supply a structure suited to respond uniformly to situations of a general character. The mechanical view must break with evolution and postulate a Calvinistic deity and a detailed predestination. The main objection to this view is that the world is not one which we can fit in with the possible plans of a mind unconfined by any limitations. There may be evidences of purpose in the world—personally I think there are—but not of unconstrained, undefeated purpose. They are of one or more purposes that are constantly broken, limited, incomplete. Nor is there any way of escape by supposing the infinite mind to be stupid or bad, for in the region of mind badness, stupidity and limitation are at bottom almost convertible terms. There are then strong reasons for rejecting predestination. Predestination—determination by an exterior purpose—seems the only alternative to the admission of determination by internal purpose.

The more unreal difficulty is that to which most weight has been attached. It is supposed that the whole physical world moves mechanically. The living being is physical. Therefore, it moves mechanically. Either the major or the minor premiss really assumes the point in question. We may grant if we will that everything that is purely physical moves mechanically, but is the conscious living being purely physical? If the term "purely" is omitted, the major premiss becomes doubtful. We are not to suppose a physical body somewhere within which a soul is seated, acted on by the impact of molecules and reacting upon them. What we call the physical is just as much of reality as is known to us by the senses and various inferences which we draw by putting the reports of the senses together. We have not the smallest reason to assume that what we so get exhausts the nature of any real thing, unless we find that it explains the whole behaviour of that thing. Now, in the case of living beings, we find just the contrary and, moreover, of one of these

living beings, every one of us has independent and first hand information showing that it contains elements that are not physical. What is the difficulty of supposing that these elements play their part in determining its behaviour, *i.e.*, that the living being is a psychophysical whole in which the parts are held together and their action correlated by elements—forces if you will—which are determined in their direction by the results to which their actions tend as they affect the living whole? Objection is, perhaps, taken on the ground of a supposed breach of continuity, but none such exists, if body and soul instead of being regarded as separate entities are taken as names for distinguishable (and possibly incomplete) aspects of one real being. Or, is it alleged that we are postulating a motion or change in the direction of a motion without a force to cause it? If the term force is used, not for a rate of acceleration, but for a cause of motion, that is not the case. The conative condition is a force producing motion. The question is merely in what ways and in what directions such a force acts, and the answer that it is directed towards results in no way affects its capacity to direct motion. Or, is it supposed that causation is denied, the truth being that the attempt is merely to discover what kind of cause purpose is? That the purpose as something found in you or me grows out of what we were before is not questioned. If the objection turns on none of these points, it comes simply to this, that all causation must be mechanical—which was to be proved, but is not.

SYMPOSIUM: ARE PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES IRREDUCIBLE?

V.—*Reply by* J. S. HALDANE.

In replying to criticisms on my own paper, I am glad to find that the differences between the different contributors to the symposium are in important respects less fundamental than appears on the surface.

Professor D'Arcy Thompson points out that there are endless inorganic phenomena of which we cannot at present, or till recently could not, give a physical or chemical explanation: but that on this account there is no reason to discard the physical and chemical principles which have served us so well in other directions. He argues that there is equally no reason for doubting the ultimate application of physical and chemical principles in biology, although in connexion with biological facts the temporary failures of physical and chemical explanations may be very prominent. Now, if it were only a matter of the temporary failure of physical and chemical explanations in many parts of biology, I should agree with his reasoning; but my argument was based on positive, and not merely on negative facts. He does not neglect the positive facts, but I think he hardly does justice to them. He argues that the self-regulation and self-maintenance which are so characteristic of life are equally present in what we regard as mechanisms—for instance, the solar system, or even ordinary machines. The solar system, as we at present conceive it, continues to work regularly just in so far as it is not disturbed from without, and its behaviour as a whole can, unlike an organism, be predicted from the simple properties, movements, and relative positions of its separate parts. It is precisely the same for any machine. A machine may happen to work a little better after some use,

but it inevitably wears out. The life-history of an organism is surely something very different from the history of a machine.

Professor Thompson argues that the developing germ, along with its environment, may be regarded as a mechanism. But the physical and chemical environment, as such, is a mere pandemonium, differing for each germ, and calculated to produce in each germ different results, just as the soap-suds in the bowl he refers to differ according to how air is blown into the soap-solution. In the germ and its environment there is surely an element of immanent order, which the mechanical conception wholly fails to express?

I fully accept Professor Thompson's suggestion that it is only the "*ordinary*" working hypotheses of physics and chemistry that seem to me inadequate in biology. Recent developments of experimental physics and chemistry are profoundly changing these conceptions, and, as it seems to me, tending to bring physics and chemistry not only much closer to one another, but also much closer to biology. Here, then, our differences seem to disappear.

Dr. Chalmers Mitchell agrees with me in so far as he considers that *at present* mind cannot be interpreted or stated in terms of physiology or anatomy, nor biology in terms of chemistry or physics. He refuses, however to commit himself as regards the future, and he lays special emphasis on the contention that life, and even mind, cannot be interpreted apart from physics and chemistry, since both biological and psychological activity are dependent on physical and chemical changes. He goes on, however, to admit that the conceptions of physics and chemistry are rapidly moving towards those of biology. With this admission he and I, though at first we seemed far apart, come very close together, just as Professor Thompson and I do; and my concluding remarks with regard to Professor Thompson's contribution apply also to that of Dr. Mitchell.

Professor Hobhouse gives an admirably clear analysis of the

nature of mechanism as ordinarily conceived, and the difference between a mechanism and a living organism; but he differs from me in this respect, that he eliminates the specifically biological conception or category. He thus attributes the difference between a living organism and a mechanism to the manifestation in the former of conation or purposive action, though often in a very low and ill-defined form.

It does not seem to me that this theory furnishes a satisfactory practical working hypothesis to the ordinary physiologist or morphologist who has to deal with the every-day observations of biology, more particularly on what is ordinarily called the chemical side. These observations do not suggest anything like conscious purpose: the reactions observed are "blind." Yet the self-maintenance and self-determination of a whole are quite clearly manifested in them, and they are, therefore, not mechanical in any ordinary sense. It seems to me, therefore, that we are in practical need of a biological, as distinguished from either a psychological or physical working hypothesis.

In other respects, I think that Professor Hobhouse and I are in pretty close agreement.

SYMPOSIUM: DO FINITE INDIVIDUALS POSSESS A SUBSTANTIVE OR AN ADJECTIVAL MODE OF BEING?

By Bernard Bosanquet, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, G. F. Stout, and Lord Haldane.

I.—*By* Bernard Bosanquet.

1. In considering some recent literature of this question,* I am strongly impressed with the result that there are two lines of argument to be regarded.†

i. The one set of arguments appeals to the fact of existence. It rests upon the proposition that finite individuals are individual existents. Using, then, the unrestricted premiss that all individual existents are ultimate subjects, it applies this conclusion to spiritual finite individuals, together with all existent "things," including things that are parts of things. I shall suggest that a proof depending on so wide a premiss is precluded from supporting, in a serious sense, the thesis that spiritual finite individuals possess substantive or substantival being.

* I note that Professor Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, uses indifferently the terms "substantive" and "substantival." "Substantive" (p. 272) I take to mean of the nature of a substance, and "substantival" (p. 282) of the nature of a noun substantive. This is not unimportant, as the meaning of "substance" is lowered by his argument, in agreement with others, almost to that of "noun substantive." It should be noted in advance that if the latter meaning were all that is in question, there could be no doubt that any object of thought could be subject (in the sense of having "substantival" being) and any could be predicate. Though not decisive, this fact is significant, and was, of course, fully recognised by Aristotle.

† A conceivable interpretation of one of these would remove the difference. I will refer again to this point (*see* p. 102).

ii. The other set of arguments appeals to the intentional character of spiritual finite beings as such—to their pretensions and their implications—a question of unity as an object or ideal rather than as a subject. It deals with such matters as the self in morality and religion, with its pretension to assert a unity which it does not find existent, to be free and responsible, to remain itself even in the social bond or in oneness with God. A conclusion from such considerations would be strictly applicable to the finite spiritual individual. But I shall urge that from such considerations the conclusion must be that which I advocate, and not that which is advanced against me. The spiritual individual has a solid claim to substantive being only indirectly, and through an admission and recognition that his immediate self is of a nature which, to speak in terms of the antithesis before us, cannot be called substantive, and must by preference be set down as adjectival.

2. I will begin by stating what I take to be the essence of the first set of arguments. They turn, not upon anything peculiar to a finite spirit, but upon the fact of thinghood. Aristotle's doctrine of substance seems to be typical of them, and is adopted by Professor Pringle-Pattison,* who at this point only, I think, strikes into this first line of argument. Indifferently, as I gather, the individual man and, for example, the stone in his signet ring, are taken to be substances, as subjects that cannot be predicates.† So, according to Professor Stout, following, as he rightly says, the popular opinion, is any existent thing or existent part of a thing, an orange,‡ or a dog's tail—it does not matter how subordinate to other individuals, or how far from such self-existence as belongs to the universe. It need merely have the independence of a substantive in relation with its adjectives.§ It must be a

* *The Idea of God*, p. 272.
† *Cf.* Joseph, *Introd. to Logic*, p. 50, *cf.* 167.
‡ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1902–3, pp. 2, 22.
§ Stout, *loc. cit.*, *cf.* note *, p. 75, above.

concrete—that is, though its relatedness to other things may determine its special nature (no unrelated* nucleus, so far as I gather, is reserved in contrast with such relatedness), its particular existence must not be derivative from this. But, I suppose, it is only in its fully determined relatedness that we could think of it as substance or subject. In its existence behind or abstracted from this it would be empty, a *Ding an sich.*

The limits of the class of substances which are ultimate subjects are, as I said, taken to be those of thinghood.† Any "thing" is an ultimate subject, a substantive, and, I presume, a substance (Professor Stout does not use the latter term), and, *pro tanto,* self-existent. An abstract quality may be existent, but cannot be self-existent.‡

In Professor Laird's most solid and instructive discussion we get the best that can be done on this method.§ The soul is a substance because it is an existent unity of existent experiences,—cognition, conation, and feeling,—each of which is such as to imply a unity of itself and the others. These experiences are substances, though not self-subsistent substances. They are parts of the soul-substance, and not merely qualities of it. They are "parts of its existence" in Professor Stout's sense. The soul-substance *is* its acts in their continuity and unity, and not including their objects. But we can identify the acts and estimate their continuity—so I read the theory—only through their objects. The soul-substance's continued identity, from beginning to end of its experienced life-course, is but little, fluctuating, and full of gaps, and I add, for my part, full of positive incoherence, self-rejection, and self-contradiction. And we are, according to Professor Laird,

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* Such as, *e.g.*, Professor Parker assumes, *Self and Nature*, p. 247.

† This, as I understand, is Professor Laird's view, *Problems of the Self*, pp. 348 and 354, and also Professor Parker's, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

‡ Parker, *loc. cit.*

§ See especially the conclusion, p. 360 *ff.*, and *cf.* p. 195.

not entitled to affirm its pre-existence nor its post-existence to the life we experience, though neither are we entitled to deny them. We are told, indeed, of a claim to freedom, independence, responsibility.* I cite a characteristic sentence. "We know what our souls are, we know the meaning of their identity, we know the sense in which they are distinct and independent in the world. Because we know these things we should hold fast to them," etc.

It is a great thing to find a clear issue. These words, taken in their context and supported as they are supported, precisely express what I am anxious to deny. They define, as I gather, the conclusions of that first line of argument to which I am referring, and the position they lay down exactly embodies the popular misconception which to me appears most at variance with fact.† For here, as I understand the issue, we can assert nothing without passing into argument of the second type. The proof of distinct existence is no basis for predicates such as those connected with freedom. That proof applies to all things and parts of things, and to all minds of brutes. And for these it clearly carries no such implications. Therefore, by itself, it cannot do so for other beings.

So far as the first line of argument has carried us, the distinction between substantive or substantival on the one hand, and predicative or adjectival on the other, amounts to nothing more than the distinction between a complex of predicates, presupposed as connected in a single focus of apprehension, and a predicate or predicates separately referred either to such a nexus, or to the one ultimate subject whatever that may be. There is no such thing as a predicate or adjective which is not referred to any subject at all. Now, we know

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* *Op. cit.*, pp. 356, 366.

† *Cf.* Professor W. E. Hocking on "The Holt-Freudian Ethics," *Papers in Honour of Josiah Royce*, p. 270. "It is not by the possession of any soul-substance that I am defined a self, but it is 'by this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal'" (*cf.* p. 278).

that thinghood or existence gives no guarantee whatever for the relevance, either to each other, or to the propositions made about the existent, of the predicates presupposed to be connected in it. Locke's wonderful section* tells us that nothing can be guaranteed to exhibit within itself the conditions of the attributes we ascribe to it. In other words, the conception of any thing, as a unitary subject, though we assume that it has some degree of intrinsic connection, can have no definite limits assigned it. There is no proposition about it which can be known as strictly and adequately true. The familiar impossibility of determining what is and what is not so much as to be called a "thing," reinforces this argument.† There is no ultimate reason for taking one complex, at least below conscious individuals, as a single thing more than another. They include one another in innumerable subordinations, from the Sahara, for example, or any patch of it, down to any grain of sand in it. A thing, therefore, as an existence, can have no claim to be an ultimate subject. It is, as such, a provisional subject, and has, of course, a being and reality, and is necessary to the universe. But it is selected for convenience of special knowledge or practice, and justifies its selection in indefinitely varied degrees. This, we have seen, the argument before us admits.

It should be noted at this point that the phrase "ultimate subject" suggests a type of subjects to which subjects of all types are reducible. If we apply the words in this sense to finite individuals, then either the proposition which applies them is obviously false, or finite individuals must include, for example, such subjects as civilisation,‡ society, nature, propositions about which are certainly irreducible to propositions about persons or things. This result would destroy the

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* Essay, IV, vi, 11.

† Laird, p. 353 ; My *Logic*, i, p. 129.

‡ Joseph, *Introd. to Logic*, p. 168 ; Laird, p. 339.

pre-eminence claimed for singular beings in the pluralistic sense. It would force us to recognise a series of subjects progressively nearer to being ultimate, up to the universe.

But can a thing, even considered as a provisional subject, ever be regarded as adjectival or as a predicate? Mr. Joseph* says very reasonably, in explaining the general view which I, for one, have adopted: "There is no desire to deny to individuals a relative independence, or to pretend that the relation of attributes or universals to the concrete individual is the same relation as that of an individual to the system of reality which includes him." And of course this is so, while we are in the attitude presupposed by the first line of argument. The whole point of this is that it forgets the abstraction under which it apprehends the structure of experience.

What follows, however, from the above explanation is this. The complex taken as one with some existent, and commonly accepted as a thing or solid starting point, substance or subject, *de novo*, is in truth, as we saw, a set of determinations which, with or without some pretence to system, are wholly inadequate and self-contradictory as a subject to the proposition in which they stand. Their real function and position, therefore, is like that of other adjectives or predicates which are identified with an existent as conditions explaining some of its characters, or as predicates explained by some. You cannot ascribe predicates truly to the existent as you apprehend it. You ascribe them to reality on conditions roughly indicated by the marks of that existent. "Reality as indicated by the characters of gold is heavy." "Reality as including certain aspects of the geological history of our globe is the Atlantic Ocean." In short, "Reality is such that at or in S it is P."

This is the formal account of the existential affirmation. Its essential truth seems to me obvious. Locke's section is enough to justify us in setting down most existents as subordinate to

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* *Logic, loc. cit.* I do not mean that he adopts this view.

the universe in such a way as must surely be called adjectival. Adjectival does not mean abstract or in the air. The adjective "agrees with" its substantive. Its name implies at once attachment and detachment. Any point in the nature of a substantive can be taken apart and made an adjective of it. We do not, indeed, think of the features currently presupposed in the solid subject, the starting point of judgment, as adjectives. Yet the adjective, when distinguished, remains attached, and presupposes in its own nature the nature of its substantive.

When this is considered, we are driven to treat highly subordinate existences as adjectival to their superordinate existences. They are emphasized in detachment from them, but they qualify them, and lose either significance or, in some cases, the conditions of existence if viewed as detached from them. It is mere formalism, dependent upon a substantiation of provisional subjects, that hinders us from saying so. And we have seen that the formula which says otherwise—the current formula S is P—is false. R in S is P, or R as S is P, applicable to part as qualifying whole, is the formula which we want, and which we shall find expressing the spiritual truth in the second line of argument with precise fidelity. It leads us somewhat to extend the usage of the term "adjective," in proportion as we note the superficial and provisional nature of ordinary substantives. To take Professor Stout's homely instance, it is plain that the dog's tail qualifies the dog. It is among the first things you note as decisive of his kind or his beauty. When we are told it is a part of the dog's existence, and not of his nature, this is a plain overstatement. It is meant that it *also* attracts attention for its own sake, and is a "this thing" with a nature of its own presupposed in it. And you can try to look at it so; but you cannot really adhere to such a point of view. Neither existence nor nature belong to it by itself. The possessive genitive, which marks it as a part, and as having its value in being a part, marks it no less as being of

a predicative nature. You cannot think or speak of it without such a genitive. If you try to do so, you think or speak falsely, making an abstraction which you forget. If you remember the abstraction you are making, the term becomes predicative at once. The same applies to all parts of things. When we come to parts of spiritual wholes, the argument is at a different level, and yet more decisive. But there is still a word to be said to emphasize the predicative nature of parts in highly unified wholes, even on an existential basis.

You can predicate any part of a structure, of the whole as subject taken in a certain aspect. It is what, so considered, the whole becomes. It is no bar to such subordination that it may possess a particular structure which repeats that of other particulars, and so is distinct from them and side by side with them. Its particular structure, *e.g.*, as a unity of acts which imply each other,* is no bar to its taking on a special shape and character expressive of its subordination to and within an inclusive structural system. At this level, in the comparison with common thinghood, it is a fair parallel to point out that the unit divisions within the whorls which are irrecoverably merged into the single orchid blossom have, each within itself, overlaid by the inclusive structure, the whole leaf-nature with its appropriate equipment of spiral vessels. Our minds, if they could be visualised, although they repeat in each an analogous structure, would not look like self-contained shapes, each repeating the other side by side like our bodies set in a row. They would look like bits of machines or organs of organisms, fragmentary and incomprehensible till the whole were supplied to which they respectively belonged, each with its driving-bands or nerves or wireless aerials hanging loose around it, all senseless and self-contradictory apart from the inclusive structural system. This would be the case even if their internal structure were ultimate. It would be merged and

* Professor Laird's soul-substance.

overwhelmed as instrumental to a wider identity. It is so continually in the daily life of fully developed intelligences. But, further, the alleged internal structure is secondary.* We can have experience below any such structure, and we might have it above.

I note the common refuge of semi-pluralist reasonings in admitting that finite individuals are interrelated, but only *in some degree* determined by interrelatedness.† To me this seems an evasion. It is meant to suggest a crowd of co-ordinate individual reals, like Herbart's, entering into relations which are secondary to their private being.‡ But these co-ordinate reals are pure assumption. There is nothing in experience to suggest drawing a line between inter-relatedness and non-relatedness: and the plain fact is that of super- and subordinate reals. You cannot possibly draw an absolute boundary line round any reals but spirits; and they, as we shall see, have power explicitly to negative the boundary which, in a sense, they suggest. When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival I do not merely deny non-relatedness;§ what I aim at denying is co-ordinate relatedness. We are speaking of the typical relation of an individual to the universe. I am surprised that this should have been compared to the relation between a shoe and a foot, or a son and a father.‖

We shall see further reasons below for admitting that provisional subjects taken in their whole reality¶ are best considered as characters predicable of the universe. And the

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* See Bradley, *Appearance*, p. 477.

† Stout, *loc. cit.*, p. 21; Pringle-Pattison, p. 274; Parker, p. 246 *ff.*

‡ It is most remarkable how Professor Parker favours such an assumption by instances naïvely taken from superficial wholes. The terms "pre-exist," "native," and "acquired," applied to the individual, betray this fallacy, pp. 246, 254, 271.

§ Pringle-Pattison, *loc. cit.*

‖ *Id. ib.*

¶ The soul-substance, as we shall see, is not the whole reality of the finite individual.

analysis of the judgment which I have suggested agrees fundamentally and especially with the nature which full experience demands for the finite individual spirit.

It is urged that individuals are none the less apprehended as they really are, if apprehended as distinct individuals in spite of belonging to a superior whole. Abstraction or analysis does not involve falsehood.* On this the comment indicated above seems to me simple and decisive. The question is whether, in considering the subordinate individual, the abstraction involved in attending to it *par excellence* is forgotten or is remembered. In the popular attitude—the attitude to which pluralist or semi-pluralist reasonings appeal—it is forgotten. And the individual taken as real on that basis is, therefore, partly unreal, and its appearance is in some degree illusory. In the attitude to which we shall finally appeal, which regards the substantiality ascribed to the self as intentional, the abstraction involved in apprehending the subordinate individual is unforgotten. This means, in other words, that it is annulled, that the claim often made in argument† is really justified, and that the provisional individual is apprehended in its true place, and in unity with the superior whole. So far as it can be thus apprehended it is or would be real. Its appearance is so far not a "mere appearance," and involves no element of illusion. So apprehended, as in the second line of argument which I shall consider, and not otherwise, it may fairly be called substantival. But this is not in its own right, for it is then revealed as an adjective at once attached to and detached from its substantive.

3. I now approach the second line of argument, and must address myself to Professor Pringle-Pattison's position. In the main he and I are arguing on common ground, a ground much narrower than that on which my discussion has so far moved,

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* Stout, *loc. cit.*, p. 23; Parker, pp. 257, 265.

† Stout, *loc. cit.*; Parker, *loc. cit.*

though at one point, as it seemed to me, he retreats to that less relevant basis. For the most part, however, we are both reasoning about spiritual finite beings and on the basis of their claims and implications.

Our common ground, as stated by Professor Pringle-Pattison himself,* includes a negation and an assertion. We both *reject* "the old doctrine of the soul-substance as a kind of metaphysical atom." We both believe that the mere individual nowhere exists; "he is the creature of a theory." "Both his existence and his nature (his 'that' and his 'what') are derived. It is absurd to talk of him as self-subsistent or existing in his own right." I need not multiply citations. Again, we both *assert* that if we could possess ourselves entirely "we should be . . . . either the Absolute *in propria persona*, or Browning's 'finite clod untroubled by a spark.'" "All this, then, is common ground."

The main difference between us is indicated in the sentence which forms the theme of this discussion. So far as the term substance is implied by Professor Pringle-Pattison, its meaning is lowered† to something like noun substantive, and expressly guarded against implying Spinozistic substance, or self-subsistence. It is expressly identified with Aristotelian substance, or the character of any and every subject which cannot be a predicate. The argument here drops down, as I said above, to the level of resting upon distinguishable existence or concrete thinghood, taking no account of what is special to a finite spiritual being. He would even admit that an individual might be adjectival, if that only meant interrelated with other reals. To me, as I said, the term would imply subordination in place of co-ordination—the character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole which includes it. So far, our disagreement is marked. I should have

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* *The Idea of God*, pp. 257–260.

† See notes, p. 75.

held, indeed, that our previously noted agreement covered this point, and required him to admit the finite being's intrinsic subordinateness. But he does not understand it so. All this, however, as we saw, amounts to little more than an argument from distinct existence.

Appealing, also, to a further line of argument, he has more important characteristics to insist upon. These may be fairly summarised under two heads. There is the topic of membership of the Absolute, and in connection with this, what I may coin a phrase to express as the teleological status of finite spirits in the universe. And there is the kindred problem of freedom and self-distinction in the great experiences of which love, social morality, and religion are typical examples.

I am criticised for rejecting the notion of the membership of finite spirits as such in the Absolute. I partly explained my position on this point in the *Mind* notice of Professor Pringle-Pattison's book, and I need not be lengthy here. I rejected the term membership, because I thought it would commit me to what we both repudiate,—eternal substances, differentiations of the absolute, identified with finite selves. Here I follow Dr. McTaggart's logic,* though not his opinion. In view of our imperfections there must be, he argues, a chasm either between the Absolute and the finite self as we experience it, or between the finite self as we experience it and its own reality. He accepts the latter alternative. I find myself driven to the former.† So far as this choice goes, I may claim my critic's assent. He rejects with me the pluralist's eternal substances. And I would call attention to the expression, which he cites with approval from Professor Laurie, that the predicates of the Absolute are

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* *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, sect. 39.

† Unless in a further sense the Absolute were taken as the reality of all finite selves.

the worlds.* Something of this kind was also in my thoughts, both in conceiving finite individuals as predicative in character, and in holding at the same time that some more inclusive differentiations than finite selves would be more fittingly considered predicates of the whole.

It was a motive to this opinion that I could not bring myself to hold finite selves to be necessarily eternal or everlasting units. I cannot be sure whether this is intended to be a subject of complaint against me. My critic nowhere rejects my view, but he seems to find fault with my theory for implying it. And I do not say that transience is incompatible with membership in a non-transient whole. But obviously, taken along with the other imperfections of existent selves, it affects the kind of membership which can be ascribed to the transient. The analogy with the lower animal mind presses upon us here. Do I understand it to be argued that M. Arnold's Dachshund† *was* or *is* an individual member of the Absolute? If he was, I should hardly object to calling all finite spirits also members of it in at least a parallel sense. For he was individual, surely, rather for others than for himself; and this is very noticeably the line of the critic's argument at this point. If we rely on such superior insight into individuality, we abandon the position that the self has membership in the shape in which it experiences itself. If he was not an individual member, and I should have thought this the more appropriate language, I should urge that the high and unique value which my critic claims for that "little self" shows that what we really need for our estimate of finite beings can be satisfied without our taking upon us the hazard of asserting membership for every finite spirit as it stands and experiences itself, with all its imperfections on its head, and all its gamut of degrees.

Therefore, I think that my critic's teleological status of

* *The Idea of God*, p. 174.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

finite spirits,* though in the general line of my own convictions, is too rigid and exacting a view. He holds that the development into finite spirits—our spirits as we know them—must be the chief end and aim of the Absolute. I cannot escape Dr. McTaggart's argument. I cannot believe that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be. And I recur to my critic's own words. If I possessed myself entirely, I should be the Absolute, and, I continue, I should not be what I experience existentially as myself. Suppose the "worlds" to be realised were not you and I and the Dachshund, but beauty, truth, and love in different renderings through different "created" systems. We, perhaps, might be instrumental as trivial elements to one such world.

Membership in a sense, of course, there must be in the Absolute for all its elements. It is the form of membership, whether as we exist in experience or otherwise, that sets the problem. If reality is temporal, a transient existence as such can have but a very passing tenure of membership; and, surely, must possess some other form of reality than individual being as a member. If reality is timeless, the transient existence must symbolise some participation which is not confined to its passage in time. I will try to fill out these hints below.

I could have modelled my statement into an almost complete agreement with Professor Pringle-Pattison, for the explicit difference between us is one of proportion and degree. But as there underlies this a real contrast of tendency, which he has rightly felt, and as it depends on a point of view which I am exceedingly desirous to emphasise, I will express my position as uncompromisingly as possible. I was not asked to open this discussion in order to gloss over a radical discrepancy of feeling, but, I suppose, in order to make it explicit. And, therefore, I will state the rest of my argument in terms of the

* The phrase is not his.

distinction between the two attitudes to life, which, as I suggested at first, are respectively embodied in the two sets of arguments we are concerned with, and between which I am desirous to express my preference.

The remaining issues which I have to discuss with my critic amount to the problem of free self-determination on the part of the spiritual finite individual, and the conceivability of confluence between such individuals, or their transmutation and absorption in the Absolute. I believe that I can best sum up my own whole argument, and explain my position as to the points just mentioned, by trying to set out the two fundamental attitudes to which I have just referred. The distinction between them is founded on the idea that the truth of our apprehension of individuals within a whole—that is, the reality of the individuals so apprehended—is relative to the degree in which we have forgotten or have not forgotten—are unawake or awake to—the abstraction involved in apprehending them.

i. The popular attitude in considering finite individuals, whether things or persons, is frankly pluralist. Alike in contemplating the natural and the human world, it models itself on the apparent self-identity of the movable and self-coherent body. It is reinforced by the current conception, an alternative expression of itself, which confines identity to linear or successional continuity, the so-called existential or numerical identity of individual things. In one of the most recent and capable discussions of the self we have this assumption quite naïvely expressed. Identity is only within one thing. Between two things there can only be similarity.*

This attitude is further confirmed in the case of human beings by theories of the first look,† which deal with them as

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* Parker, p. 42 *ff.* The assumption is most remarkable in view of the extended use of identity in difference which Professor Parker makes *within* the "numerical" individual.

† Cf. *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 80 *ff.*

members of a crowd. The apparent self-completeness of our bodies, and their external repetition of a single type, side by side, as free figures devoid of material co-adaptation or connection, occupy our vision, blinding us to the moral and spiritual structure which lies behind the visible scene.

And, once more, all this is emphasised as the very basis even of our spiritual lives by our religious individualism, which re-echoes the metaphysical doctrine of substance in a popular shape. We are brought up to identify our self and our destiny with the history of a substantial soul, by implication pre-existent to our experienced life, and certainly post-existent to it; continuous, therefore, throughout our passage in time, and concentrating our hopes and fears upon its particular development through life and beyond as the sum and climax of our value.

This attitude of mind, the outcome of a natural bias and prolonged tradition, is very far from giving way when the orthodox dogmatism which reinforced it has decayed. Our being and our destiny are still thought of in terms of a linear progression; and the inherent demand for self-completion is construed as a desire to "go on" and continue our achievement *in propria persona*. The reality of life's issues is made to depend upon their prolongation for each of us beyond the existence which we experience between birth and death. If we do not "go on" in person, so it is implied, our values lose their reality. The connection is expressed in the familiar rhyme:—

> "Life is real, life is earnest,
> And the grave is not its goal;
> 'Dust thou art, to dust returnest,'
> Was not spoken to the soul."

We see here how naturally the reality of values seems to connect itself with the persistence of particular souls. For a younger generation, the vehicle of such an ideal is probably different, but the moral atmosphere, if I read our

literature right, remains for the most part the same. Hope, anxiety, and expectation fix themselves at every moment on the linear future, and if this basis is shaken, the substitute is not a wider outlook, but despair.

I do not see how it is possible to maintain that any attitude even remotely resembling that which I have indicated does not involve forgetting the abstraction by which we attend to finite individuals within the whole of experience. The doctrine that identity is exclusively numerical, or of existence, is enough by itself to determine this point of view, of which it is indeed a concise rendering. And the contention that a substantive character, or that of an ultimate subject, is coincident with thinghood exhibits at once the obviousness of the position and its untenability.

ii. I pass to the further attitude which comes to us partly through the experience of life, as in morality and religion,* partly through science and philosophy. Here we find that in various degrees we are becoming conscious of the abstraction, subject to which in every-day and practical life we conceive both the "thing" and the spiritual finite individual. In fact, we had already transcended it in the recognitions which morality and religion imply. But our power of abstaining from explicit reflection on what we have practically recognised is, as as we all know, extraordinary. Thus, it is only in science and philosophy that the abstraction under which we currently conceive the thing and the person is at all completely undone "for us," as contrasted with "in us."

The case of the "thing" is simple; but, as the essence of the first attitude was to treat individuality on the basis of thinghood, it is well to recall, what was mentioned above, that there is really no standard of thinghood.† Distinct individuality, at any rate below the level of mind, is a question of degree;

* Which themselves exhibit different degrees of it. Morality is very far more "forgetful" than religion.

† See reff., p. 79, *supra*.

and there is none such whose boundaries cannot be indefinitely extended into the natural world, whether in scientific or in æsthetic* experience.

Turning to the spiritual finite individual, we feel ourselves here at last attempting to deal with him in his proper character. We have no doubt of his unity, his freedom, his real and substantive being, which in principle and on the whole, though still subject to limitations springing from our impotence, yet reveals the individual in the general or typical light in which he must be taken as truly experienced within the universe.

I will recur to the two features† which I proposed to treat from the present point of view. I will try to explain, that is, how in this attitude we should approach the individual's claim to unity and to freedom.

We are confident of our individual unity. It is in our experience as existents continually interfered with and broken down, but all this failure we resent and repudiate. In existence, however, as we feel every day and every hour, it is not realised. The continuity of our whole succession of experiences amounts to little, and much which existentially attaches to it we reject and deny to be truly our belonging.‡ None the less, it is our nature to be a single self. We claim it as a right, and accept it as a duty. Our very repudiation of elements within our existential complex means the rejection of what we cannot unify. We carry with us a pretension to be ourself, which includes less and more than we find in our existence. Our unity is a puzzle and an unrealised aspiration. It is demanded by thought and action, but we cannot find it in existence.

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* As when a painter is said to paint on the whole of his canvas at once.

† *Cf.* p. 76, *supra*.

‡ If by a miracle a man of sixty could have himself, as a boy of ten, introduced to him and open to his insight, is there anything, apart from external history, or bodily marks, by which he could identify the boy with himself?

This, and not our experience of our acts, is the secret of our confidence that we are one. We are so, because to be a thinking being is to demand a unity, and every act of such a being is an attempt to realise it. But philosophy tells us, as we agreed, that if we possessed our unity, we should no longer be what we experience our existence as being. Here, then, is our substantive reality, in which we are not mere features, predicates, characters, but are seen, apart in principle from abstraction, as substantival solidly founded entities, possessed of an indefeasible unity.

Yet, what is the nature and structure of this reality? Is it the self as we experience it in detail? Surely not; or it is that self, but in an illumination more intense than the customary, and revealing a further structure. It *is* a substance and an ultimate subject, but not in its own right. Its existence, as an existence, bears the unmistakeable stamp of the fragmentary and the provisional. Can there be any one who does not feel it so in every act and every thought? But through all this, and operative in it, there shines the intentional unity. It is not my monad nor my star. It is the life which lives in me, but it is more of that life than I succeed in living. I *am* substantive and subject, then, but only so far as I recognise myself to be adjective and predicate. If, forgetting the abstraction, I set up to be in myself a self-centred real, I become *ipso facto* in the main a false appearance and all but worthless. This is when I come nearest to being a substantive in my own right, in error and in sin. How can I be a false appearance if I actually appear? Is not the answer very simple? I can mistake the character in which I appear. I seem to myself, perhaps, to be the King, and I am the fool. There is, then, just this much truth in me, that I am here upon the stage, thus much, and no more.

Then, let us think of freedom—man's character in morality and religion. The paradox of its nature is familiar, and needs only a few words to exhibit its connection with the present

argument. The attitude from which we started sees freedom wherever the objects of volition are selected by any response of the self. Thus, at every point, the linear self—that which lies in a serial continuity of acts—is accepted by this attitude as substantive and independent. And it is true, as I have argued throughout, that this self has existence, and a status which represents itself as independent on the basis and analogy of thinghood.

But on reflectively weighing the experience of religion and morality we necessarily supersede this attitude by that other of which we are speaking. We become aware of lateral, so to speak, as well as of linear, identity, and are forced to undo the abstraction under which we were judging. We find that we were like a horse in blinkers, blind to all that is not straight ahead. We begin to apprehend the individual as within the super-ordinate wholes to which he belongs, and so to estimate in their reality both him and them. For the individual, as we are accustomed to accept him, there could be, we begin to understand, no self, no will, no knowledge, no morality, no religion. Apart from the content of his centre there could be no feeling self; apart from their objects his acts are an empty form; and in all his objects there is no object that is not universal and derivative. His identity with the community, we observe, is not reducible to similarity between him and other individuals. It lies in the participation of moral substance, and in the reciprocal adaptation of structure, on the part of all apparent units, to identical and indivisible function.*

A man is free†—we now restrict the expression—in so far as he wills the universal object. The reason is obvious. It is only what is universal that is free from self-contradiction. It is only what is free from self-contradiction that can be willed

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* See above, p. 82.

† It is a mistake of fact to say that freedom is most strongly felt in mere choice, Parker, p. 296 : contrast Laird, p. 124.

without obstruction. Every contradiction in my world of experience obstructs my action and embarrasses my will; and every pain or defeat or confusion of which I am aware, in any subject or object apprehended by me, is a contradiction in my world. I am only free in such objects of volition as confront with adequate solutions the situations which I apprehend.

Thus, in accordance with a familiar paradox, it is only in a will above my own that I can find my own will and my freedom and independence. Here, again, it is only by acknowledging myself adjectival and under necessity that I can become substantive and free. Observation of life at its highest effectiveness fully harmonises with the analysis of the judgment suggested above. In all serious moral action, in all social volition or religious self-determination the form of experience is "Reality in S is P." The moral universe in me expresses itself thus. There is always an incoming wave of identical object-consciousness. Nothing can come of nothing; and by itself myself, consisting of its acts, is nothing.

I will speak of two special points that might cause a difficulty,—the question of initiative and the question of confluence.

If every community consists of individuals, and if the wills of all individuals are derivative, where is the source of derivation? Everything seems derivative from what is itself derivative, that is, from other individuals. The answer lies in the recognition of lateral as well as linear identity. The communal will, for example, though revealed in a number of individuals, is a single thing as much as external nature, which is revealed in the same way. Participation in its structure makes every particular unit an individual, that is, a particular, in which the universal or the identity assumes a special modification. His will is made out of the common substance, and, even when when he rejects and reverses the form in which it is seen elsewhere, his volition is still dependent on it. The

relation is familiar to us in every structure of elements. If all the elements are gone, the structure is gone; but yet the functional character of the structure is not co-ordinate with all or any of the component elements as such. It is really in the universal function that they have even their structure.* It is this property of being a centre, in which the universal spirit applies itself to the concrete situation, which gives the spiritual individual just that note of independence which is claimed for him. If nothing beyond, so to speak, the local centre were in operation, there could not be the growing sense of necessity which is the mark of all serious will, and indicates the shaping of the common life to the special environment. Some compare the volition to the judgment. The comparison is illuminating for volition. The judgment is not the response of a punctual centre, but the self-shaping of a full world.

Then, again, is the confluence of selves conceivable, and is there any analogy or example in its favour? I might argue that the knot is cut by the admission that if we possessed our self we should be the absolute; for certainly we should then include or be blended with innumerable other selves. To explain further. What seems to me important is to set free the idea of the self; to recognise that the self is constituted just by what it is and what operates in it; and that its limits and distinctness flow from this, and not this from any given thing or being. Two theoretical points are here concerned. There is what I have called lateral identity—identity of co-existent being as contrasted with that of a thread continuous in succession. It seems to me all-important for a free and full understanding of the self to make at least as much of co-existent as of continuous identity. Otherwise, we unnaturally narrow down the basis of our self. And there is the emptiness of the ego, which it appears to me that Professor Pringle-Pattison and Mr. Balfour misconceive with really amazing perverseness.

* Haldane, *Organism and Environment*, Lect. IV.

The point, as I take it,* is that if the ego has a prior content, apart from what it unifies, unification becomes impossible. If the self is to be free and self-modelling, the ego must be a mere spirit of unity working in and throughout experiences. Otherwise, it must bring with it some character or nature which would be an antecedent condition biassing and restricting the development of the soul or self.

I am accused of not at all appreciating the idea of the self. I will try to summarise and distinguish precisely what seems to me right in the common view, what I should like to see recognised in addition, and what associations of the common doctrine I wish to repudiate.

1. I agree that the self has existence as a function which is a system of functions.† It is not a mere adjective in the sense in which P is so taken in the formula S is P.

2. But I think it should be recognised that—

i. Belonging to the self is a matter of degree, and all its belongings, including its not-self, are contributory to the being of a finite individual.

ii. The self and its not-self are concretely real only as identified by modifications of universal content‡ and by appercipient systems.

iii. The existence of the self is not adequate to its implied unity, which is a pretension inherent in a thinking being.

3. Such an attitude to the soul as is expressed in Swinburne's very splendid lines, "Because man's soul is man's god still" (Prologue to *Songs before Sunrise*), ought, as it seems to me, to be rejected.

In face of current commonplace assertions about the independence and initiative of the finite individual, or of the self, there are some undeniable, though hardly less commonplace

* See *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 325; *The Idea of God*, pp. 128–9.

† My *Logic*, I, p. 2.

‡ See Laird, pp. 199, 246.

observations, which should not be forgotten, and which I will summarise by way of recapitulation.

α. The self as defined in (1) above has no content and can originate nothing. The finite individual thing in nature has, so far as we know, no separately distinguishable nucleus. The spiritual individual is the utterance of his place and time—a sub-variant of the content of his age, and a derivative of his family stock like a bud on a plant.* And, if we abstract from these conditions, he is nothing.

β. Judgment is said to be my act, and is even compared with volition (not by me). But is it controllable by my self, whatever that can mean? It is, surely, the conclusion of my self-moulding whole of knowledge; and, if it is genuine, I, as my punctual self, cannot affect it at all. The world judges in me, though from my point of view. The analogy with volition would extend the application of this remark.

My love and hate are not controllable by others. True, but the remark is too narrow. For they are not controllable by me. No one, I think, has said that you can love and hate as you wish. How easy life would be, if you could! It is urged that in the "great experiences," say, love, social morality, and religion, you must yet remain distinct from other personalities; you must have "otherness."† But the remark appears to me to miss the point. Your regeneration in these experiences does not spring from anything which the other personalities previously contained. It is an introduction to a higher individuality, of which the plural persons are instruments like the carbons of an arc light. They are contacts which draw on the forces of the universe, not on themselves.

γ. The individual's expressive powers belong to his free communication with nature and the thought around him.

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* Laird, p. 358.

† Pringle-Pattison, p. 289.

They may be impeded any day by obstructions to memory or apprehension, and he can do nothing to help it, but so far ceases to be.

δ. A simple analogy from knowledge supports the conception that the perfection of the finite individual would imply a change in his identity, and possibly an absorption into another's. If my philosophy were made complete and self-consistent, I am sure my critics would admit, it could no longer be identified with that which I profess as mine; but would probably amalgamate with that of someone else, and in the end with that of all. I do not know why the same should not be the case with my self.

We must remember that the claim to have synthesised distinct personalities has actually been made,* and the stability alleged to have been gained by the process is in harmony with all probability. The difficulty of separate bodies was absent in the case alleged, but it seems as if this might be no more than a practical difficulty. Common language admits one self in different bodies, and the "general will" seems to be an indisputable fact.

All this is matter of degree, of which the extreme psychological curiosities are not the only or the more important cases. The illuminating comparison is between the extremes within our recognised, our normal self, and those "selves," whether vicious, morbid, or exceptionally great, which we feel unable to reckon as fully belonging to the former. Even the identity of selves which are *prima facie* external and side by side is none the less real for being mediated, and can become, as we know to be true of the reciprocal recognition of intelligent beings, all but immediate. Fully to "enjoy" the self, we want much more freedom in repudiating the self sequential upon us, and accepting that beside us. Our continued self-identity is apt to be a fetish which becomes a slavery. I may add as an illustration that

* In the Beauchamp case.

while no one feels the facts of moral responsibility more strongly than I do, it always strikes me as a grave injustice that a man should be severely punished for an offence of very old date; though, of course, it would not be practically permissible that intentional evasion should involve escape.

There is one more word to say. Our theme is not the soul or self, but the finite individual. And the reality of the finite individual is not confined to his temporal existence as a soul or self.* Where his action and influence extend, he is so far real, beyond his existence. Our failure to grasp the connection where it is remote seems simply to mean a want of apprehensive power on our part. It seems impossible to hold that men who have lived in the past are not real so far as their thoughts and characters are present and operative† to-day. They are not here in full personality, but their reality would be diminished if its activity of to-day were subtracted from it. It is often maintained that what is a fact once is a fact for ever. But this must not be taken to mean that the whole reality of the fact is compressed within its existence and eternally petrified. The reality of the battle of Waterloo is still liable to change and increase.

It seems to follow from this point of view that spiritual individuals must qualify the universe not merely as subordinate existents, which declare themselves adjectival in claiming attachment to their substance, but, more finally and completely, as predicates *pur sang*. The point becomes plainer and more urgent when we hold their existence as selves to be very transient. If the series of events is the reality, then a quality of individuals, outside their existence, is the chief way in which they are present in the reality. If reality is non-temporal, it is timelessly characterised through them by such a quality, reinforced by whatever character corresponds to a brief passage

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* See p. 83, above.

† See Nettleship, cited *Value and Destiny*, p. 264.

in time. In any case, we have seen, this problem presents itself, on the current view, about the minds of brutes, on the unique value of each of which nevertheless so much has been said. The whole question is analogous to that which is now being raised about the localisation of objects in space. They are, it is suggested, wherever their very various appearances are operative or are perceived.*

Thus, individuals not merely exist for a brief space in the world, but characterise it as permanent qualifications. This is what the poets have said, and it seems to be true. I need not quote the Adonaïs, but I will cite some humbler verses of a recent writer:—

> "Walking through trees to cool my heat and pain,
> I know that David's here with me again.
> All that is simple, happy, strong he is.
> Caressingly I stroke
> Rough bark of the friendly oak.
> A brook goes babbling by; the voice is his.
> Turf burns with pleasant smoke.
> I laugh at chaffinch and at primroses.
> All that is simple, happy, strong he is.
> Over the whole wood in a little while
> Breaks his slow smile."†

We all, so far as we know, exist in the world for a very short time; of course, we make a difference in it, and are necessary to it. But this is only to say that we have existence, and there is no thing, nor part of a thing, of which so much cannot be said. It does not, therefore, seem to follow, from our existence only, that we are worlds into which the universe is primarily organised; and our transitoriness and imperfection are such that to draw a sharp line between ourselves and inferior existents on the ground of our given unity does not seem feasible; while, if we appeal to our intentional pretension to unity, the moral of this, as we saw, points in another direction.

It is more natural to suppose that our brief existence is the

* Parker, p. 69; Dr. Haldane, *loc. cit.*

† *Fairies and Fusiliers*, Robert Groves.

temporal appearance of some character of the whole, such as, in any case, constitutes a very great part of the finite individual's reality as experienced in the world. For what appears as a passage in time, the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units. And there are indications which point in this direction, and suggest in what kind of worlds, or higher complexes, we might find our completion. While we serve as units, to speak the language of appearance, the Absolute lives in us a little, and for a little time; when its life demands our existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters,* which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise, and in which our reality enriches the universe.

I reserved a conceivable interpretation for the primary attitude which I described, reinforced as it was by traditions from the metaphysic of substance. Suppose that this metaphysic or theology† dealt with substances eternal indeed but created; and that such creation ought to be understood, as Kant apparently must have understood it, though the fact is seldom noticed, to imply an underlying oneness with the creator.‡ Then, what the doctrine really signified for religious thought was a communicated and derived substantiality, founded on a sense of unity, whose ultimate meaning was unity with the creator—a unity not conditioned by time. Then, the conception of substance, whose withered husk has become the support of pluralism, and has been lowered to the level of thinghood and existence, would have meant essentially an attempt to insist on the eternity of all spirits in God. I presume that this was not so for Aristotle. But Aristotle did not speak the last word on the subject.

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* I may refer to the paper, "Unvisited Tombs," in my *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, 1918.

† I admit that my idea of it comes chiefly from Dante. For the point in question, see *Purg.*, 17, 109.

‡ Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, pp. 188, 196.

SYMPOSIUM: DO FINITE INDIVIDUALS POSSESS A SUBSTANTIVE OR AN ADJECTIVAL MODE OF BEING?

II.—*By* A. S. Pringle-Pattison.

The vital interest of this discussion centres in what Professor Bosanquet has aptly called "the teleological status of finite spirits in the universe"; and it is plain, as he says, that no settlement of the question whether such spirits are to be regarded as substance or adjective in the common or Aristotelian sense of these terms can determine that status, seeing that the term thing or substance is commonly applied to innumerable objects, animate and inanimate, to which we should never dream of attributing the status and destiny which have been claimed for the human individual. I do not mean, therefore, to dwell at any length on Professor Bosanquet's criticism of what he calls the first set of arguments; and it is the less necessary for me to do so, as he acknowledges that my own argument in *The Idea of God* depends, in the main, upon other considerations. I did, however, pointedly refer to the confusion introduced into the debate by the Spinozistic use of the term substance and the description of all "provisional subjects" (things or persons) as "predicates" or "adjectives" of "the one true individual Real." My conviction of the forced and misleading nature of such terminology was amply confirmed by the difficulty I had in persuading the compositors and readers of the Clarendon Press to accept the word "adjectival" in this connection at all; it evidently to them made nonsense of the sentence in which it occurred. I will try, therefore, to re-state my reasons for holding this use of terms to be radically misleading and a subtle pre-judgment of the whole question at issue.

"Reduced to plain prose and ordinary English usage," I

said, "the adjectival theory of the finite is simply the denial of unrelated reals."* Professor Bosanquet says, in his present paper, that it means for him more than this: "When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival, I do not merely deny unrelatedness; what I aim at denying is co-ordinate relatedness," and, again, "To me the term would imply subordination in place of co-ordination—the character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole which includes it." I do not think, however, that this distinction in itself points to any real difference between us. The word co-ordinate is not mine, but in my view reals which are interrelated with one another, and in that sense co-ordinate, will naturally be subordinate to the systematic whole in which they are included as parts. A difference would only exist if interrelation (to use my own word) is held to imply the doctrine of self-existent and initially *un*related reals. So, apparently, Professor Bosanquet interprets it; but, surely, the *prima facie* suggestion of the word is the precise negation of such an unmediated pluralism. In my book, at any rate, pluralism of this description is combated explicitly and implicitly at every point of my argument. Setting aside some metaphysicians of the pluralistic variety, therefore, I think the rest of mankind would readily agree that any individual thing "qualifies" and "characterises" by its existence and character the nature of the whole to which it belongs. The nature of the whole would be different if the individual in question did not exist, or if its individual character were other than it actually is. This would be true, *e.g.*, of any material system and its parts, or of any social whole and its members. But when we transform this admission into the statement that the provisional subjects in question are "best considered as characters predicable of the universe," although there may seem to be only a verbal change in the form of expression, we have passed in reality, under cover of

* *The Idea of God*, p. 274.

the verbal change, from the general relation of whole and part to the specific and quite different category of substance and accident, thing and quality, in the traditional and ordinary sense of these terms. We have committed ourselves, in short, to the uncompromising doctrine of Professor Bosanquet's *Logic* that all finite individuals "are in ultimate analysis *connections of content* within the real individual to which they belong." The words which I have italicised contain the *crux* of the situation; and they reflect precisely the confusion which leads Spinoza to resolve all things and persons into modes of the attributes of God. For although Spinoza puts his own sense upon Substance, and treats it, like Professor Bosanquet's Reality, as the one all-inclusive individual, his conceptions of attribute and mode are entirely based upon the traditional contrast of substance and quality as applied in the Cartesian system to the two cases of mind and body. Hence, as a mode of the Divine attribute of thought, a human mind is simply a complex of ideas, as it were an objective ideal content, continuous with the rest of the system of ideas which together constitute the infinite intellect of God. Spinoza has no account to give of the unity which makes each individual mind a separate centre of thought and action; persons are merged in the ideal continuum of the infinite intellect, and the identity of the intellect and the will becomes the most characteristic doctrine of the system.

Professor Bosanquet's treatment of all finite individuals as merely "apparent," "superficial," and "provisional" subjects is entirely in line with Spinoza's account of them as substantiations due to "imagination," uncorrected by reason; and it leads him similarly to the conception of the universe as a continuum of interconnected content within, or referred to, the one ultimate subject. Hence, the stress laid on the doctrine that the true form of predication is not "S is P," but "Reality is such that at or in S it is P"—where the "at" or "in" is, I would point out, an inconsistent concession to the ordinary view, which substantiates S. What the judgment expresses,

on Professor Bosanquet's principles, is, I take it, a connection of content, and the only proper formulation is, therefore, "Reality is such that S implies or is accompanied by P." This, if I am not mistaken, was the form in which the doctrine was first propounded by Mr. Bradley, and it has the effect of abolishing the singular judgment altogether and reducing all propositions to hypotheticals or scientific universals of the type, "If S, then P." In other words, what the judgment immediately asserts is a connection of qualities, but in order that these universals may not be left hanging absolutely in the air, the predicative relation is restored by referring or attaching the qualities so connected, along with all similar connections of qualities, to R, the one ultimate subject. But, surely, this indiscriminate and unmediated reference to Reality is as unnatural as, *e.g.*, Berkeley's attempt to resolve all the things and happenings of the external world into the immediate acts of God. And, as I have urged in my book, and as I particularly desire to urge again in this more general reference, it ignores entirely the concrete texture of existence as distinguished from the abstractions of the intellect. For the existence of a world at all just means individuation. Every existent is a "this," a "one," a being in a strict sense unique, even although, in the case of inorganic objects, one may readily admit that the bounds of what we treat as an individual depend largely on our immediate interest or practical purpose. According to that interest or purpose, any part of a spatial or temporal whole may become in its turn a whole, but the point is that every part so attended to exhibits the same characteristic of concrete thisness. The relation of whole and part has, in short, nothing to do with the relation of substance and accident; and the much misunderstood idea of substance, as applied to every existent thing, and to any of the parts into which an existent thing may be subdivided, is at bottom simply an attempt to express the characteristic structure exhibited by concrete reality at any point, of being a "this" as well as a "what," a

being possessing qualities and not a mere conflux of universals or, in other words, a highly complex adjective. The uniqueness which comes from the occupation of different parts of space or moments of time is, of course, the lowest or most imperfect form in which individuation manifests itself, and a merely inorganic view of the physical world may well be an abstract way of looking at the facts.* In any case, the physical world as a whole must be interpreted in the end as organic to the world of life and consciousness. It is in living and sentient beings that we seem first to meet the real individual, for in these the unity and centrality are in no wise imposed upon the facts by our way of regarding them. They are objective in the sense that they express the essential mode of the creature's existence. The organism in commerce with its environment as a responsive centre of feeling and action, and in all its activities a self-maintaining whole, thus becomes for us the clearest type of the process of rounding to a separate mind, in which, at a higher level, the creation of the self-conscious individual consists. The higher we go, the more clearly does individuation impress itself upon us as the very method of creation, or, to speak less theologically, as the central and most characteristic feature of the cosmic evolution. If, then, we follow out this indication, so far from being a vanishing and relatively unreal incident in the process, the finite spiritual

* A biologically-inspired thinker like Dr. Haldane declares that "the idea of life is nearer to reality than the ideas of matter and energy, and, therefore, the presupposition of ideal biology is that inorganic can ultimately be resolved into organic phenomena." There being, as he forcibly argues, "not the remotest possibility of deriving the organic from the inorganic," he holds that, "in tracing life back and back to what appears at first to be the inorganic, we are not seeking to reduce the organic to the inorganic, but the inorganic to the organic. . . . What were at first taken for the origins of life from the inorganic have gradually turned out to be definite living organisms. But biology will not stop at these; she will gradually push her advance victoriously further and further into the domain of the apparently inorganic."—*Mechanism, Life and Personality*, pp. 100, 104.

individual, with all his potentialities, tends rather to appear (if one may speak teleologically at all in such a reference) as the only conceivable goal of the divine endeavour.

Such in outline was my argument, or at least my suggestion by way of commentary on Professor Bosanquet's on the whole grudging and depreciatory treatment of the finite self. Yet, as I began by admitting, the status of finite spirits in the universe cannot be decided by proving that they are substances in the ordinary sense, for many such substances are at once insignificant and transient. Professor Bosanquet's attitude to the self seemed to me, however, to be the outcome, or at any rate the culminating instance, of a general refusal to recognise the significance of numerical identity as the basal characteristic of concrete existence. The very phrase seems to offend him: every reader will recall the scornful distaste with which it is handled from time to time in his pages. Doubtless, it is of no value in itself. It is no more than matter without form, the frame without the picture; and the significance of any individual lies in its content—in the values realised in its life. But Professor Bosanquet's exclusive preoccupation with content leads him to forget that content is equally an abstraction, if severed from the centres of experience—the beings—in which it is realised. Truth, beauty, love—all the great values—what meaning have they apart from their conscious realisation in a living individual, finite or infinite? Professor Bosanquet appears however, to think of content as a self-existent continuum and of the conditions of individual existence as comparable to partitions introduced into this continuum (as we might let down vessels of different shape into a stream) by which one section or area is temporarily enclosed and, to its own misfortune, isolated from the rest. Hence, the removal of these arbitrary divisions leads naturally to the conception of the "confluence" of selves, the supplementation of one by another, and eventually to the confluence or fusion of all finite selves in the Absolute.

It was this conception of the confluence of selves and a similar expression about the "overlapping" of intelligences which led me to assert that, "if one were inclined to put it strongly, one might almost say that Professor Bosanquet's theory does not contain the idea of self at all; the world is dissolved into a collection of qualities or adjectives which are ultimately housed in the Absolute. And again, just because of the failure to appreciate the meaning of finite selfhood, it is difficult to say whether even the Absolute is to be regarded as a self or not—that is to say, whether what is called the absolute experience possesses the centrality or focalised unity which is the essential characteristic of a self, and, in its degree, we may say, of everything that is real."* A self may be largely identical in content with other selves, and in that sense we may intelligibly talk of "overlapping," but to speak as if their common content affected in any way their existential distinctness is to use words to which I can attach no meaning. So, again, a self may cease to be, but it cannot coalesce with another self; for the very meaning of its existence is that it is a unique focalisation of the universe. And the same thing applies to the "transmutation and absorption" of finite selves in the Absolute: it is hardly disguised either by Professor Bosanquet or Mr. Bradley that such transmutation is equivalent to the disappearance of the individualities in question. Yet, Professor Bosanquet returns, I see, in his present paper to the ideas of confluence and absorption and supports them by "a simple analogy from knowledge." Just as his philosophy might be improved (in the opinion of his critics) by incorporating elements of truth from other quarters, and might thus even become in the end a system of absolute truth, so he himself (the analogy runs) might amalgamate with other people and in the end attain perfection as the Absolute. I could not desire any better illustration of the confusion against which I

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* *The Idea of God*, p. 271.

am contending than this comparison between the piecing-out of an impersonal system of thought and the life-course of a moral personality which, however it may bud and blossom and ripen to maturity, must grow always from its own root.

But it is time to turn from this general argument to the special considerations which must determine the survival or non-survival of human persons. These are discussed by Professor Bosanquet in the latter part of his paper, and although there is here a considerable extent of common ground, there is in the end, as he observes, "a real contrast of tendency" between us; he even speaks of "two attitudes to life" as embodied in our respective arguments. First, as regards the points of agreement: I do not hold, any more than Professor Bosanquet, that finite selves are "necessarily eternal or everlasting units;" or, in other words, that they possess an inherent and inalienable immortality. Such an indestructibility was supposed to be demonstrated by the old metaphysic on the ground that they are unitary and indiscerptible substances. This argument, if it had any vitality and convincing power before Kant, has certainly not survived his criticisms in the Paralogisms. I consider the traditional notion of the soul-substance a piece of covert materialism, and I have strongly repudiated the apparent revival of the doctrine in Dr. McTaggart's theory of eternal substances. I agree entirely with Lotze that "so far as and so long as the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is, and is named, simply for that reason, substance. The attempt to find its capacity of thus knowing itself in the numerical unity of another underlying substance is not a process of reasoning which merely fails to reach an admissible aim; it has no aim at all. That which is not only conceived by others as unity in multiplicity, but knows and makes itself good as such, is, simply on that account, the truest and most indivisible unity there can be."* I would

* *Metaphysic*, Book III, c. 1, English translation, p. 430.

even emphasize the initial "so far as and so long as," for I consider the substantiality of the soul in this sense not as a gift from above, conferred once for all, but as a matter of achievement. What is given is simply the opportunity; the achievement is a question of degree, and is dependent moreover on resolute and continuous self-maintenance.* Consequently, I agree with Lotze further that, in regard to immortality, we can expect from philosophy no demonstration of the old pattern; we have no other principle for deciding the question beyond this general idealistic conviction, that every created thing will continue if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world.†

Again, while I think that the denial of human survival must profoundly affect our general view of the world, I cannot agree that the doctrine of immortality is, as some would make it, the cardinal article of a philosophic or religious creed. Professor Taylor, for example, following other defenders of the faith, recently declared that if "in this life only we have hope," pessimistic atheism seemed to him the only alternative to the Christian faith.‡ Surely this is an over-statement. I confess I never listen to the strange lapses in St. Paul's Resurrection argument without recalling Clifford's nobler conclusion: "Do I seem to say: 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' Far from it; on the contrary I say: 'Let us take hands and help, for this day we are alive together.'"§

A belief in personal survival may well make the difference between what might be called roughly the Christian and the Stoic view of the world. But Stoicism was a noble creed, which expressly inculcated a religious attitude to the universe, and it has been the nurse of noble characters. William James seems

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* Cf. *The Idea of God*, p. 413.

† *Metaphysic*, p. 432.

‡ In a paper contributed to a volume of essays on *The Faith and the War*, p. 149.

§ *Lectures and Essays*, I, p. 226.

to state the case here fairly when, in one of his early papers on pragmatism, defining theism and materialism by their practical consequences, he finds the differentia of theism, as contrasted with the "utter final wreck and tragedy" of materialism, in its assertion of "an eternal moral order." "A world with a God in it to say the last word may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of Him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that where He is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things."*

> "The Good, the True, the Pure, the Just,
> Take the charm 'for ever' from them, and they crumble into dust."

The "for ever" in Tennyson's lines refers, of course, to his favourite theme, the immortality of the individual; but it is the permanence of our ideals themselves, as expressing the eternal foundations of the word, which is the irreducible minimum of a reasonable faith and the irreducible minimum of the moral demand we make upon the universe.

I expressed this view with some emphasis at the close of my second lecture in a passage which has been referred to with approval by Professor Bosanquet, Professor Mackenzie and others. But the passage was not introduced, nor did the context present it, as a considered judgment in a negative sense on the question of immortality itself. It was a protest, as I indicated, against the absence of a sense of proportion in the discussion, and also, I may say, against the vehemence with which immortality appeared to be asserted by some of the disputants as a personal claim. For I find myself much in agreement with Professor Bosanquet when he insists that, at the religious standpoint, we have left the world of claims and counter-claims far behind us. It is difficult to conceive of anyone claiming immortality as a right *for himself*, on purely personal grounds; indeed the idea of a

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* *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*, p. 14.

"right" in such a reference is so incongruous that to make such a claim might almost be said to disqualify the claimant. And even on the sacred ground of the human affections, perhaps the ultimate attitude of the religious man would be that expressed by Carlyle in one of the pathetic outbursts of his *Autobiography*: "Perhaps we *shall* all meet Yonder, and the tears be wiped from all eyes. One thing is no Perhaps; surely we *shall* all meet, *if* it be the will of the Maker of us. If it be not His will, then is it not better so?" It is certain, at all events, that our conclusions as to the value and destiny of the individual must ultimately depend upon our conception of God and of his relation to his creatures. If we can reach any positive convictions, they will be based not upon human claims but upon the perfection of God and his nature as Love. In the sequel of my argument this conception of the divine Life and its consequences were gradually developed, and the permanence of individual personality came accordingly to be more and more insisted on in opposition to the transient function assigned to it in Professor Bosanquet's theory.

I agree with him that it is desirable in the interests of this discussion not to gloss over any radical discrepancy of feeling or contrast of tendency in our respective views, and as he has re-stated his position "uncompromisingly" in the concluding pages of his paper, I will be as uncompromising in my reply. It seems a hard thing to say, but a reading of this re-statement confirms the suspicion already indicated that, in all his thinking, Professor Bosanquet completely fails to realise the elementary conditions of selfhood. In his theory there is no real self at all, either of God or man, but only a logical transparency called the Absolute. In speaking of finite selves he seems never to look at them from the inside, if I may so express myself, but always from the point of view of a spectator momentarily concentrating attention upon them in abstraction from the social whole which is their setting. He insists, quite rightly, that if our minds could be "visualised"

in this way, "they would not look like self-contained shapes"; they would appear "fragmentary and incomprehensible . . . . all senseless and self-contradictory apart from the inclusive structural system." But because a mind cannot be extracted and exhibited as a self-contained whole apart from "the moral and spiritual structure" in which it is rooted, it does not follow that the mind or self is simply a punctual centre in which a system of moral and social relations reflects itself into unity as rays of light are concentrated in a focus.

The existence of the self for the self is an experienced certainty; it is, in a sense, the ground on which we stand. We must take up our stand accordingly *within* the self, and our philosophy must be able to account for, or at least to find room for, this mode of existence and the measure of freedom and independence which it involves. Now, conscious experience reveals itself in the triple character of knowledge, feeling and will, and every conscious fact exhibits these three aspects in an indissoluble unity. Although this is obscured in theories which lay exclusive stress on knowledge and, in their preoccupation with the content known, forget the act of knowing and the feeling which is inseparable from it, experience proclaims itself everywhere, under proper analysis, as the experience of self-centred individuals. And, by common consent, it is the volitional aspect of that experience, the facts of will, culminating in deliberate moral choice, in which the consciousness of "authorship," as Professor Parker calls it,* is most indubitably present. The authorship of our own acts and our responsibility for them—this is the inmost meaning of our freedom and independence, and any theory is self-condemned which can find no room for this elementary certainty. Professor Bosanquet evades this issue when he talks disparagingly of "mere choice" and makes play with the familiar equivocation between freedom, meaning the

* *The Self and Nature*, p. 295.

capacity of choice between good and evil, and freedom in the sense of willing "the universal object," accepting "a will above my own," in a word, the achieved harmony of the perfect moral will. His references are to "all serious moral action, all social volition or religious self-determination." "The moral universe in me expresses itself thus" is the proper formula, he tells us, for such experiences, just as he says elsewhere of the judgment—the "genuine" judgment—that it is not properly my act; "the world judges in me, though from my point of view." But what of judgment which is not genuine, what of volitions which run counter to the moral universe, volitions in which, in Professor Bosanquet's own words, "I set up to be in myself a self-centred real"? Professor Bosanquet edges away from the difficulty with the parting shot for his opponents that it would appear to be precisely "in error and in sin that I come nearest to being a substantive in my own right." There is, however, no question of being a substantive "in my own right," but only of the selfhood which is implied in having a will at all; and the fact remains that, on Professor Bosanquet's theory, error and sin are totally inexplicable. How can I take up this attitude of opposition if I have not some kind of existence over against the spirit of the whole, if there is not some otherness in the relation between us? And one becomes tired of pointing out that exactly the same is true when, in religion, we bow to a higher will and accept its purposes as our own; the surrender of the selfish will implies the power to assert it. Where is the merit or value in the self-surrender if the whole process is a make-believe on the part of the Absolute? If the Absolute is the only agent in the case, how can it will anything *but* the universal?

The truth is, Professor Bosanquet's general theory is of the type mentioned above, in which the logical analysis of knowledge is substituted for an account of living experience. The logical analysis of knowledge yields us no more than the

Kantian unity of apperception, which, as such, is no real self (whether human or divine) but simply the ideal unity of systematised knowledge. Kant himself equates the subjective unity with the idea of Nature as a "Natureinheit," or systematic unity. It is the idea of the unity of the universe as an intelligible system, an idea which Kant insists is a *necessary* idea, the necessary presupposition of any knowledge whatsoever. I am far from disparaging the importance of this conception in its proper reference—in logic or epistemology—but to treat the postulate of knowledge as itself a real being—the so-called universal consciousness—is, in effect, to hypostatise an abstraction. And if we restrict our attention to knowledge-content, there is no ground discernible for the distinction and multiplication of personalities. These are at best only different points of view—peepholes, so to speak—from which an identical content is contemplated. They are distinguishable, therefore, only by the greater range of content which they command and the greater coherence which they are consequently able to introduce into their world-scheme. The natural consummation of such limited points of view is to be pieced together and harmonised in the central or universal view-point from which, with all the facts before us, we should be able to see them all in their proper relations as a completely coherent system. The existence of finite centres at all is a superfluity for the theory, which accepts it (somewhat ungraciously) as a fact which cannot well be denied, but a distinction whose "precarious and superficial nature" it cannot sufficiently emphasise.*

It is noteworthy how Professor Bosanquet tends to preserve the same attitude even in the moral sphere, where volition is so fundamental, and the clash of wills so much the crux of the situation, that here one might have thought it would be

* Compare for this attitude Professor Bosanquet's second lecture in *Value and Destiny*. *Cf.* also *The Idea of God*, p. 276, and the passages there quoted from *Appearance and Reality*.

impossible to ignore the individual selfhood involved. There is, first of all, the Spinozistic assimilation of volition to judgment. Then, as in the parallel case of knowing, we have attention directed from the act of will to the content willed; and, as it is difficult (Professor Bosanquet tells us) to maintain that any action willed is intrinsically and absolutely bad, evil comes to be regarded as simply good in the wrong place. "It is the narrowness of man's mind which makes him do wrong. He desires more than he can deal with. What he can make his own, as a set of values which do not conflict, is but little. And of what is extruded something refuses to be suppressed and forms a nucleus of rebellion." But the constituents of this bad self are not bad in themselves. It is only that "good, being narrow," is "opposed by omitted elements in the character of evil"; and as "the antagonism which makes it evil depends on finiteness," it "must vanish if finiteness is transcended." In other, if cruder, words, our wills are evil because we cannot will everything at once. In the Absolute, where all possible objects (we may conceive) are willed together, all possible desires will be fulfilled. What was evil, or appeared so, will come to its rights as good; or, to speak more strictly, the contrast of good and evil will be transcended, the Absolute being "beyond good and evil" in the ethical sense. The preceding quotations are from a paper on the "Reality of Evil" in Professor Bosanquet's volume of essays just published,* but the same doctrine was expounded in the seventh Lecture in *Value and Destiny*.† "The stuff of which evil is made is one with the stuff of which good is made. No tendency or desire could be pointed out in the worst of lives or of actions which is incapable of being, with addition and readjustment, incorporated in a good self. The evil attitude is an incident of the good, asserting the same sort of aims and asserting them as good, and

* *Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 106–7, 115.
† Pp. 215–17.

only asserting them against the acknowledged good system, because the acknowledged finite good and the finite creature are unable to adjust themselves to each other in an all-inclusive system." In such a system, "there is room for the character of all evil, redistributed and resystematised, just as there is in truth for the elements of all error." And in this context occurs the famous passage in which A and B are shaken up in a bag together to make a perfect man, and the Absolute is described as a limiting case of such a process.

What are we to make of this attempt to present error as a species of truth, on the ground that it "is an arrangement in the same world as truth and deals with the same realities," and of the parallel proposal to treat evil as a kind of good because good and evil are made of the same "stuff," that is to say, are both judgments on human "tendencies and desires"? On me the suggestion makes much the same impression as the materialistic reduction of the universe to a problem in the re-distribution of matter and motion. There is a similar determination to reach a formal identity by abstracting from differences on which the very character of the universe as a spiritual cosmos depends. In the case of error, we are told, there is only a "confusion between realities," which can be got rid of by "re-arranging and re-adjusting the conditions of the statement," and a judgment of moral condemnation may pass [similarly] into one of approval if we sufficiently "re-distribute and re-systematize" the elements of characters with which it deals. But such a statement as the last has no relevance whatever, for moral judgments are not passed upon particular tendencies and desires in the abstract. These may be said to belong to the pre-moral world of animal innocency. The moral judgment deals with the character of an individual agent as revealed by his action in a concrete situation. It was not my purpose, however, to discuss the nature of good and evil in all its bearings. I adduced Professor Bosanquet's treatment of the subject as the crowning instance of his tendency to dis-

integrate the individual personality and reassemble its abstract elements in the Absolute. The natural effect of this treatment of the lesser individuals is gravely to compromise the claim of this ultimate individual to be itself concrete, in the sense of being a self-conscious experience or life. It tends to become merely the logical unity of an abstract or impersonal content. Or, if we do treat it as an agent, the agency is of the Brahmanic type, in which there is no real difference or "otherness" between the Absolute and its creatures. It feels and thinks and acts in them:

> I am the doubter and the doubt
> And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

My position, on the contrary, is that belief in the relative independence of human personalities and belief in the existence of God as a living Being are bound up together. The reality of both God and man depends on the reality of the difference between them. Thus I interpret the meaning of creation. The process of the finite world is not a game of make-believe which the Absolute plays with itself;* it means the actual origination of new centres of life and agency, not created by a magical word of evocation, but given the opportunity to make themselves. Professor Bosanquet, in his chapters on the "Moulding of Souls,"† describes this process suggestively as one of "eliciting our own souls from their outsides"; but he admits later that "elicit," though a useful word, "covers an almost miraculous creation which it does not explain."† The chapter in which this remark occurs is headed, indeed, "The Miracle of Will," although in the sequel of the argument the author hardly lives up to his title. The process is in truth not simply "almost" but wholly miraculous, if by that is

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* As suggested, for example, in Emerson's lines:

> "They know not well the subtle ways
> I keep and pass and turn again."

† *Value and Destiny*, pp. 79, 97.

meant that, in the nature of the case, we, who are its products, cannot understand the method of our own creation any more than we can fully reconcile to ourselves the separateness and moral independence of the status achieved with the relation of creaturely dependence which is involved from the beginning and persists to the end. But the process goes on daily before our eyes in every case of the growth of a mind, and we do well, with Lotze, to accept the miracle as an ultimate fact. And my contention is that it is to be accepted, not as an unexplained and puzzling exception to an otherwise intelligible scheme of things, but as itself the illuminative fact in which the meaning of the whole finite process may be read. What meaning or value can the process have, "from the side of the Absolute," save as mediating the existence of spiritual beings, objects of the divine care and love, and themselves capable of responsive love and fellowship?

Professor Bosanquet says, in his present paper, that "I cannot believe that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be." It is a becoming confession and one in which I hope we should all heartily join. But to put the case in that way is hardly to put it fairly. It is not I, "such as I experience myself to be," or, as he puts it in the previous page, the finite spirit "as it stands and experiences itself with all its imperfections on its head," which can be conceived as the end of the Absolute (and apparently the finished result of all its pains); it is the spirit as God knows it and intends it to become, the spirit with its infinite potentialities and aspirations and *the consciousness of its own imperfections*, which is the fulcrum of its advance and the guarantee of a nobler future. This is what Professor Bosanquet means by the "intentional," as opposed to the "given," unity of the self. Our unity, he says, is "a puzzle and an unsatisfied aspiration"—it is a "demand," a "pretension," which is never made good. And he takes the line of arguing that because the desire for

immortality, so far as it is conceived in a religious spirit and deserves serious consideration, is not a desire for the perpetuation and stereotyping of my present self in all its poverty and meanness, but rather a desire to be fashioned more and more in the likeness of a perfect humanity, therefore it is not a desire for personal continuance at all, but, strictly speaking, he seems to say, inconsistent with it. It is identification with perfection which we seek, in the sense of merging our own personality altogether in that of the perfect Being. As he puts it in his Gifford Lecture, it is not "our" personality but "a" personality, whose eternity the moral and religious consciousness demands, and so it is "no puzzle," he concludes, "no 'faith as vague as all unsweet,' to offer the eternal reality of the Absolute as that realisation of ourself which we instinctively demand and desire."* Surely, this is to misread the situation. Because I desire to be made more and more in the likeness of God, I do not therefore desire to *be* God. The development of a personality in knowledge and goodness does not take place through confluence with other personalities, nor is its goal and consummation to yield up its proper being and be "blended with innumerable other selves" in the Absolute.† As Socrates said on one occasion, "whatever else may be doubtful, this is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power." In spite of Professor Bosanquet's fresh attempts at justification, and in spite of the ecstatic utterances of the mystics, I maintain that the idea of blending or absorption depends entirely on material analogies which can have no application in the case of selves. "I surrender my soul heartily to God," wrote Labadie, the French Pietist, in his last will and testament, "giving it back like a drop of water to

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* *Value and Destiny*, pp. 282, 288, Lecture IX, "On the Destiny of the Finite Self." As I am controverting the general conclusion, I specially desire to recognise the high and serious level, both of thought and feeling, at which the subject is discussed in this lecture.

† *Cf. supra*, p. 96.

its source, and rest confident in Him, praying God, my origin and ocean, that he will take me unto Himself and engulf me eternally in the divine abyss of His Being." The physical metaphor dominates the whole conception. But absorption or "engulfment," in the case of a spiritual being, means only the extinction of one centre of intelligence and love, without any conceivable gain to other intelligences or to the content of the universe as a whole. Did Labadie suppose that he had not already his being in God, "without whom nothing can be or be conceived," or that a union founded in knowledge and love and conscious service is not closer and more intimate by far than any which can be represented by the fusion of material things? Did he suppose that the engulfment of his private being could in any way enrich the fontal Life from which it sprang? Surely, his value to God, or that of any other worshipping saint, must be held to lie in the personality of the worshipper. The existence of an individual centre of knowledge and feeling is, in itself, an enrichment of the universe; and the clearer and intenser the flame of the individual life, the greater proportionally the enrichment. To merge or blend such centres is simply to put out the lights one by one. In the society of such individuals, and in their communion with God, the supreme values of the universe emerge; and it is not personal vanity which suggests that for the Absolute such communion must possess a living value which no solitary perfection or contemplative felicity could yield.

This value, according to the view suggested, is not of the kind implied in Professor Bosanquet's usual type of statement *e.g.*, "the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units," "the Absolute lives in us a little and for a little time; when its life demands our existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasize."* In such

* *Supra*, p. 102.

statements we still have what I will call, for the sake of emphasizing the distinction, the pagan, egoistic or self-centred view of the Absolute, which conceives its life on the analogy of æsthetic enjoyment, the doings and sufferings of the subordinate units contributing to this supreme experience the note of danger and tragedy, the sympathetic thrill of heroic daring, endurance or self-sacrifice, but all still conceived, in the main, as the dramatic interest and emotion of a spectator. And the emphasis on the contributory function of the units makes it seem as if the whole were but a play staged in order that the Absolute may enjoy those dramatic thrills. I do not say that such a description does full justice to Professor Bosanquet's conception, but such is the impression frequently conveyed by his statements; and it is the self-centredness of such a Being which I have impugned in my book as falling short of our highest standards of human excellence, and therefore *a fortiori* unworthy of the divine perfection. In the fine essay on "Unvisited Tombs," to which he has referred us, Professor Bosanquet quotes with effect a passage from a novel of the day, in which the ambitious aims of one of the characters are contrasted by the speaker with his own more modest outlook:—"'For my part, I care infinitely more for the small things of life—love, friendship, sympathy.' 'The small things! Good Lord!' said the bishop, and his jaw dropped. He also dropped the subject." Professor Bosanquet's commentary is the same as the bishop's, "the greatest things of all no one can take away." Even "beauty and knowledge," he indicates, lofty and universal values though they are, do not stand beside them. And the saying of Pascal is well known:—Tous les corps ensemble, et tous les esprits ensemble, et toutes leurs productions, ne valent pas le moindre movement de charité, car elle est d'un ordre infiniment plus élevé. If Love, then, becomes the ultimate expression of the divine nature, as it is in the Christian conception, self-centredness must disappear; the divine life must be a life with and for others, and the otherness must be real and not only apparent.

But all this, it may be replied, does not guarantee the permanence of individual finite spirits, for the condition of otherness is equally satisfied by successive generations of conscious beings, each of which is transient and yields place to another. Here, again, however, I would apply the idea of the divine perfection, appealing for the interpretation of the more and the less perfect, as we needs must, to our own experience. I remember many years ago reading a little book by one of our minor poets, in which he expounded with some complacency what he called "The Religion of a Literary Man." Among other serious topics which he handled was that of the Hereafter, in its bearing on friendship and the death of friends. We love our friends, he argued, not, as we often say, "for themselves," but for their possession of certain qualities—"for their good nature, their wit, their beauty, or whatever their qualities may be; and these qualities are to be met with over and over again, possibly in still more satisfying harmonies. Thus we have not to wait to meet our old friends again in heaven, we meet them again already on earth—in the new ones." The rest of the book I have quite forgotten, but this sentiment has remained in my memory as a signal instance of poverty of feeling and shallowness of nature. The application of the reminiscence is obvious. Are we to attribute to the divine Friend and Lover of men a levity of attitude which we find offensively untrue of our ordinary human fidelities? Are we to liken Him to a military commander, who is content, if fresh drafts are forthcoming, to fill his depleted battalions? To the military system, men are only so much human material, so many numerable units; but a chance encounter with one of the men in the flesh, a touch of human-heartedness, is sufficient to dissolve the abstraction which so regards them.

My references to the question of individual survival, both here and in my book, are of a general character. The considerations adduced represent, it might perhaps be said, an "attitude" towards the question rather than any determinate,

far less any dogmatic, solution of the problem. Certainly, they need not be applied in any rigid or mechanical fashion—as if we should insist, for example, that everything born in human shape inherited thereby an indefeasible title to an eternal destiny. Personality has to be won before there can be any question of its conservation.* Achievement, moreover, as we saw, is a matter of degree, and depends on continuous self-maintenance. There seems no reason for denying the possibility of "dissociation" or disintegration, caused either by acute disease, as in the morbid cases of which Professor Bosanquet cites a remarkable example, or due in other cases to more ordinary causes. Mere sloth and self-indulgence may induce a condition of moral flabbiness in which a man becomes little more than a loosely associated group of appetites and habits. Some persistent purpose, or rather some coherent system of aims and ideals, is required to constitute a real personality. If this is not present, or is not maintained, we lose hold of ourselves, as it were, and the body alone continues to confer a semblance of unity on this group of flickering impulses and animal, or semi-animal, satisfactions. When the bodily frame is dissolved, how should the self continue in being, seeing that it has already long ceased to exist as a moral unity? Must not the destiny of each spirit inevitably be confided in this sense to tself alone? As it is expressed in Matthew Arnold's sonnet,

> "The energy of life may be
> Kept on after the grave, but not begun;
> And he who flagged not in the earthly strife,
> From strength to strength advancing—only he,
> His soul well-knit, and all his battles won,
> Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life."

I cannot close without drawing attention to the enigmatic paragraph with which Professor Bosanquet concludes his paper. I should have thought that "the eternity of all spirits in God," spirits being taken as "substances eternal indeed but created,"

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* *Cf. supra*, pp. 110 *ff.*

and creation being understood "to imply an underlying oneness with the creator," resembled very closely the doctrine which I have supported. But this runs so counter to the general tenor of his argument elsewhere that I am doubtful as to his precise meaning. I confine myself, therefore, for the present to the expression of a hope that if he exercises the right of reply, he will amplify to some extent the very interesting but tantalising suggestions of these concluding sentences.

SYMPOSIUM: DO FINITE INDIVIDUALS POSSESS A SUBSTANTIVE OR AN ADJECTIVAL MODE OF BEING?

III.—*By* G. F. Stout.

In the present discussion, the topic formally proposed has been treated as subordinate to another problem, that of the "teleological status" of individual minds as bearing on the further question of their continued existence in a future life. What is the connexion of the two questions? If we agree that individual minds are subjects and not adjectives, this, of itself, helps us very little in determining their teleological status? On the other hand, if we agree that they are merely adjectives, this may make a great deal of difference to our view of their relative value. At any rate, for Professor Bosanquet, the question of the teleological status of finite individuals is inextricably bound up with his view that they are adjectives and not ultimate subjects; and this, again, follows immediately from his general theory of predication.

I shall, therefore, begin by examining this logical doctrine. I shall then consider his view of the value of finite individuals as determined by his logical theory. In conclusion, I shall discuss the value of the finite individual, independently.

I.

To determine precisely what Professor Bosanquet intends to assert in his theory of predication, we may start from the following passage (p. 83) in which he tells us what he means to deny. "When I say that certain apparent subjects are adjectival, I do not mean merely to deny non-relatedness; what I aim at denying is co-ordinate relatedness." From this it follows, on the negative side, that no relatedness of one part

of any kind of whole to other parts is a relation of subject and adjective. Positively, it follows that every relation of a whole to a part or partial feature of it, considered as such, is a relation in which the whole is subject and the part its adjective. The universe, therefore, as all-inclusive, must be the only subject, and whatever has a limited being must be merely an adjective of the universal reality. The logical basis of the theory which regards the universe as the sole subject of all adjectives is the identification of the relation of subject to adjective with that of whole to part—of the "superordinate" to the "subordinate." We must then begin by examining this general logical theory.

In the first place, what, precisely, does the theory mean? Clearly, we are not here confronted merely with a proposal to extend the application of the words "subject" and "adjective." What is meant is that the dog's tail, inasmuch as it is a living part of the living animal, is an adjective of the dog in the same sense as its colour, shape, barking, and eating.

In justifying this position, Dr. Bosanquet uses one main line of argument. He attempts to show that adjectives which characterise a part as such always characterise the whole as such. If one end of a stick is in contact with the ground, the whole stick is in contact with the ground at that end. If my hand grasps a tea-cup by its handle, I grasp the tea-cup with my hand, and the tea-cup, as a whole, is grasped by the handle. Inasmuch as one end of the rainbow is violet, the rainbow is violet at this end. Inasmuch as the mainspring of a watch is elastic, the watch is elastic in this part or as regards this part. Verbal statement of the equivalence may not be always so easy or natural as in these examples. But the principle holds universally. What is a character of a part, as such, is *eo ipso* and *pro tanto* a character of the whole.

But this is not what requires to be proved. The original thesis was not merely that all adjectives of the part are adjectives of the whole, but that the part itself is an adjective.

Professor Bosanquet seems to take it as evident that the second of these propositions follows from the first. He does not consider the possible alternative that the same characters may belong to two subjects ultimately distinct from each other, *e.g.*, the tail and the dog. If the alternative appears paradoxical, it should be remembered that we are here moving in a region of apparent paradox. It can, I think, be excluded only if we make a further assumption which would not be accepted by everybody, though I am not myself prepared to deny it. It must be assumed that a subject is not something distinct from all its adjectives, definable only as that to which they belong; but rather that it is nothing but the complex unity including all its adjectives. On this view, "snow is white" means that whiteness is one among other adjectives contained in the unity of a single complex which is identical with what we call snow. The identity of the subject is the identity of the one complex which includes what we call its adjectives. This being understood, it does seem to follow that if all the adjectives of the part are adjectives of the whole the part itself is an adjective of the whole. For this merely means that the adjectival complex which is the whole contains the adjectival complex which is the part. The tail is thus an adjective of the dog in essentially the same sense as sweetness is an adjective of sugar. One consequence which is directly implied in this position is that the whole, as subject, is identical with each of its parts; and that each of its parts, as subject, is identical with it and with every other part. Each part is distinct from the whole only as a partial complex of adjectives contained in the comprehensive unity of the whole; and one part is distinguished from another only as an adjective of the same whole,—only as the colour of the dog is distinguished from its shape. Regarded as subjects of adjectives, the dog *is* its tail, the dog's tail is the dog, and the dog's tail *is* also its stomach. It is, therefore, perhaps, futile to urge against the general theory that whole and part must ultimately be qualified by distinct adjectives, inasmuch as

the whole includes but is not included in the part, whereas the part is included in the whole but does not include it. To say this is to meet the theory by a blank denial instead of criticism. For precisely what is maintained is that the whole as subject is included in the part, as the sugar that is sweet is included in the sugar that is white.

Thus, the unity of the universe as all-inclusive is identified with the unity of substance as including its adjective. If there is any other relation except that of subject and adjective, it must be a relation between adjectives, not between subjects, and it must be one of part to part, not of whole to part.

I have now given an account of what I take to be Dr. Bosanquet's position, and of the reasoning on which it is based. If I have stated it wrongly, I have, I think, been sufficiently definite to make it easy for him to point out precisely where I have misunderstood him. I must now show why I cannot accept his position. In his reasoning, if its premisses are granted, I find no flaw. Given that a subject is merely the unity including all its adjectives, and given that every adjective of the part as such is an adjective and the very same adjective of the whole, it does seem to follow inevitably that the part itself as such is an adjective, and that there can be no subject but universal reality, seeing that all other wholes are parts of this. What is really doubtful, and, as I hold, false, is the proposition that the adjectives of the part are *eo ipso* adjectives of the whole.

Let us examine a simple example which may be regarded as typical. Consider the proposition: "This stick is dipped in water." As it stands the statement is ambiguous. It leaves room for the question: "Is the stick wholly immersed or only a part of it, and, if so, which part?" Different answers ascribe different adjectives to the stick as subject. Now, if we say that part is immersed, we can also assert of the stick as a whole that it is immersed, or, at any rate, dipped, in the water. Is it, then, the self-same adjective which qualifies both

the stick and its part? Obviously not. There is a certain correspondence but not identity. The part is entirely under water, the whole is not. It is so partly and partly it is not so. What we mean by saying that the stick is partly immersed is simply that it includes a part which is totally immersed, usually with the further implication that this makes a more or less important difference to the whole.* Now, the vital point is this. We may regard as an adjective of the whole its inclusion of a certain part. Yet, just because this inclusion is itself an adjective, it cannot be identified with the relatedness of the subject to its adjective any more than sweetness can be identified with the fact that it belongs to sugar. Being an adjective, it is one term in the relation of subject and predicate; and must, therefore, be distinct from the relatedness of either term to the other. On the same principle, the equality of one line to another cannot be either of the lines, and the similarity of one colour to another cannot be either of the colours. It follows that the relation of whole to part cannot be the relation of subject to adjective, except in the special case in which the whole is simply a complex of adjectives. Except in this case, the relatedness of whole to part is itself an adjective, and is, therefore, ultimately distinct from its own relation to its substantive. Now, where from the adjective of a part we pass to a corresponding adjective of the whole, this always presupposes the relation of whole and part as ultimately distinct from that of subject and adjective. The adjective of the part is not an adjective of the whole; still less is the part itself an adjective of the whole. What *is* an adjective of the whole is that it includes a part which is qualified by a certain adjective. "The dog moves in or at or as regards his tail" means that the "dog has a tail which moves." The motion of the tail both conditions and is conditioned by the state of the dog as a whole. But the state of the dog as a whole is not the

* For instance, we may be able to propel a boat when the oar is partly under water.

same as the state of its tail. It is the state of all its parts in their unity. What holds for the dog holds also for the universe. "Reality as including certain aspects of the geological history of our globe is the Atlantic Ocean," means "Reality includes a geological system which includes a part that is identical with the Atlantic Ocean."

I say is "identical with," and not merely "is," in order that I may steer clear of an ambiguity in the use of verb "to be" as copula. Its meaning is radically different when it couples substantive with substantive and when it couples substantive with adjective. When I say "this horse is black," I do not mean that the horse is identical with "black" or "blackness." What I mean is that the blackness* belongs to the horse as an adjective. But when I say "this horse is an animal," I do mean that it is identical with some animal or other—some member of the class "animals." I do not mean that any animal belongs to the horse as an adjective.† Now, if the verb "to be" coupling substantives signifies identity, and if the whole is identical, as Professor Bosanquet holds, with its part, why should it sound so absurd to assert that the dog is its tail or that the universe is the dog? It sounds absurd because it *is* absurd. The dog cannot be identical with its tail, and the universe cannot be identical with the dog, and, in general, the whole cannot be identical with its part. This remains impossible, even if we suppose that the part is not a distinct subject, but only a minor complex of adjectives within the wider complex which is the whole. It is, of course, the same comprehensive complex to which this partial adjective, and also other partial adjectives, belong, just as it is the same

* Or, rather, I should hold a particular instance of blackness. Blackness is a class-term and means "all 'blacks.'"

† There is a similar ambiguity in the word not. When B is a substantive "A is not B" means "A is other than B." Where B is an adjective it means "A has some adjective or other incompatible with B." See Johnson, *Mind*, N.S., vol. xxvii, 1918, p. 148.

sugar which is both sweet and white. Yet, the whiteness is not identical with the sweetness; and, therefore, the whole complex, which includes both whiteness and sweetness, cannot be identical with either of them. This would be possible only if the relation of subject and adjective was that of identity. But it is not. When identity is asserted of a subject, it is itself a relational adjective, not the relation of the subject to its adjective.

There is yet another aspect of Professor Bosanquet's doctrine which must be dealt with before we can leave this general discussion. He regards it as essential to his position that the nature of everything except the universe shall be entirely determined by its relatedness to other things. In particular, the nature of the parts of a whole as such must be entirely determined by their inter-relatedness within the whole. "I note," he says, "the common refuge of semi-pluralistic reasonings in admitting that finite individuals are related, but only in *some degree* determined by inter-relatedness. To me this seems an evasion" (p. 83). The reason why he regards it as an evasion is that "there is nothing in experience to suggest drawing a line between inter-relatedness and non-relatedness." It thus appears that for him the alleged evasion is to be found in the doctrine that part of the nature of things may be determined by relatedness and part be independent and isolated. Now, at least so far as I am concerned, this is a misunderstanding. I am not attempting to draw a line between relatedness and non-relatedness. I am not denying that the nature of a thing is "nothing" apart from relatedness. My point is that the inverse is equally true and important. The relatedness of a thing is "nothing" apart from its nature. Admitting, at least for the sake of argument, that the nature of a thing can be nothing apart from relatedness, I deny the totally different proposition that the nature of a thing is *nothing but* its relatedness. If this were so, there would be nothing to be related. If, then, two or more

terms are related, there is always the question, What are they? It is never a complete answer to this question to say that each of the terms is merely *that which* is related to the other and that otherwise it is nothing or a mere instance of being in general. Here, at any rate, it would seem that the Hegelian dictum virtually holds good and being in general is equivalent to nothing at all. There must ultimately be a qualitative element in the nature of related terms which makes it possible or necessary for them to be related as they are. This seems to me to hold good ultimately for all relations. But, for our present purpose, it is sufficient that it holds good, at least, for some of them. Take, for instance, likeness and unlikeness. Purple as a sense-datum is in one way like blue and in another like red. These relations are, as Locke would say, founded in the ideas related. They involve the intrinsic nature of red, blue, and purple. It is true that the intrinsic nature cannot exist or be possible without the relations. It is, however, equally true that the relations cannot exist or be possible without the intrinsic nature of the terms related. Consider next that relatedness to an object which consists in being pleased with it or the reverse. Here we have a relatedness which would be impossible if it were mere relatedness and nothing more. What gives its specific character to the relation itself is the intrinsic quality in which pleasant feeling differs from painful feeling, and this, certainly, cannot be resolved into mere relatedness.

A thing may exist and possess qualities essential to its function as part of a certain whole even when it has severed or before it has acquired its connection with the whole. Elasticity is essential to the function of a mainspring in the mechanism of a watch. But the mainspring may remain elastic when it is removed from the watch and inserted in some other piece of mechanism. Its nature, therefore, as part of the watch does not merely consist in its relatedness to other parts. This cannot, of course, apply directly to the universe as the all-

inclusive whole. The point, however, is that within the universe there are parts of such a nature that they can be related in a variety of alternative ways. Their whole being, therefore, can hardly consist in their relatedness.

Before leaving this somewhat arid logical discussion, I have yet to notice two special arguments against the view that finite beings can be ultimate subjects.

One of these is that "nothing can be guaranteed to exhibit within itself the conditions of the attributes we assign to it." This seems an *ignoratio elenchi.* What has to be shown is that nothing can really possess the attributes we ascribe to it. The proposition that it does or can possess within itself all the conditions on which those attributes depend is *prima facie* quite different. It is for Professor Bosanquet to show that it is none the less really the same. But he cannot do this except by begging the question at issue. He cannot do it except by assuming that the relation of condition and conditioned is the same as that of subject and adjective. Until this is clearly and cogently established, I shall continue to regard the question, "Is this sweet?" as distinct from, and logically prior to, the question "What makes it sweet?" The other argument is based on the alleged impossibility of determining what is a "single thing." Things "include one another in innumerable subordinations, from the Sahara, for example, or any patch of it, down to any grain of sand in it. A thing, therefore, as an existent can have no claim to be an ultimate subject" (p. 79). How is the conclusion supposed to follow? It can only follow if we supply the additional premiss that there is no difference between the relation of part and whole whatever the whole may be, and the relation of subject and adjective. Yet, this is precisely what has to be shown. Granting that everything except the universe is part of a wider whole, both it and the whole to which it belongs may, none the less, be ultimate subjects of adjectives. If I can select for special consideration as ultimate subject, either the desert of Sahara or a grain of sand in it, this is because they

both really are ultimate subjects. The grain of sand is included in the desert of Sahara, but it is not, to use Professor Bosanquet's bewildering metaphor, "merged and overwhelmed" by it (pp. 79, 82). If it were merged and overwhelmed it could not be included. If the items of my bill were merged and overwhelmed by the sum total, what should I have to pay? How could I check the account? I find myself unable to attach meaning to such a word as "overwhelming" when applied to the universe. It stands for a process in time which is itself included in the universe, and the universe can include it only if it includes what is overwhelmed, what overwhelms and the process of overwhelming, in their distinction from each other.

II.

If an individual mind is a mere adjective it can have only the value of an adjective; if it is identical with the universe, and with other parts of it, it cannot make a distinct contribution to the value of the whole. If every item of a bill is identical with the sum-total and with every other item, it cannot make a distinct contribution to the sum-total. In no intelligible sense can it be said to be included or contained in the sum.

Dr. Bosanquet's view of the teleological status of finite minds is largely, if not entirely, based on his theory of predication. We must therefore examine his special application of the theory to finite minds. On p. 93, we find a typical deliverance. "I am substantive and subject, but only so far as I recognise myself as adjective and predicate." What is the precise meaning of this? We might suppose the point to be that a mere adjective, which recognises itself as such, cannot be a mere adjective. But this would imply that in recognising itself as a mere adjective, it makes a mistake; and this is just what Dr. Bosanquet does not mean to assert. I take it that his real drift is as follows: In recognising myself as adjective, I recognise that I qualify a substantive, and this, in accordance with the general theory of predication, can only be universal

reality. If, now, I am permitted to apply to universal reality such words as "I" and "myself," then I can truly assert that "I myself" am "substantive and subject." Surely, this is a lame and impotent conclusion. Given that I may call chalk cheese, I can truly assert that chalk is edible. None the less, chalk is not edible. To escape such futility, we must assume not only that a part as such is an adjective of the whole, but also that an adjective is identical with its subject. If, then, I am an adjective of the universe, it follows that I am the universe, and that I may legitimately mean the universe when I use the words "I" and "myself." Yet, this assumed identity of adjective and substantive has not been made out, and seems untenable. The sweetness of sugar is not the sugar itself, and the loudness of a sound is not the sound itself. It is, indeed, the same sugar that includes within its complex unity both sweetness and whiteness, and it is the same sense-datum that includes both loudness and pitch. This, however, is quite another story.

We find Professor Bosanquet insisting on the derivative being of the finite self; and he seems to take for granted that what is derived can have no being and nature of its own distinct from the factors which meet within it. Does this follow? Is it not, on the contrary, plain that what is derived must always be distinct in existence and nature from the conditions which are combined in it? A mighty river is derived from a multitude of tiny rills. It is nothing apart from its tributary waters. But it is certainly something more and other than these, and in some ways much more important. I am here treating derivation as a co-ordinate relatedness. If, on the other hand, we permit ourselves to speak of the part as derived from the whole, then, inasmuch as the whole includes the part, the part is derived from itself, and this can only mean that, *pro tanto*, it is not derived at all. I cannot, therefore, admit that the distinct being and nature of the individual is at all affected by what Professor Bosanquet says concerning the derivative

character of the factors which enter into his complex unity. His distinct and exclusive individuality remains untouched even if we grant that "apart from the content of his centre there could be no feeling self," that "apart from their objects his acts are an empty form"; and that "in all his objects there is no object that is not universal and derivative." For all these factors as they meet in his being acquire a character which is inseparable from the unique unity and distinctness of his own individual existence. It is only in him that feeling becomes interest in objects, enjoyment, regret, hope, etc. Apart from his "acts" his objects are not objects at all. Yet, it is only so far forth as they are objects that they can be intelligibly regarded as entering into his being, and that his interest can be directed to them. One way of putting this is to say that only the knowing or thinking of things, not the things themselves, enters into the constitution of the individual. Now, I see no satisfactory distinction between the knowing or thinking of a thing and the thing itself as known or thought of. The pretended analysis which distinguishes in knowledge, abstractly considered, (1) a knower, (2) what is known, and (3) a relation between them, seems to me to be merely an arbitrary fiction. The knower is simply the complex unity which includes things as known and the various modes of being interested in them. I do not, therefore, quarrel with Dr. Bosanquet, when he takes for granted that objects as such enter into the constitution of the individual mind. All the same, I must insist that this holds only for objects *as such*. They are included in the complex unity of the self only in what the schoolmen called their "intentional," or objective, not in their "formal" being. When two individuals, A and B, both know or think of the same thing, its being known or thought of by or in A is normally a quite distinct fact from its being known or thought of by or in B. Intentional existence is two-fold, whereas formal existence is undivided. *A fortiori*, the interest which A takes in it is quite distinct from the interest which B takes in it. For this interest

involves feelings which are quite distinct in A and B, however they may resemble each other or condition each other.

It is from this point of view that we have to consider Dr. Bosanquet's distinction between the lateral and the linear identity of the self. If taken in its obvious sense, this distinction is valid. "One crowded hour of glorious life 'may be' worth an age without a name." We have to take account not only of the serial succession, but of the range, variety, and unity of knowledge and interest within each successive phase of our life-history. But it is important to note that the distinction is not between two identities, one lateral and the other linear. There is only one identity of the undivided self which includes these two aspects in inseparable unity. The present moment of conscious life is only a phase in its successive development. This, however, is not what Dr. Bosanquet means by lateral identity. He seems rather to mean a unity which comprehends parts of the universe that fall outside the life-history of the individual as a successive development. These parts of the universe are regarded by him as parts of the self. The main example and illustration of such lateral identity is supposed to be found in the social system. The community is regarded as a single mind, and its members as partial phases or modes of it, having no distinct unity and identity of their own. "The communal will . . . is a single thing. . . . Participation in its structure makes every particular unit an individual, that is a particular in which the universal or the identity assumes a special modification. His will is made out of the common substance" (p. 95). Now, it is plain enough that this doctrine follows directly from Dr. Bosanquet's theory of predication. Society is a whole of which its individual members are parts. If, then, the parts of any whole as such are adjectives or modes of that whole, the individual members of society are modes or adjectives of the social system; and, if we consider them as subjects, they are identical with that system

and with each other. Having seen reason for rejecting the general theory of predication, we are in no way bound to accept this application of it. We have rather to test Dr. Bosanquet's view of the relation of the individual to the community by a direct appeal to the relevant facts. We admit at once that the life of a community is a single thing with a unity and identity of its own. Yet, this unity and identity is essentially distinct from that of a single mind. It is simply contrary to fact to say that, in so far as I am a member of society, my mental processes are connected with those of other members of the same society in a way at all analogous to that in which the various phases and constituents of my own being are connected in the unity of my conscious life. If A knows that one side of a shield is black and B knows that the other side is white, they do not, therefore, either severally or both together, know that the shield is black on one side and white on the other. Unity of apperception is absent. A may, indeed, communicate to B what B does not know. But this merely means that A uses means whereby B is enabled to know for himself the same fact which is already known to A. When it is known to both, its being known to A is distinct from its being known to B, and A's knowledge that B knows it is not the knowledge that he knows it himself. Social inter-relations consist in the mutual knowledge of each other and mutual interest in each other of distinct minds, and in their co-operation in thinking and willing. The essential presupposition is that the mutually co-operating minds are distinct individuals, and not merely parts or phases of one mind. There is nothing in the social system which thinks, feels, or wills, except its individual members taken severally. This is the indispensable condition of their social unity. If the whole system is, in any sense, higher or more valuable than its individual members, it is because it includes these without in any way impairing or diminishing their distinct individuality. If and so far as two minds become

confluent in a single mind, they can no longer be in social relation to each other; if the single mind is to enter into social relations, it must be with other minds. This being so, the lateral identity of the self, as conceived by Dr. Bosanquet, is, strictly speaking, a figment. My knowledge of other minds, and interest in them and in their relation to me and to each other, does, indeed, constitute part of my own being. But the other minds do not, therefore, enter into my being in any other way or respect. The whole being of a member of society cannot consist in the knowledge which others have of him and the interest which others take in him.

III.

I have so far considered the subject-predicate theory of the universe both as a general doctrine and in its special bearing on individual minds. I now pass to the problem of the teleological status of finite spirits as an independent question to be determined apart from logical or metaphysical preconceptions and, in particular, apart from the preconception that they are merely "adjectives."

There are two main issues which I intend to raise. The first is whether the worth of the individual, as such, is ultimate and irreplaceable by anything else; or whether, on the contrary, it can be regarded as merely a means or stage leading to a higher good in which it is conserved without final loss or sacrifice. The second is whether we have any right to assume the possibility of a good which is both higher than that of finite individuals and does not by its intrinsic nature presuppose that of finite individuals as ultimately distinct from itself. How far my answer to these inquiries may supply ground for believing in a future life I shall not directly attempt to decide. But I shall add a few concluding words on the nature of the question at issue so as to define what we ought to mean by a "future life" whether we believe in it or not.

In discussing the value of the finite individual as such, what

logical relevance has the admitted imperfection of the individuals known to us? Professor Bosanquet dwells on this imperfection as if it were decisive in his favour, and it is of the utmost importance to define the exact nature of his argument. It might seem, at first sight, as if he were guilty of a rather obvious fallacy. Granting that my "continued identity from beginning to end of my experienced life-course is but little, fluctuating and full of gaps," what follows is merely that I am a very defective specimen of individual unity and identity, and that, to this extent, I imperfectly exemplify the kind of value which belongs to an individual mind. In considering the nature of this value, I ought to take account of individual unity and identity so far as it is present and not so far as it is absent.

But Mr. Bosanquet is not really guilty of this *ignoratio elenchi*. He distinguishes between the individuality of the finite individual and his finitude. So far as unity and identity are realised in the life-history of the finite individual, the more individual he is; but, according to Mr. Bosanquet, in precisely the same degree he transcends his own finitude. Inversely, the more defective is his unity and identity, the less individual he is; but, according to Mr. Bosanquet, this is merely to say that he is more finite. On this view, the individuality of the finite individual and his finitude are mutually exclusive opposites; the more of the one means the less of the other. Thus, whatever value may belong to the finite individual belongs to him as an individual but not as finite. If he were completely individual he would not be finite at all. There would be no distinction between him and the absolute whole of being.

Now, on this fundamental question, I am unable to accept Mr. Bosanquet's position or his grounds for maintaining it. One of his grounds for maintaining it is to be found in his conception of the "lateral as distinguished from the "linear" identity of the self. If the development of the individual in the range and depth of his knowledge and interest means that he includes within his own individual identity what he comes

to know and to be interested in, it is plain that in this process he comes to embrace within his own being more and more of the universe, so that in the limit all distinction between the universe and himself would cease. I have already dealt with this question and I need not recur to it here. But I must examine another fundamental assumption which underlies Mr. Bosanquet's whole treatment of the finite individual.

Mr. Bosanquet seems always to take for granted that nothing can belong to the distinctive nature of the finite individual except his finitude. Whatever is positive in his being is regarded as apart from and independent of his limitation. He is distinguished from other beings and from the all-inclusive universe, not by what he is but merely by what he is not. It is this presupposition alone which gives point to Mr. Bosanquet's denial of the worth of the finite individual *quâ* finite. What he is constantly maintaining is that finitude is mere defect or privation; and that, therefore, what is finite cannot have value *in so far* as it is finite.

It is plain that this argument loses its force, if there are characteristics of the finite individual which, though they are themselves positive and of positive value, none the less presuppose his limitation, so that they could not belong to a being which was not finite. But there are such characteristics. For instance, the social relations of human beings and all the positive activities which they alone make possible presuppose the mutual distinctness and mutual exclusiveness of individual minds. What is called the common will could not exist unless each individual member of the community had a will of his own. This, however, is a fact with which I have already dealt. What I now wish to lay stress on is the positive character of the process by which the finite individual gradually transcends his own defects and privations so as to be and to have what he was not or had not before. It is no sufficient analysis of what takes place merely to say that first there is a stage of relative defect or privation, and that this is succeeded by a stage in

which the defect or privation is removed. We have also to consider the nature of the transition from one stage to the other. It is plain there can be no such transition in a being who is supposed to be without any kind of imperfection, so that he already is and has all that he is capable of being and having. The process belongs distinctively to the nature of finite beings as such. The only questions that remain are (1) whether it is positive or itself merely an imperfection, and (2) how far it has positive value. Considered merely as a transition in time, Mr. Bosanquet would, no doubt, regard it merely as a form of defect or negation. But my point is that the specific form taken by the time process in the development of individual minds is no mere defect or negation. It is positive, inasmuch as it is self-development or self-realisation. It is positive, inasmuch as it involves the active process in which wants, needs, desires, purposes, aspirations, work through trial and failure towards their own fulfilment; and, at the same time, become themselves progressively more differentiated, more comprehensive, and more perfectly organised in systematic unity with each other. Each stage in this process exists only as a step towards greater advance. Out of relative fulfilment new wants and aspirations arise: and there is, as Hobbes says, "no satisfaction except in proceeding. To rest finally on what has already been achieved means stagnation and decay." Such self-development is plainly possible only for a finite being as such. It presupposes the limitations which it transcends. Hence, it cannot be ascribed to a being supposed to be perfect in the sense that there is nothing left for it to seek or aim at. The supposed perfection would, in this respect, be an imperfection—a privation.

We may go further and affirm that the privation would consist in the absence of something positively valuable. It is hardly too much to say that all value *for* the finite individual, and that the whole value *of* the finite individual both for himself and for others, is inseparable from the process of conative

self-development. What is good for me remains only potentially good for me so long as I am irresponsive to it,—so long as I merely ought to feel the want of it but do not actually feel the want of it. Any attainment which does not come to me as the satisfaction of my own felt needs or aspirations is *pro tanto* of no value to me; it is of no value to me because it forms no part of my own self-development. On the other hand, there is for me no positive evil which does not partake of the nature of failure, defeat or repression; it is no positive evil to a cow that it does not understand Hegel's Logic.

I may illustrate my result by what Dr. Bosanquet says about the "demand for unity" (p. 92). "We carry with us a pretension to be ourself, which includes less and more than we find in our existence. Our unity is a puzzle and an unrealised aspiration." We are confident that we are one, "because to be a thinking being is to demand a unity, and every act of such a being is an attempt to realise it. But philosophy tells us . . . . that if we possessed our unity we should no longer be what we experience our existence as being." Dr. Bosanquet would not, of course, deny that the pursuit of our own unity presupposes that we are already in some measure one. What we strive after is the maintenance and further development of the imperfect unity which is already present in each stage of our existence. If, now, I am right in my main contention, it is precisely this conative process, with its various phases of trial and failure, success and defeat, which is essential to good and evil for finite individuals. It is a mistake to look for the value of the finite individual in a supposed ultimate achievement considered in detachment from the process of its attainment. There may be no conceivable ultimate achievement, the series need not be convergent. But, even if we suppose that there is such a terminus, it will have value only as the ultimate success or satisfaction of the conative process which constitutes the self-development of the finite individual. It will, therefore, be experienced as the unity of just this finite individual who has successfully striven after it.

We are now in a position to answer the question whether the finite individual as such has a value of his own which is ultimate and irreplaceable by anything else. Inasmuch as he has a value which is inseparable from the process of his own self-development, he has, *qua* finite, a value for which nothing else can be so substituted as to justify us in asserting that nothing is lost. If his life-history is cut short for ever, so as to leave his actual aspirations after good unfulfilled, possible aspirations not yet developed, and the evil which is in him and around him not yet condemned, rejected, and vanquished, there is something wanting which cannot be replaced by anything else. There may, perhaps, be a greater good to which the finite individual is instrumental, but this is not and cannot in any way include what is valuable in his own self-development.

This brings us to our second question. Have we any right to assume the possibility of a good which is both higher than that of finite individuals, and does not presuppose that of finite individuals as ultimately distinct "from itself"? Conceive an individual so self-complete and self-contained as to want or require or demand absolutely nothing either for itself or for others. Are we to regard such perfection as involving perfect goodness or supreme value? I do not deny that this may be so. But I can discern no reasons to compel me to assert that it must be so. Further, I find no ground in our experience of the nature and condition of value which would lead me to hold even as a probable hypothesis that it is so. On the contrary, if I am to follow the clues supplied by experience, I must regard all value as essentially relative to conative process. It does not, however, follow that it can exist only for finite individuals. For the conception of God put forward by Professor Pringle-Pattison is free from this difficulty. An individual may have no defect in himself, so that for himself he wants or requires nothing, and yet he may be interested in finite individuals, and may find a field for his

activity in making possible and promoting their self-development. It seems to me a misuse of language to call such an individual finite or imperfect, merely because there are other individuals distinct from himself. If there were no other individuals, his being would be impoverished and his power less.

Before concluding, I have yet to say something about the problem of a future life. What I have already said concerning the value of finite individuals has no bearing on this question, unless we make a further assumption, which is by no means generally accepted, and which I cannot here discuss. We have to assume that there is a teleological order of the universe directed to the fulfilment of values. On this understanding, we have good reason for holding that our lives are not ultimately cut short by death; we have reason for regarding our life-history on earth as only a partial and passing phase of our whole life-history—partaking, perhaps, more or less of the nature of a dream, and for some of us a bad dream. If we accept this position, we must, however, be very careful not to commit ourselves to any special view of the nature and conditions of a future life. All that our general position entitles us to maintain is that in some way or other the life-history of the individual will be continued so long and in such a way as to make its continuance worth while to that individual. But to make it worth while may well tax the boundless resources of the universe. It may involve a complex adjustment of conditions beside which that required for the origin and development of animated organisms on earth, and of the minds associated with these organisms, is as nothing. This being so, it ought not to count as a serious objection that the various special ways of imagining our continued existence, which have been current in the past or which we can now devise, are utterly unconvincing, and, when closely examined, incredible. When I give the reins to my fancy, I can imagine many possibilities which are not usually considered. For example, it seems to

me arbitrary to assume that a future life means the continuance of the stream of individual consciousness without a break, after the death of the body. On the contrary, it may well be that, when my body dies, I also cease to exist as a conscious being. Countless ages may have to elapse before the conditions are ripe for my continued self-development. The interim would, of course, be nothing to me, as I should have no experience of it. Again, it seems to me to be very rash to take for granted that the self-development of the individual excludes confluence with other individuals.* The confluence need not involve loss of individual identity on the part of either. Each in blending with the other may find his own distinct being enlarged and enriched. The "I" before coalescence may be recognisable as the same with the "I" after coalescence. Or, if and so far as there is loss of identity, the loss may be only transitory, to be recovered with usury at a later stage. Similarly, the dissociation of personality may be a preparatory process leading to a higher and richer identity in which none of the dissociated identities are ultimately lost. For aught I can see, the scheme of a future life may involve endless confluences and dissociations.

These are possibilities which occur to me, and no doubt there are many others of which I have no inkling. We are moving about in "worlds not realised."† The two points on which I am here insisting are:—(1) that we must carefully avoid confusing the general conception of the future life with special views of its nature and conditions; (2) that we are justified in believing in the future life, only if and so far as we are justified in believing that the universe has a teleological order directed to the fulfilment of values. This last is the really vital question.

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* I have argued that such confluence is not exemplified by *social* union. But this supplies no reason for denying that it takes place at all.

† And it is quite possible that our present life may be, in large measure, "a sleep and a forgetting."

SYMPOSIUM: DO FINITE INDIVIDUALS POSSESS A SUBSTANTIVE OR AN ADJECTIVAL MODE OF BEING?

IV.—*By* Lord HALDANE.*

THE question under discussion is far from being one of mere logical precision. It raises a cardinal point in metaphysical inquiry. For Professor Bosanquet the finite individual is a construction of reflection. As the relational thought which is our human instrument is not the highest conceivable form of knowledge, its constructions represent, relatively to the highest knowledge, appearance only and not final reality. Our experience to become perfect would have to be transformed at a level at which feeling and thought, the unmediated and the mediated moments in that experience, while preserved in a new entirety were yet transcended in it. So only can reality be reached. It follows that for him the finite individual of our experience, being a construction by judgments in which subject and predicate never adequately unite, is not an ultimate reality, but is adjectival in its true nature.

For Professor Pringle-Pattison, on the other hand, even finite individual personality, although a creation of God, has the metaphysical character of uniqueness and finality, whether or not it is immortal in time. Its function is, accordingly, not the transient one which Professor Bosanquet assigns to it as a vehicle of the Absolute. It is a real self, and not an appearance only. It is more than a "Kantian unity of apperception," which is only "the ideal unity of systematised knowledge."

* The only papers before me, at the time of writing what follows, were those of Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison. I have since read that of Professor Stout. In essentials I do not know that what I imply differs much from what he writes in his Parts i and ii.

It is a true "focalisation of the universe," and the notion of its transmutation in an Absolute, "the idea of blending or absorption, depends entirely on material analogies which can have no application in the case of selves."

In the case of Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison alike, the doctrines of their respective papers are pointed applications of metaphysical principles which they have developed in concrete application to the current problems of life in well known volumes. I propose, therefore, to inquire, first of all, what light the context of their other utterances casts, in the instances of the two writers, on the apparently sharp antitheses of their present papers. The genesis of the divergence appears to me, I may say at once, to be traceable in the case of Professor Bosanquet mainly to the extreme to which he has pushed criticism of that finite knowledge which is not less his instrument in the investigation of reality than it is and must be the instrument of all of us. The observation on which I shall venture in the case of Professor Pringle-Pattison is not wholly dissimilar. I think that he has shied unduly at the sight of the Kantian unity of apperception to which he has so often referred. I agree with him that, as Kant conceives it, this doctrine presents an alarming spectacle. But then in Kant's hands the unity of mind had been reduced to the condition of a corpse by the defective treatment of itself which resulted when knowledge sought to lay itself out on the dissecting table, to be operated on with "judgments of the understanding," and a restricted supply of categories drawn from the Aristotelian logic. A better method might well have been to let nature make her own diagnosis and work out her own cure. Yet, the gruesome spectacle of the result of Kant's critical method has been, I think, in Professor Pringle-Pattison's case, to make him avert his face, and to interpose something which is not in truth very unlike the mantle of the category of substance, between himself and those who, like Kant and Professor Bosanquet, treat know-

ledge as what can itself be subjected to a critical process that may be fatal to it. In saying this, I am not overlooking the disclaimer by Professor Pringle-Pattison of the application of the category of substance to the self, which occurs comparatively early in his paper, in a passage where he accepts a similar disclaimer by Lotze.

Both writers have obviously been much influenced by the objective type of idealism which is commonly called Hegelian. But they diverge in the application of common principles, and the divergence is accentuated by metaphors to which they are driven, as, indeed, all metaphysicians are bound to be in some degree.

The real difficulty seems to me to arise largely out of the metaphors used. Professor Bosanquet, in his paper in the present discussion, speaks of "our brief existence as the temporal appearance of some character of the whole, such as in any case constitutes a very great part of the finite individual's reality as experienced in the world."* We are "very subordinate units," which the Absolute needs for its expression through us in what appears as a passage in time. "While we serve as units, to speak the language of experience, the Absolute lives in us a little, and for a little time; when its life demands an existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervading features or characters which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise, and in which our reality enriches the universe."

I think I see what Professor Bosanquet aims at indicating by these words. No one who has read the second volume of his *Gifford Lectures,* admirable alike in theoretical grasp and in largeness of ethical outlook, can doubt what is his main purpose. But the metaphors leave me uncomfortable. I have the doubt whether what has to be said can be said safely, excepting in more strictly guarded and abstract language.

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* *Supra*, p. 102.

The difficulty is not unlike that which arises when people speak of real or transfinite number. It is quite right to use the word number, if, but only if, we have carefully redefined it. And I have to bear in mind writings in which Professor Bosanquet has developed other aspects of his doctrine. For him the finite self is, as I interpret him, a construction based on a centre of feeling, and the unity of such "centres," and of the systems of experience built up along with them, is to be sought only in a form of reality of a kind different from that of the self as it appears to us. He seems to me to accept the position that our reflection, which is based on relational thought, is not capable of disclosing the actual character of this further form of reality, because all relational thought in the end distorts and deflects from truth. In the result what it gives us is appearance only, and from appearance we have to look for reality in another region,—that of an Absolute in which the breaches in the integrity of immediate experience made by relational thought are restored, and knowledge is transformed into knowledge that must be immediate, but which is of a kind we cannot image in our minds, although we must assume its possibility as foundational to reality.

I take this to be the view of the Absolute which Professor Bosanquet has worked out on lines parallel to those on which Mr. Bradley has proceeded. I will only observe that my difficulty about the general doctrine, great as has always been my admiration for the mode in which both of these thinkers have worked out and expressed it, is that it produces in my mind a sense of intellectual insecurity. How do they get even negatively at the character of the absolute experience? If the only way of thinking be relational, and this way cannot be that of truth, what other path to the Absolute can there be? It is the old difficulty which arises when men begin by criticising the instrument of knowledge, and so discredit it and their own criticism along with it. The outcome is not new knowledge but a scepticism which bids us cease endeavour.

Faith in the possibility of knowing even so much about the Absolute as is permitted in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* and more recent *Essays on Truth and Reality*, or in Professor Bosanquet's *Gifford Lectures* or his well-known eighth chapter in the second volume of the last edition of his *Logic*, becomes difficult when abstract thought has been to so great an extent deposed from being a guide to truth, and possibly from being even aware that it is no guide.

In Chapter XV of his *Appearance and Reality* Mr. Bradley himself deals with the question which thus arises in a fashion which shows that he is fully conscious of the difficulties attending the solution he offers. He starts with this, that the subject is always beyond the predicated content. The fact, for instance, of sensible experience cannot be exhibited as an element in a system of thought-content. Thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide, and yet, if it remains this, how does it contain immediate presentation? In order to do so "it must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach something other than truth." It desires to reach a whole which can contain every aspect within it, but if it does, all that divides it from feeling and will must be absorbed, and so thought will have changed its nature. In a mode of apprehension which is identical with reality, "predicate and subject and subject and object, and in short the whole relational form, must be merged." This is Mr. Bradley's argument, but he holds that it does not really lead to scepticism. For, although an Other than relational thought is required, this Other is not inconceivable for thought. Its otherness will lose the character which gives rise to difficulty if the ideal content of the predicate is made consistent with immediate individuality. Were it possible for thought to attain its ideal by taking up reality in a form adequate to its nature, that nature would no longer appear as an Other. Now, the content of the thought which desires to include all the features of that nature has them in an incomplete form, inasmuch as it desires their completion. There

is thus no gulf, no inconsistency, in the faith that thought can look for the Other, for which it is in search, in the Absolute. There we reach the identity of idea and reality, "not too poor, but too rich for division of its elements." Such an experience "we cannot possibly construe," or "imagine how in detail its outline is filled up."

My difficulty in connection with this argument arises, as I have already said, from the impression that on Mr. Bradley's premises I cannot see how it is to be justified. The difficulty might not arise at all if thought could be taken in a fuller sense than Mr. Bradley appears to take it. What is often called the "logic of the understanding," which sets subject and predicate in isolation, seems to me to have unduly influenced his argument: and to have led him to do less than justice to the view that judgment is only a fragmentary aspect of the activity of mind,—an activity which in fact always proceeds beyond isolation and tends to exhibit subject and predicate as aspects in an entirety which is their truth. In the final chapter, entitled "Ultimate Doubts," he seems to me to express himself in language which carries further than in the passages I have indicated, and to go a good way towards restoring the claims of the larger view of thought which has been called that of reason as distinguished from understanding. "There is no reality at all," he says, "anywhere except in appearance, and in our appearance we can discover the main nature of reality. This nature cannot be exhausted, but it can be known in abstract." A little earlier, in the chapter on "The Absolute and its Appearances," after saying that for metaphysics all appearances have degrees of reality, and that metaphysics can assign a meaning to perfection and progress, he declares that "if it were to accept from the sciences the various kinds of natural phenomena, if it were to set out these kinds in an order of merit and rank, if it could point out how within each higher grade the defects of the lower are made good, and how the principle of the lower grade is carried out in the higher,

metaphysics surely would have contributed to the interpretation of nature."* And a little later, "In a complete philosophy the whole world of appearance would be set out as progress. It would show a development of principle, though not a succession in time. Every sphere of experience would be measured by the absolute standard, and would be given a rank answering to its own relative merits and defects. On this scale pure spirit would mark the extreme most removed from lifeless nature. And, at each rising degree of this scale, we should find more of the first character with less of the second. The ideal of spirit, we may say, is directly opposed to mechanism. Spirit is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased. The universal here is immanent in the parts, and its system does not lie somewhere outside and in the relations between them. It is above the relational form and has absorbed it in a higher unity, a whole in which there is no division between elements and laws. The sphere of dead mechanism is set apart by an act of abstraction, and in that abstraction alone it essentially consists. And, on the other hand, pure spirit is not realised except in the Absolute."

Now, what does this mean if it be not the restoration of even relational thought to the throne from which it had been previously deposed? Here Mr. Bradley lays emphasis on the principle that philosophy has not to explain genetic evolution in

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* The suggestion here made by Mr. Bradley about evolution in thought, and the lower categories as intelligible only through the higher, is of real importance as a corrective to the different and too abstract view of those men of science who try to base their procedure on mechanical and chemical conceptions alone. It is in the light of what is logically higher that what is lower becomes for the first time really intelligible. We seem, as matter of fact, to work downwards in analysing experience for the purposes of physical and natural science, from the higher and more concrete experiences to the lower and more abstract. The bearing of this corrective consideration on the general doctrine of evolution in its cruder forms is considerable. In a recent book, *Organism and Environment*, Dr. J. S. Haldane expresses better than I can myself do the result on this point.

time, but has to explain degrees of completeness in thought. His position seems very near to that of Hegel in the *Phenomenology*. But Hegel insists that thought develops and completes itself; and is, therefore, not hindered by limitations on its capacity such as Mr. Bradley assigns to it in the earlier passages I have referred to. The "absolute knowledge" to which Hegel leads up at the end of the *Phenomenology* is not, as I read him, knowledge as it would be for an Absolute Mind, but finite human knowledge which has by its own efforts so freed itself from abstractions which have stood in the way of its self-completion that even for such knowledge free mind discloses itself as the foundation of experience in all its stages and phases.

In the second series of his *Gifford Lectures*, Professor Bosanquet seems to me at times to approach very near to this Hegelian conclusion. The finite individual is more than merely finite, and has a capacity in thinking which goes beyond what is finite. "It is freely admitted," he says, early in his second Lecture of this series, "that in cognition the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being, and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding it ceases to be a self-contained and repellent unit." He does not find the distinctness of finite centres a difficulty. For "the pure privacy and incommunicability of feeling as such is superseded in all possible degrees by the self-transcendence and universality of the contents with which it is unified." These contents are "organs of self-transcendence." Feeling, "in order to be capable of utterance in determinate form, must take on an objective character. It must cease to be a blank intensity; it must gather substance from ideas." And in so doing it "must change its reference to self, or modify the self to which it refers." Different persons are "organisations of content which a difference of quality, generally, though not strictly, dependent on belonging to different bodies, prevents from being wholly blended." "We do not experience ourselves as we really are."

But this opinion does not prevent Professor Bosanquet from coming to the conclusion, expressed at p. 100 of his paper, that "spiritual individuals must qualify the universe, not merely as subordinate existents which declare themselves adjectival in claiming attachment to their substance, but, more finally and completely, as predicates *pur sang*." He remarks that, even if a series of events is the reality, then a quality of individuals, outside their existence, is the chief way in which they are present in the reality. The Absolute of which they are in final analysis predicates is an Other. It does not, as I read his paper, appear to him safe to seek it even in the subject aspect of a knowledge which is that of a finite individual. The Absolute is Other because it is apprehended, so far as it is apprehended at all, by a mode of knowledge different in kind from the mode of ordinary knowledge. It seems, therefore, to be for reflection an object distinct from the finite self.

No doubt, as Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet have shown in their investigations into the theory of judgment, thinking presents itself to itself under a relational aspect. But it presents this aspect just so far as it throws its own activity into this form for its own purposes. Its limitations are self-created, and it is in its completeness foundational to them. It is only as completed that it can accordingly come to rest with itself.

Professor Pringle-Pattison is dissatisfied, not only with Professor Bosanquet's view of the finite self, but with another view which, by looking for the reality of the self in thought, is also antithetical to his own conclusions. He objects to "the theorem of an All-thinker and of the universe as the system of his thought."* The formal ego is of no real account. "It was the substantiation of the logical form of consciousness which led to the theory of the universal Self, as an identical Subject which thinks in all thinkers."† The

* *The Idea of God*, p. 199.

† *Ibid.*, p. 389.

finite individual is itself a subject. But it is a subject exclusive of other subjects. "Finite centres may 'overlap' indefinitely in content, but, *ex vi termini*, they cannot overlap at all in existence; their very *raison d'être* is to be distinct and, in that sense, separate and exclusive focalisations of a common universe."* The self or subject, as we have already said, is not to be conceived as an entity over and above the content, or as a point of existence to which the content is, as it were, attached, or even as an eye placed in position over and against its objects, to pass them in review. The unity of the subject, we may agree, simply expresses this peculiar organisation or systematisation of the content. Yet, it is not simply the unity which a systematic whole of content might possess as an object, or for a spectator. "Its content, in Professor Bosanquet's phrase, has 'come alive': it has become a unity for itself, a subject. This is, in very general terms, what we mean by a finite centre, a soul, or, in its highest form, a self."†

Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison are both idealists of the objective type, but they differ in their tendencies. The former lays stress on the characteristics of the subject as such in the self, but these characteristics are for him not final. Experience has a larger meaning in which they are transformed, and in some sort exist transformed in the Absolute. The first form, therefore, does not represent the full or actual reality. It appears as it does because of the operation of a thinking which is ever establishing relations which are themselves not finally real, and the self is a construction through such relations, and as such is adjectival.

For Professor Pringle-Pattison, on the other hand, finite personality is no mere construction of thought. It is a self-sufficing entity which can never properly be a predicate of anything else. How it is related to the Absolute he will not try to say. The problem is inscrutable for human thought.

* *Ibid.*, p. 264.
† *Ibid*, p. 285.

The relation of the finite self to an Absolute God (for the theory of a finite God has no place in his book) impresses me as one of the most obscure points in his theme. As I have already said, it is for him of the essence of the self to be exclusive of other selves; and, although he admits that this cannot be so in the same fashion in the relation of man to God, how it can be otherwise is one of the things which he declares cannot be explained, and which remains a mystery. Here his doctrine seems to me to be at a disadvantage compared with that of Professor Bosanquet. The latter can accept as intelligible the principle that underlying all knowledge there is one absolute subject which manifests itself in finite selves, if not in a form which is free from appearance or represents final reality. But the former holds the self to be an exclusive unit, subject somehow to an exception, which cannot be formulated even abstractly, in the relation of man to God. For Professor Pringle-Pattison each finite self is unique, and is "the apex of the principle of individuation by which the world exists."* In this fashion the self is for him impervious, not indeed to all the influences of the universe, but to other selves, "impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue. In other words, to suppose a coincidence or literal identification of several selves, as the doctrine of the Universal self demands, is even more transparently contradictory than that two bodies should occupy the same space." The unification of consciousness in a single self is thus fatal, in his opinion, to the real selfhood either of God or man. But he goes on to point out† that we are equally substantiating a formal unity if we cut loose the individual selves from the common content of the world, and treat them as self-existent and mutually independent units. "We are then obliged to proceed to represent the universal Life in which they share as another unit of the same type, and difficulties immediately arise as to the relation

* *Ibid.*, p. 390.
† *Ibid*, p. 390.

between the great Self and its minor prototypes. Thought sways between a Pluralism, disguised or undisguised, and a Pantheism which obliterates all real individuality. But by the existence of the personality of God we do not mean the existence of a self-consciousness so conceived. We mean that the universe is to be thought of, in the last resort, as an Experience and not as an abstract content,—an experience not limited to the intermittent and fragmentary glimpses of this and the other finite consciousness, but resuming the whole life of the world in a fashion which is necessarily incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself. Equally incomprehensible from the finite standpoint must it be, how the measure of individual independence and initiative which we enjoy is compatible with the creative function or the all-pervasive activity of the divine. But in whatever sense or in whatever way our thoughts and actions form part of the divine experience, we know that it is a sense which does not prevent them from being ours."

I have quoted these words from the *Gifford Lectures* on *The Idea of God*, because they appear to me to present the crucial difficulty of the author's position. The book is a striking contribution to philosophy, not merely because of its delicacy and precision in expression, but because of the accuracy with which the critic "winds himself" into the realisation of the inmost difficulties of those whom he is criticising. Still, in the passage just cited, Professor Pringle-Pattison is not less candid about his own difficulties. "Necessarily incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself." Surely, this is to despair of knowledge, and so to come very near to the precipice of scepticism. Now, human capacity in knowledge is, of course, limited. Its limits become progressively apparent when we remain with what is given us directly by sense, or attempt no more than to image or visualise. But the inherent quality of the thinking which proceeds by means of concepts, in mathematics, in physical science, in philosophy alike, is that it carries us beyond the confines of the immediate, the character of which

is that it starts as in contact, direct or indirect, with our individual organism. Indeed, it is only for thinking that such a contact and the resulting limits have any meaning at all. In so far as we state a problem, we define it and are above it. We cannot see God. From the days of Moses of old, people have suspected this. Yet, the power of abstract thought knows no such barriers as are presented by the restrictions on the imaginable present. There is no region, not even the region of the Absolute, which it cannot survey conceptually. In thinking we never stand still, we are always enlarging and developing the field of our progress. To deny this is to deny the foundation, not merely of certainty, but of doubt itself, resting, as doubt always does, on reflection. And on this account, while recognising the great contribution which I think Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet have made to philosophy, I, for one, have never been able to follow the invitation to contemplate the Absolute as unintelligible to what is the only kind of thinking by which I can make any progress at all, or to which I can attach meaning. No doubt it is true that not every form of reflection is adequate to metaphysical problems. What is called "the logic of the understanding" is indispensable for the purposes of everyday life, setting its objects, as it does, in hard distinction from each other. It calls, however, for the recognition at every step of the explanation of the self-imposed inadequacy of its abstractions from context to grasp reality in a more complete form,—the reality which, for example, perplexes the logic of the understanding when physical or chemical conceptions are used for the explanation of a living organism. The conceptions which relate to life are beyond the modes of reflection which belong to a lower and more abstract stage. Life is intelligible only in terms of the concepts of life, just as mind is intelligible only under conceptions which carry us beyond life into a spiritual region which belongs to mind itself, and to mind alone. While, therefore, I am deeply conscious of the splendid

thoroughness with which Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet alike have sought to subject knowledge to sceptical scrutiny, I think that their efforts fall short in attainment, just as in another form did those of Kant before them. Knowledge appears to me itself to be the source of all of its own apparent limitations. As it imposes them on itself so it delivers itself from them. The explanation is that in its essence it is never static. It is a self-development, a process of self-completion within which all distinctions fall. What is called relational thought is for me little more than a series of illustrations of the "logic of the understanding" in various forms; thought is capable here, as everywhere, of correcting and rising above its self-imposed fragmentation.

If this be so nothing can, so far as the power of conceptual thought is concerned, be legitimately pronounced to be, to use Professor Pringle-Pattison's phrase, "incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself." If such incomprehensibility confronts us it is because the categories and resulting metaphors we have employed have not been adequate to their subject matter. And this makes me say that I doubt whether Professor Pringle-Pattison is free from much the same reproach under this head as in another way extends to Professor Bosanquet. I mean that both writers in particular seem at points to have yielded in their metaphors to the blandishments, so perilous for the metaphysician, of the category of substance. Now, this category, when it tempts those to whom it offers its blandishments, rarely appears without decorations which disguise it. It is only when it is following its legitimate avocations, avocations which in other aspects of science are very numerous, that it does not seek to conceal its nakedness. When it appears in the region of mind it assumes such titles as "unit," or "imperviousness," or "otherness," titles which may be legitimate but which require much qualification when assumed in this connection. To set up the Absolute as what is impenetrable to thought, as in different fashions both Pro-

fessor Pringle-Pattison and Professor Bosanquet seem, at times at least, to do, is very like attributing to it the exclusive nature which is characteristic of a substance or a thing as we speak of it popularly. And the same observation applies to current language about the finite self. Is such language adequate, and can it be used in philosophical discussion without danger of misleading?

I will take the everyday relationship to each other of finite selves. We all of us, unless our minds have been "debauched with philosophy," assume that we have the same world before us,—a world the identity of which lies in the correspondence of its aspects for all of us. We instinctively rule out the claims of the subjective idealist. It is not a set of distinct and independent experiences that we severally have, but one and the same experience in corresponding forms. That experience is relative to the position of each of us in the world, but none the less we think that it is the same sun and moon and stars that we all see, and the same earth that we feel beneath our feet. Varying as are the aspects of experience to our particular selves, that experience is dominated by correspondence in thought in the relations it contains, relations which are logically antecedent to distinctions of time and space. The same thing is true even of the succession and variety of our own private experiences. They may be treated analytically as manifold. But not the less the experiences so distinguished are regarded as falling within the single experience of one individual, however, as in madness or other afflictions, we may to external appearance, and even for ourselves, change from time to time. And when, as under abnormal psychical conditions, the phenomenon of the double self emerges, this still remains true, although the self presents a distorted form.

How is identity in knowledge possible? Surely, only if there is real identity in what is at the foundation of all knowledge. When we turn to what, for want of a better name, I will call the "subject" moment in self-consciousness,

I think that we find identity which is true reality and no mere appearance. The unity of knowledge in myself appears to lie in the activity of my thinking in the organised system of categories or ground-conceptions through which I lay hold on what I see and feel, and so find in it a real experience, objectified in the Kantian sense. Nor is the activity of my thinking a subjective operation in the sense it was for Kant. In my object world of reality I recognise as actually there substances and causes and life as genuinely as there are actually in my mind the conceptions under which these appear. So far the New Realists are right, I think. But then are not these relations there simply because there is no factual separateness of subject from object, of mental from non-mental world? They may be separated as universals for logic in reflection, but only in reflection. Reality, taking this to include the totality of experience, the subject moment of activity in judgment not less than the object as fixed and distinguished from it by abstraction, appears to imply as *foundational* in it a systematic activity of mind which, while taken by itself in isolation it is a mere abstraction, is not the less an essential moment in the entirety of the fact of actual experience. The "that" in experience we cannot deduce. Our immediate existence as selves is within and conditioned by it. Its logical side is only one aspect in it. There is another aspect which confronts us in imagination as incapable of deduction from the first; and is, just for this very reason, required for the explanation of the "that," the externality and irreducibility with which sense perception appears as confronted in its every movement. And yet this appears on scrutiny to be itself but a moment in the entirety, a moment which is no more, taken by itself, adequate to the explanation of reality than is the other moment of abstract thought. What we come back to in our logical analysis of the object world before us is always, when we go far enough, the activity of the subject. In such activity substance is only one among its many conceptual

modes, and is by itself an abstraction inadequate to express the full nature of reality. The idea of God as another substance, or even as another and different subject, appears to be radically imperfect.

How, then, do we come to speak of finite centres, and to recognise them as possessing in some degree at least the quality of reality? Speaking for myself, I do not think that the answer to this question is obscure. We start in our experience from the fact of the natural world in which we live, and we find that our minds, while transcending the relationships of externality, affirm them *sub modo* in their application, and so remain possessed by them. The living organism transcends the relation of mechanism, and is yet not free from its laws. So the finite self appears in experience under the aspect of a living organism which is yet much more than a living organism. John Smith my friend, when I meet him in the street and recognise him as the comrade whose personality is intimately known to me, is none the less an organism with a life-history. He is primarily for me in this connection a person, subject just as I am subject, but he may, from a lower point of view, which is not concerned with his higher values, be described as occupying so much space and as weighing so much of carbon and other chemical compounds, and with what must be thought of as a definite quantity of potential energy stored up in him for conversion into kinetic. But these aspects, although true at their own stage in knowledge, fall far short at the stage of reality at which he is John Smith for me. They may after his death interest the anatomist and the undertaker, but rarely does his friend who greets him think of them. What binds him and me together is that he is a person with a distinct individuality, depending in part on conditions of space and time, but certainly not less on what belongs to regions of experience, intellectual, ethical, and æsthetic. The conceptions which his recognition implies, and the relations, intelligible only as expressed in them, which bind him to me,

belong to these higher phases in an experience which includes many lower ones. From the other phases, which belong to physical and animal existence, I cannot wholly abstract. If I could I should not meet or recognise the finite individual, John Smith. What I do meet and recognise is none the less no merely physical or animal structure. I find myself face to face with a person, who has sensations and emotions which my mind interprets as possessing a meaning resembling that of my own. Yet, more than this is necessary to draw us together. These sensations and emotions are for him set in thoughts which correspond with mine, and are present to my consciousness as identical in their foundation with my own way of thinking. Indeed, it is only so that they are present to my consciousness, or that I can reach them. Looks and words are external signs, and signs which are unimportant and of no account except as the embodiment of meaning. In their significance I recognise my own mind; I find myself again. Not perfectly, for John Smith and his looks and words are in one aspect part of the external world which confronts me. But it is an external world which has, by its meaning in my mind, in this fashion become my own world, in which in what corresponds and is identical with myself I have found myself *pro tanto*. I am subject-object and he is object-subject. In the subject moment lies the identity of man and fellow-man. The separation of our finite centres thus lies in externality, but in an externality which is preserved while it is transcended by the recognition of mind as what is identical in him and me. The identity is in the subject aspect, which admits of differentiation only when its activity fixes it as itself an object in self-distinction from other objects. The tendency of thought is to seek for identity, and difficulty in finding it becomes the less as the standpoint becomes progressively more and more the standpoint of thinking. It seeks such identity when it recognises life, the whole which, superseding the causal standpoint of physics, is present in every part of the

organism in the form of quasi-purposive action. It seeks such identity, and finds in it a higher form in instinct and in the subsequent stages in the development of the unity of animal life, and still more in conscious purpose, manifesting itself in the deliberately chosen self-organisation of human beings in social units, self-fashioned to fulfil consciously pursued ethical ends.

The important point is that the distinction of finite centres from each other possesses one significance when we look to their physical aspects, another significance when we find them as organisms obeying the impulses of the species, and a still different meaning when we find them as conscious intelligences co-operating in social wholes. As we reach the highest regions of mind, in art, in religion, in thought, the distinctness of the finite centres still remains. But it remains for purposes which, at this stage, though real, are subordinate. The transition has been to new conceptions, a change which is more than what can be expressed as one in time. It is a transition within mind to higher standpoints and degrees of reality, in which the higher supersede and yet preserve as logical moments those that they transcend. An ideal and perfect universe would be one in which the recognition of all these degrees of reality, these stages in the logic of comprehension, took their places in a mind recognised as completely at one with its object, and containing its world in that completeness as a moment in its own creative activity, a self-creation in which end and means were not finally divorced by the time process. Such a universe neither John Smith nor I can present to our consciousness as an image. We can think of it as an ideal, for in science thought, if it abstracts sufficiently from images and proceeds by concepts, is confronted by limits only to find that it can get beyond what it turns out itself to have fashioned. Yet, the daily experience and the ordinary standpoint in reflection of my friend and myself cannot be maintained at this level. Mind and body are

not separate existences. They are higher and lower aspects of a reality in which experience is not properly separable from experiencing. Thus, intelligence is conditioned not the less that its reach through such abstract methods as those of mathematics or philosophy has no limit; and, from the nature of reality as dependent on mind, can have none. It is conditioned because the brain is the organ through which it has in fact to operate. It is not the less intelligence because it has aspects in which it is presented in space and time abstractly as a mere object apprehended. For the individual man, notwithstanding that he is also the subject in knowledge, cannot escape from the fact that the knowledge is *his* knowledge, the mental activity of a particular individual, whom, if we abstract from what is indeed of the essence of his personality, we must regard as an organism, or even as a thing with properties. It is thus that the category of substance introduces itself. In finite knowledge, that is to say, knowledge which operates under conditions like ours, this will always be so. For we start in time from what we feel, from what our organism brings to consciousness, and the process of our knowledge is one which develops the implications of what seems to come to us from without through the channels of the senses. But, in developing these implications, we are not extracting externalities out of externalities. We are rather bringing to light principles which are implicit, as foundational, in even the simplest experience, and among them the moment of the subject. In the feeling of organisms lower than man, if we can speak of such feeling at all as analogous to our feeling, such a moment may not be implicit in the same fashion. It belongs to the stage where personality is attained. For, apart from personality, and except as present to it, there is no world such as exists for me. Even for the dog that approaches to being intelligent, my own world does not exist. This war as such has no meaning for his mind, and it could not be for him a full experience.

When it is said that reality means nothing and is nothing

except in so far as it is "experience," there is an ambiguity to be guarded against to which I have already referred. The word "experience" suggests what is experienced in abstraction from the act of experiencing it. It suggests the activity of some particular finite individual, whose experience may present itself as from a different standpoint, or a different position in space and time, from that of others. But such distinctions and differences really fall within knowledge and its terms. By knowledge I mean the entirety of the concrete activity of mind, which may take the aspect of feeling, as much as of the abstract thought from which feeling is inseparable, and which is itself inseparable, save by abstraction, from feeling. And I mean also the entirety of mental content, which extends, not only to being known, but to knowing what is known. Now, beyond this I cannot get, for nothing outside it has or can have any significance for me. There is and can be nothing outside it. It is quite true that if, when we speak of mind, we intend only a finite individual, a particular intelligent organism, the Berkeleian argument either leads us to solipsism, or, as Mr. Montagu has pointed out in his essay in the volume called *The New Realism*, and published by six American writers on philosophy, is a fallacy arising out of using the middle term "idea" ambiguously, so as to denote in one premise the act of perceiving and in the other premise what is perceived.

But the fallacy arises only if we intend by the ego a finite individual confronted by an object world to which it stands as a separate object. Only if perception is regarded as a causal operation of one of these objects on the other is there a final distinction between being perceived and the act of perceiving, and therefore an ambiguous middle term. No doubt, common sense tells us that the object exists independently of any particular self which it happens to confront. Yet, the whole process and the distinctions which are made in it not the less arise only through and for mind. We must not surreptitiously assume the notion of "things with properties"

as what we are here considering. Outside knowledge, actual or potential, in the larger sense, nothing has any meaning for us, and not only things and their relations, but objects with their relations to subjects, derive their significance and their reality from distinctions that fall within knowledge because made in it. The self-consciousness of an Absolute can be no more and no less than an Absolute which knows itself as itself, and is real in the process of its self-differentiation as difference showing in identity and identity showing in difference. Whether such expressions as "self" and "personality," suggesting as they inevitably do the finite, and space and time as not merely *for* mind but as regions which it inhabits and which confine it, are adequate here, is a legitimate question which has been often put. At least it seems as though we must attribute to such an Absolute all that is adequate in the ideals essayed in these expressions, and possibly more. The point is that with such a self or personality, if adequately developed by thought, we are not in the "ego-centric predicament" of subjective idealism, the extreme from which "New Realism" leaps to another extreme, again dependent on knowledge being no more than a causal relation between objects in knowledge.

Where I find myself in sympathy with the New Realists is in their desire to set up in its fullness what they, wrongly as I think, call the non-mental world, and to believe in its reality as it seems to plain people. Why should we try to break up its simple self-existence into some other kind of existence? The "New Realism" tends to abolish the supposed gap between the real and the ideal; and, with this gap, I think tends also to abolish itself, by pouring everything into a region which it has, by a set of abstractions, distinguished as non-mental. Idealism of the objective order tends not less on its part to do away with the implications suggested by its name. For it the universe is just there as it appears, as real as in the other view. Within mind as our medium we, and all the particular selves into

which intelligence particularises itself, live and move and have our being. There is no question about the existence of mind. The only question is what in this wide significance it imports and implies, and in what systematic form we can express its implication. For it is the foundation on which rests and out of which emerges every distinction between known and knowing, between felt and feeling, between object and subject, between non-mental and mental. No wonder that the standpoints of realism and idealism seem to converge the more closely we scrutinise them. The controversy arises from reflections which are unduly abstract. Not only can we not deduce the fact of the universe from anything else, or resolve it into logical concepts, but we are not called on to do so. There is no problem excepting that of making explicit what is implicit before us. The meaning of the great fact is the only legitimate question. The world is there as it seems to me. Its "that" is foundational and is experience. Its "what" is the problem of philosophy. By foundational I mean what I assume and imply as the basis and presupposition on which we know and raise even our merest questions.

If this be so, then one of the things that confronts us among the facts is that to which Professor Bosanquet devotes the second volume of his *Gifford Lectures*, a volume which I hold in high admiration not the less because of my doubts about certain points which he and Mr. Bradley both seem to me to press unduly. "The finite-infinite creature," as he says,* "is always in a condition of self-transcendence. This is the same as saying that he is always endeavouring to pass beyond himself in achievement. He is always a fragmentary being, inspired by an infinite whole, which he is for ever striving to express in terms of his limited range of externality." I cordially agree, excepting that the metaphors are a little dubious. We have to think largely in names, and images and metaphors we cannot

* P. 304.

wholly avoid. The criticism which I make on the modes of expression to which I have been referring is a criticism to which I am well aware that my own language is open. I wish it were otherwise, and that a strict terminology, akin to that of the mathematician, was in use by metaphysicians. But even Hegel himself, who aimed at such a terminology, was a great sinner in this respect.

I have found it hard to follow Professor Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley in assigning to feeling regarded *per se* the place in reality and in the highest knowledge which they seem to me to attribute to it. If knowledge is an abstraction apart from feeling, so does feeling seem to me unreal when relational thought is excluded from it. I find it difficult to interpret the highest and most direct form of knowledge as akin to unmediated feeling. Experience is one, although it has many aspects and degrees towards perfection. It is surely always mediated by thought. In the subject moment of our everyday self-consciousness it seems to me that the highest point which is attainable by us is reached, inasmuch as there we find freedom from the limits imposed by the organism, and deliverance from time and space, and consequently from the externality and otherness of the object *over* which thought always reaches. The non-mental world can hardly be with truth set over against the mental as an existence which confronts it. To do what the New Realists do seems to me to amount to resting their science upon an inadequate category, that of substance. But in truth even for the New Realists there is no world to which they can legitimately apply the description "non-mental." They reproduce in what they name as "non-mental" the universals which their critics put on the other side of an imaginary line, a line between thought and things. Now, it is not clear why such a line should be laid down at all, except in the sense that experience discloses many grades of reality, many forms of which the higher are not reducible to the lower. How are what we speak of as values to be passed over to a

region that is non-mental, and how is our consciousness of their reality to be regarded as the effect of a mechanical activity of what is looked upon as merely a different substance, the nervous system? Surely, the facts tell us that, to quote a very recent utterance of Professor Bosanquet, "our being is not restricted to our physical self, but enters into the unity of spirits."*

Experience of this self seems to disclose an entirety, a spiritual entirety, within which its not-self is distinguished as only one moment of the whole from its own activity as subject. The individual self comes before us as our object with other selves in a world which is characterised by the separateness in space and time of physical organisms. Of these self-conscious activity is the interpretation and completion. And the self is subject and always more than substance. It is not as God, for its natural origin and conditions limit its activity and mark it as finite. Yet, on the subject side we meet with what holds its various experiences in one entirety, and enables it, not only to transcend the limited range of its direct experiences, but to survey and pass beyond these limits by the power of thought. It is in thought, the very essence of the subject, that we find an aspect in which the separateness of selves is transcended. When we say "I" we speak in the language of the universals of thought. But even when we thus say "I" we are speaking abstractly. "I" is only my point of departure. "I," in my full self-development, takes me far beyond the merely formal self, to which Professor Pringle-Pattison has demurred as on the face of it quite inadequate, and which is really no more than a first phase in reflection, a partially conceived object set before itself by thought as a counter object to what confronts it as an external world. Knowledge has not done its work until, proceeding beyond the formal synthetic unity of Kant, it has grasped the process of its self-development, which

* *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 159.

alone discloses the full meaning of such distinctions made in the self-creative universe within which fall both thought and its object. There seems to be a single subject of knowledge which we may call so truly, if we remember the limitations of language and the danger of categories that are inadequate outside their appropriate fields. It is in the identity of selves on the subject side that we can seek an immanent God that is truly an Absolute God, and not One set over against the self as an Other.

If it be right to regard knowledge in its full meaning, not as a property or instrument imperfect in its very nature, but as the fact which is presupposed as the foundation of all reality, then the bond between the finite individuals emerging in the processes of nature must be this, that when they know, their thinking is not to be looked on merely as an occurrence in space and time, nor as a property existent in the sense in which the properties of individual substances are distinguished as existing. Whether the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles is an expression adequate to what identity means when applied in this connection to the self I am not at all sure. For we pass at the standpoint of the self from the region of differences arising within the object world into a higher region of self-differentiation.

To bring the points in controversy to their focus, it seems to me that the question raised in this discussion ought to be answered along the following lines:—

Neither of the terms substantive or adjectival is adequate as scientifically descriptive of the mode of being of finite individuals. These terms suggest the relation of a thing and its properties, while what we are dealing with belongs to a different region in knowledge and to a higher stage in the hierarchy of reality. Selves are mutually exclusive of each other in those aspects, actual but not their only aspects, in which they belong to nature as souls completing the significance of organisms which, by abstraction, may be looked on

just as organisms, although they have as intelligent a higher significance. It is thus that we find in experience exclusion of each other by individuals. Such exclusion is a fact, but it is not the whole truth. For, in so far as these individuals are apprehended by mind as subject in knowledge, their activity is identical in difference, in the full sense in which the activity of mind is identical in difference. In this sense it is right to say, if the meaning of the language used be carefully guarded, that there is no numerical diversity of minds, inasmuch as mind is essentially subject activity, and is no property of a substance but an intellectual activity that differentiates itself in the experience of individual selves, and yet remains, as it is the nature of mind adequately conceived to do, identical in the differences which it creates, and returning into itself from them. Of the process we can frame no imaginative picture, because such pictures can only be made out of the particular material furnished through our organs. But we can conceive it in thought. It is not in principle more beyond the grasp of thought than is what we mean when we speak of the real or the transfinite numbers already cited as examples. Moreover, we must assume thought to be adequate to such a task, because otherwise no step of any genuine kind can be taken in philosophical analysis, nor can thought itself be relied on even to demonstrate its own inadequate character.

There seems to be apparent a common tendency in different schools of philosophy to converge. The "New Realism" itself, as I have already said, suggests a revised form of what is called objective idealism. If it were to give up as not essential to the reality of its non-mental world the view of knowledge as a causal mode of external action of one substance on another, the environment on the nervous system, and were it simply to ask for the rejection of the ego-centric claim, and for a recognition of the world as comprising within its reality every kind of quality and value and there as it seems, the "New Realism" would have got near to a point on which, from another side, the

idealist movement appears to be converging. What is necessary is surely to eliminate the obsession that the conception of things as in mutual exclusion confronting things is more than a useful working conception, requisite at certain stages in the development of knowledge. It remains true that progress depends on the extent to which we can, as we proceed, *ex animo* substitute for the conception of our universe as substance the conception of it as subject. Even, however, when we employ the expression subject, the employment is apt to prove lip service. Because all categories are essential in an entirety of knowledge which in its only adequate form consists in recognition of higher forms as preserving, even in their supersession of them, the substance of lower conceptions, we are apt to lapse back into those lower forms to the exclusion of others beyond them. Employed in judgments of the understanding that are of high value in everyday life, they yet entangle us in contradictions if taken as more than merely partial results reached on the way to the full truth. Especially in psychology is one struck with this feature. There is an enormous amount of detailed work of a high order which has of late been accomplished in psychology. Yet, the science remains a collection of fragments, and something more is needed to complete it. Because mind, even when it seems to be conditioned, is still mind, it can pass in thought beyond what, under the aspect of organism, it feels around it, and can find itself in what has seemed foreign only because of the abstractions which it has itself made. As individual selves, whose factual state is one of existence in space and time, we cannot experience directly the whole of a process which for us must remain unending. But because, although finite, we have not the less on that account mind as the foundation of our existence, we are also infinite and capable of passing in reflection beyond the limits of our individuality, and of contemplating the self *sub specie æternitatis*.

If this be so, then the expression "finite" imparts something more than a mere spatial metaphor. It means that mind,

making use of the lower categories, differentiates itself, as part of the process of its own activity and in fulfilment of an end, into selves which imply only a certain stage or degree of reality. That stage is *de facto* ours, it is the plane at which we exist and reflect; it gives us our "that," a world of fact which is a centre of gravity, as it were, even for our highest aspirations, and in which we cannot gainsay that a world confronts us in which we are ourselves included, yet from which in other aspects of our nature we distinguish ourselves as free and as including it. For reflection there emerges the conception of a higher unity, a unity which the very conditions of our immersion in nature prevent us from envisaging, but which we can reach by conceptual thought, and of which in art and religion we have in some measure a revelation less mediated by abstraction than that which metaphysics affords.

Art, religion and philosophy alike appear to point to the same conclusion. The further upwards we proceed along the stages by which the self manifests its reality the less do we encounter of that hard and fast distinction of selves which confronts us most of all in the anthropological relations where the separateness of organisms is everywhere a cardinal fact. The more complete our progress from substance to subject, and the stages of this progress are manifold, the nearer do we appear to come to the conception of selves as dependent on fundamental unity of intelligence,—a unity which, appearing last, discloses itself to analysis as foundational, and therefore first. Such a feature of identity in all self-consciousness is inadequately characterised as an absolute subject or self. The expression misleads, for it suggests that we are taking greater liberties with notions which belong partially to lower stages than they will bear. We suffer from the greatest of all difficulties, even in the thinking that is most guarded, the suggestions which arise from our inadequate metaphors. No image drawn from our experience under conditions of externality in space and time is adequate to express what we can

only present to our minds conceptually. If our medium in conceptual presentation is feeling, as in art and religion is largely the case, the fact is emphasised that in their final forms feeling and thinking are not so sharply separated as they seem to be in lower forms of experience. Yet, even these feelings must be mediated by thinking. The modern realists are surely right in their refusal to treat the so-called non-mental world as excluding from direct experience all that is of a universal character. Matter and mind fall together, but the conception of an experience in which they so fall together is not to be looked upon as one in which either the mental or the non-mental, themselves the results only of a distinction within mind, can be regarded as self-subsisting entities. The larger entirety must include both. But not as an unintelligible Absolute different from an actual experience interpreted by philosophy. Nor yet as though it were some superior monad existing apart from all finite monads and related to them in a fashion which reflection itself cannot interpret. It is rather just in those higher aspects of self-consciousness in which the knowledge and volition of selves display more and more of identity and less and less of the difference which is characteristic of the external world, that the search for the foundation of finite selfhood seems fruitful. It is from above that we must start again, and work backwards from the end to what appears its beginning, if we would understand the beginning of knowledge itself. And when we do examine, steadily and critically, our modes of expression and seek to eliminate from them suggestions of relations which belong to the external world, especially relations such as those of things and their properties, it does not seem difficult to conclude that the question whether finite selves are substantive or adjectival raises a dilemma which has no exhaustive application to the problem before us. If philosophy can reach this point it will have got some way towards redeeming itself from the reproach that it seems to deny realities which plain men insist on, by seeking to dissolve them into what seem to these plain men to be unreal abstractions.

SYMPOSIUM: DO FINITE INDIVIDUALS POSSESS A SUBSTANTIVE OR AN ADJECTIVAL MODE OF BEING?

V.—*Reply by* Bernard Bosanquet.

In grammar any content can be an adjective and any a substantive (p. 75), especially in inflected languages which possess the neuter adjective. A proper name can be an adjective—"a Solon." Still, in becoming an adjective a name indicates a change in the status of its object. The object becomes *ad hoc* only intelligible as attached and dependent. An adjective has a meaning without its substantive, but a meaning which becomes self-contradictory if we try to conceive it without attachment to something more nearly existent in its own right.

A difficulty in determining the general significance of the term "adjectival" arises at this point. When one says "finite spirits are essentially adjectival," the reply comes "If this only means that each of them could not exist, supposing the rest of the universe did not exist, and exist in relation with it, that is a truism, and tells us nothing of their nature." But the argument goes deeper. It aims at combating a dangerous fallacy in philosophy, morals, and religion, and urges a point of view which, always recognised in the great faiths and philosophies, is now winning its way among the influential ideas of the world. The dangerous opposing fallacy is that of individualism and pluralism, which, while claiming, like certain forms of realism, to be a philosophy of the future, is in its essence a superstition of the past. The contention is, not merely that the existence of finite individuals presupposes a world in relation to them, but that their nature, the peculiarity and value of each of them, lies in their unity with

systematic wholes of a certain kind and structure, and beyond the immediate being in virtue of which they are presented as finite. Man, for example, is adjectival to his community, or to a tissue of interconnected communities including those continuous developments of mind which are the very heart of common life, though not the co-operative creation of a number of persons. The development of art or of science is a case in point. It is childish to say that the life of Art is a succession of individuals: it is a great coherent spirit and revelation.

The same thing *mutatis mutandis* can be shown of objects existing in space and time. It follows, indeed, from the nature of finite individuals, by definition, and it ought to be borne in mind that the thesis of our discussion, as primarily stated, was a denial of adjectival character founded only on the most general nature of thinghood or existence. Every existent as such was to be an ultimate subject which could not itself be adjectival to any further subject. And this conclusion was to extend to all finite individuals. It seemed natural to point out that a premiss so widely drawn could hardly have a relevant bearing on the characteristics of spiritual beings; and the comparison which it involved, between external objects and human selves, was disclaimed early in the discussion (p. 103).

Yet, having been made, it was worth examining. It seemed clear that in a mode parallel to that of human spirits, though involving different characteristics, the thing in space, too, is self-contradictory when taken by itself, and only becomes coherent and intelligible when referred as dependent to a continuous world (p. 79). Professor Stout's luminous exposition* of this relation, in his treatment of the sensible thing and its appearances is the best answer to his criticism of the thesis that a thing is not an ultimate subject, and therefore by the definition not a substance, if it does not include the conditions of its predicates. It is not an ultimate subject because, taken alone, it is not a

* *Manual of Psychology*, 456 *ff*.

subject of its predicates. It is not their subject at all, and they are not its predicates (*Cf.* p. 135), and if you try to take them so, they are throughout discrepant with one another. To make it a subject, an indefinite amount of the environment must be included with it, and then the contradictions of its appearances cease to exist.

I have just said that this self-contradictoriness of finite individuals as finite follows from their nature by definition. It seemed to me that the stages of my argument explained this sufficiently, but I will state what I mean by it in a very few words.

Finite* means ended or limited by a negation. Individual means indivisible, and indivisible not as atom, as the least that can have being, but as a whole, as what loses its essence if divided.

A finite individual then is a positive unit, limited by a mere negation. But this is a contradiction. A thing's limit expresses its nature, and a bare negation cannot be the nature of anything. If the contradiction is to be removed, the limit must not merely be shifted (for that leaves the bare negation as before), but turned into a positive expression of the unit's nature, by becoming a distinction and no longer a bare negation. A simple instance is the satisfaction of desire or the removal of foreignness by knowledge. What was a negation of the positive unit has become a reconciled distinction in which we feel our self affirmed, and the finiteness has so far become self-complete or infinite. Internally, as we saw, it is the same. The unit, claiming to be indivisible, is full of discordances which cannot be harmonised without going beyond it and taking in further elements. Thus finiteness is fatal to individuality within and without, and nothing can be individual except as infinite, nor infinite except as part of a systematic whole in

* *Cf.* Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, p. 68 *ff*. All students will have seen that my argument has its main source in this book. But I do not for a moment suggest that Mr. Bradley would approve my development of it.

which its contradictions are at least relatively solved and harmonised. It is plain then that the finite individual is by definition adjectival. It is attached, included, subordinate, not merely interrelated on equal terms.

It would have been the worst of all failures if in a discussion on which so much trouble has been spent there had been none but a verbal issue. I was not perfectly certain at first but that the difference between Professor Pringle-Pattison and myself was of this nature. But on continued study of his argument, and on comparison of it with that of Professor Stout, I have come to the conclusion that, on the limited subject in dispute, both of them are definitely against me, and both are agreed in what I must call the same heresy. The *odium theologicum* rightly has a bad name, and if I am obliged in my argument to appeal to the facts of religion, this does not mean that I claim any special competence in this subject myself, or that I deny it to my critics. I am saying what in the first instance I have gathered from others, what my own experience and reason seem to me to confirm, and what I believe, indeed, my critics would in principle admit, though, I suppose, they would deny my applications of it. I should like to say at this point that in the interval before the publication of the present volume, I have carefully re-studied Professor Pringle-Pattison's *Idea of God*, and that my admiration for the book, and my sense of agreement with it, have been increased by this re-perusal. From my point of view, the author does himself less justice in his paper than in the original work, although the element on which our controversy turns was, of course, evident there.

But here is the principal ground of my contention. The opposition, as I see it, is one between the reflective theory of morality, and the concrete facts of morality and religion. Of course I believe that my theory of the judgment is true; and I hold that it and the account of the finite individual support each other reciprocally because both are truly and directly

drawn from experience. All that is said in the way of comparing my view to an abstract logical theory, and finding an analogy between it and Spinozism, is to my mind irrelevant. I mentioned the word Spinozistic on p. 85 precisely in order to exclude all such ideas from the discussion, and to tie the argument down to that interpretation of substance which my critic said he was concerned with, and which I have shown to throw no light on the main issue. The term "logical" is introduced over and over again with really no shade of applicability to the thesis which it is used to characterise. That thesis is essentially an attempt to interpret and describe the religious experience, in which the spirit of man realises, through will and worship, its insignificance in and by itself, and its value in union with supreme power and goodness. The phrase "looking from the inside" at finite selves introduced on p. 113, is as a matter of fact in precise agreement with my idea (p. 82) which it is used to deny. That idea is that if you realise the genuine being and inward essence of a mind, as it really is in itself and not as the correlative of a body among bodies, you see that it is an indissoluble factor in the unity of spirits, uttering in and through its unique individuality the nature of the systematic whole. The interpretation twists the conception by main force into its polar opposite, as one in which minds are viewed from the outside and in abstraction from the social whole, as mere punctual centres of reflected rays. Professor Stout has executed an analogous *tour de force* (p. 136). Foreseeing the objection that a mere one among similar parts, *e.g.*, a cell in a crowd of similar cells, could hardly be said to represent in itself characteristically the nature of the whole they belonged to, I pointed out (p. 82) that in highly-developed wholes—I had in mind Driesch's equipotential systems, but thought it better to take a more familiar instance—the apparently undistinguished nature of constituent units may be "merged and subordinated" by the nature of the whole so as to develop a unique and characteristic individuality in the

primarily similar part, *e.g.*, as a head or a heart among apparently homogeneous cells, in which the need and functioning of the whole finds a peculiar and concrete expression. And in this it is actually suggested that I have treated the determinate peculiarity of an individual as lost and over-ridden in the whole to which it belongs.

From this I pass to Professor Stout's comment on what I mean by an apparent subject being adjectival (p. 127). I mean, I said in effect, that it is not co-ordinate with its substantive in distinctness and independence. The two inferences which he draws from this simple statement of indisputable fact require, in the first instance, a further premiss, and in my judgment a false one—that all parts of any whole are co-ordinate with each other; in the second instance, a false conversion, from "if adjectival, then not co-ordinate,"* to "if not co-ordinate, then adjectival." I certainly prefer hypothetical judgments to be reciprocal, but I never said that all of them were reciprocal. I am not bound to deny that some beings, subordinate to others, might yet be substantival. It might even be possible that the same being might be substantival in one relation and adjectival in another.

This might seem impossible, if the adjectival being is adequately distinguished by the appropriateness of the grammatical form of the adjective for its expression. This is what Professor Stout insists on, when he says, in effect, that a part cannot be the adjective constituted by its own inclusion in the whole. But this applies, I think, only to a part related by mere inclusion. And it is noticeable that he reduces to this type an example of mine which has, *prima facie*, quite another meaning (p. 132 top). A part in a systematic unity is not a part by mere inclusion, and its distinctive attachment operates as a

* By "not co-ordinate" I meant "less than co-ordinate." Of course the substantive is in a sense "not co-ordinate," *i.e.* more than co-ordinate.

condition under which its adjectives and itself characterise the whole. Manipulate the cells as you like; the head grows at one end of the cylinder; that is the typical case I had in mind.

Participation in the communal mind (p. 139) illustrates the same principle. The individual has his positive nature in the membership of a community which includes and sustains him. The argument, I think, is seldom understood in its full depth. The grown man is taken, as if sprung from a tree or a rock, and the mediateness of the connection between his mind and that of other men is insisted on, and that there is no single mind of the community other than the minds of its members, which resemble each other, but are far from being one. But this reasoning begins far too late, and stops far too soon. Ask a grown man whether he is of one piece with his society, and he may tell you he ignores or even loathes it. But that is not to the point. He is made of its substance, physical, intellectual and moral. The communal mind is not a ghost hovering over a nation; it is the minds of individuals in which the common stuff gives varied expression to the qualities and functions of the whole. And the argument stops too soon. Mediateness is no bar to identity, and minds of a community have in many ways more in common with each other than any one mind with itself. To deny identity between them involves an individualism which could not be arrested there, but would destroy the unity of the self with its past and future. Each "mind" finds its completion in the other, its purposes supported and corrected, its contradictions removed, its tendencies and inclinations represented, reinforced, systematised. A man communicates with himself largely by language, as he does with his neighbours. In relation to him, his society is an infinite whole within which he is a finite being, partaking through it of infinity or self-completeness.

Thus again we can judge the suggestion of a perfect, that is, infinite, being, with an interest in a world of finite beings

outside him.* An interest is surely the emotional counterpart of an implication, and a being which would be impoverished by the absence of another is plainly finite as against that other, and is part of a more comprehensive unity, which, immanent in it, is the ground of an implication connecting it with other members of the unity.

So with lateral identity (see pp. 139 and 136), and with the claim to be substantive in virtue of an adjectival nature. These are direct readings of the individual's attitude in as far as he recognises himself to be more than finite. The question in the case of lateral identity I understand to be how much is meant by "I" and "mine"—how far, for example, a man thinks of his own reality as extending beyond what must perish at his death if he counts on no survival of his personal consciousness. All that is suggested by this question seems to me the plainest fact, and yet of extreme importance. I have tried to illustrate the view in the essay to which I referred in the paper. The other passage (p. 93) is a direct translation into abstract language of the experience that a man feels strongest when he recognises that his strength is not his own.

Having thus developed the conception of the finite individual as adjectival, we may approach the fundamental difference of which I spoke at starting.

Briefly, the point is, that Professor Pringle-Pattison and Professor Stout† both definitely commit themselves, as regards the realisation of value, to the strict standpoint of reflective morality. Imperfection in the universe is to be overcome, and good is to be realised, by the successive strivings, in time, of the finite individual intent upon self-improvement, attended by the consciousness of its own imperfections, which is the

* I did not think Professor Pringle-Pattison, on the whole, adopted this conception in his book (*cf.* p. 146).

† See pp. 114, 120, and 143 *ff.*, and compare p. 146: compare *Idea of God*, p. 413, "it is in and through finite individuals that the divine triumph is worked out." See, on the other hand, *Idea of God*, p. 396.

fulcrum of its advance and the guarantee of a nobler future. Thus it may become what God knows it to be and intends it to become. And it is in this light that it is the end or value to which God or the Absolute is organic. Now, here there can be no doubt what we have to face. We are tied to a universe of finite individuals striving after self-amelioration. And we are tied to its eternal imperfection, for, as finite individuals, it is plain that they must always be in self-contradiction. The mention of God's knowledge of them introduces, indeed, a conflict familiar in Kant; God, it would seem, sees the infinite series as completed, and, as God's vision must be the true one, the series cannot really be infinite, and the whole doctrine demands readjustment. It is plain, however, that the argument is meant to appeal to the endless future conations of the finite being as finite, for the process is attended throughout by the consciousness of defect and the anticipation of a nobler future, and yet is contrasted with our terrestrial experience. Now, from the religious point of view, no such prolonged striving is necessary. For the finite spirit recognises his unity with the divine goodness by faith, and so shares at once the perfection which, as finite, he could not win by any striving. And, if such striving were necessary, we have no security that it should be even at all effectual, for why should we be better in another life than in this? while, as we have seen, it cannot be completely effectual, for it presupposes the continuance of the finite being as such, for whom to be perfect is admittedly and *ex hypothesi* a contradiction. We are back, in short, in the Kantian moralistic and individualistic position, and it was hardly necessary for me to explain it in such detail.

And Professor Stout's doctrine is, I must think, the same. The turning point is the idea that value is relative to conation,* and that therefore the positive conation of the finite being

* Which also appears emphatically in the *Idea of God.*

as such is the necessary and sufficient condition of the realisation of value. But this, it seems to me, will not do at all. The conation of the finite being as such is the conation which ends or is sated, but is not fulfilled or satisfied—it is not directed to an object in which it could be satisfied—and which in principle must give rise to an infinite series, the alternation of satiety and craving, without approaching betterment or satisfaction. These can only come through a conation which is in itself relative to some element of infinity, that is, of stability or perfection, in and by which the contradiction of the finite being is in some degree solved and laid to rest. But, for the finite being, as we saw, such perfection can never be final or complete, and it is startling that Professor Stout seems to accept and approve this consequence, owing to the fear of a dead arrest. This, of course, is a well known scruple. But it is going far, in deference to it, to accept a universe wholly or mainly constituted by finite beings, striving each in his own right after a perfection *ex hypothesi* unattainable, whose unattainableness, according to the theory, he must be supposed to recognise and enjoy, as the security for his continued activity. It is most noteworthy that a value established—*per impossibile*—through such a finite conation could have no essential appeal to any being but the subject of that conation. A true value appeals to all conative beings so far as not defective.

Experience surely suggests a solution less violently reactionary, or futurist. The conception that in perfection all the life of conation must be annulled is inconsistent with any experience of fruition, and æsthetic enjoyment, for example, tells quite a different tale. Finite conation, as we saw, is not, visibly and as finite, creative of value. If we believe in the perfection of the universe, we must hold that much finite conation has, in the infinite whole, a relation to value beyond what we see. And this belief must always be indispensable, however great may be the apparent visible betterment of the finite

individual. For, as finite, such betterment must always remain self-contradictory and unsubstantial and, *qua dependent on finite conation*, in principle egoistic. And, therefore, such a faith is as justified in respect of our present life, as in any progression of strivings it could ever become. The unity, moreover, of the individual by faith with a goodness not actually visible to him, leaves conation, so far as it is the condition of value, that is, so far as it is rightly directed and is linked with elements of true fruition, at its very highest pitch, though in possession of its infinite fulfilment. How this fulfilment through faith is related to the visible betterment of the individual is an old problem, which I have endeavoured to restate elsewhere.* The relation is fundamentally distinct from that which my critics have sketched, and is, I believe, that which is inherent in the religious consciousness. It does seem to me, to my great surprise, that we are here dealing with a recrudescence of moralistic individualism, uniting itself with the not unattractive conception of a finite God and an unfinished universe.†

Here I may refer to my short statement on p. 86 of the argument from the imperfection of the individual, which has been held (p. 142) not to be clear. It seems to me simple and straightforward. We are taking, on certain grounds, the universe to be perfect; we know the apparent finite individual, both by definition and in experience, to be defective; therefore perfection must lie in a reality in which the individual is other than, as finite, he appears.

The issue, as I said, is an old one. It is the issue between justification by faith, which I take to be the essence of the religious consciousness, and justification by works, which I take to be the characteristic demand of the reflective moral

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* *E.g.*, *Gifford Lectures*, 2nd series, p. 324. *Suggestions in Ethics*, 180.

† These conceptions Professor Pringle-Pattison rejects in his *Gifford Lectures*. But they seem to me inevitable on the principles of pp. 120, 122, and 124, of his paper; compare also *Idea of God*, p. 43 (Human beings *not* the final purpose) with the paper, pp. 108 and 120.

consciousness. The position has so often been analysed that it hardly seems necessary to guard it by pointing out that, while the former includes the latter, the latter excludes the former. You could not, indeed, have even actual morality on the basis of the reflective moral theory. It always includes an element, however unrecognised, of religion, that is, of abandonment of self in a greater whole.

I may be held to have done less than justice to Professor Pringle-Pattison's insistence on the personal being and relation of the individual, as the moral of the comparison with existents (*e.g.*, p. 106), and as necessary in the religious attitude itself. In my view, this comparison has been disposed of by the criticism of the finite existent as self-contradictory, and the demonstration of the finite person as essentially a member of an infinite whole, in which he ceases to be a finite individual. But there is a further point, on which I must touch in passing.

Reference is made, with a sort of contempt, to the conception of a connexion of qualities within the supreme unity, and to content as the basis of a self, as if this were an inferior and unworthy conception of the structure of a personality, and in some way incompatible with individuality. But such a point of view is not altogether self-evident. The connexion of content, I suppose, is the same thing as the unity of consciousness. It is the principle of spirit by which, through retention and reproduction, an individual whole is built up on a foundation of persistent quality. The process is outlined by Professor Pringle-Pattison in his Gifford Lectures, and, I should say, not incorrectly.* Now, when we urge that a personality so built up and organised by the operation of identity of content is complete only in recognising its relation to the reality from which it came, and out of which it is

* *Idea of God*, p. 273. So far as he rests on Mr. Bradley's analysis, he must give weight to the conclusion that "no content sticks in the this."

continually nourished and renewed, we are not treating it with disparagement, but are recognising the characteristic in which it has its power and glory. Its power of authorship and its originality depend, I suppose, on this "connexion of content." This *is* the unity of its spirit by which what it *is* passes into what it *does*. As to the comment on my account of error and evil (pp. 117—119) as hostile to the unity of the person, I should point out that, above all things, it is successful in maintaining that unity. No disintegration of the personality could be so hopeless or so final as a doctrine which should recognise in it an evil which has nothing of good, or an error which has nothing of truth. The individual would be split up from top to toe, and no possibility of improvement or deterioration would remain to him.

On the fundamental issue, then, as stated in conclusion by Professor Stout (p. 148), I agree, of course, as to the first point, that we must not confuse the general conception of the future life with special views of its nature and conditions. And I draw attention to the moderate and critical attitude of these two thinkers on this problem, which, though hardly itself a philosophical issue, is yet an important indication of philosophical leanings and has a very grave ethical bearing. With reference to the second point, my view must be different. We know, I should conclude, that the universe is in itself a realisation of values. The identical criterion of value and reality leaves, on this point, no room for doubt. That the idea of "future life" can in any way be supported by this insight seems to me, on the other hand, a thesis which rests on a confusion. The only perfection possible for a finite individual we can have here and now, and it is certain, and fulfils, through faith and its implication for the will, our utmost conation. To appeal to a continued striving, our finite nature being unchanged, is to appeal to a struggle in which failure is predetermined and may be disastrous and in which the apparent value created by the mere striving is fraudulent and selfish. For the certainty of

perfection in the universe is *ipso facto* abandoned, when it is made dependent on the visible* strivings of the finite, and on the *de facto* interest of *de facto* conations.

Lord Haldane in the first place helps us by drawing attention to a quotation (p. 159) from Professor Pringle-Pattison's *Idea of God*, which in comparison with his paper and with Professor Stout's allusion to it shows (see, *e.g.*, pp. 122 and 124, *cp.* p. 146), I venture to think, a deeper appreciation of the difficulties attaching to "the relation between the great self and its minor prototypes," and arising "if we represent the universal life in which they share as another unit of the same type."

Lord Haldane himself is desirous to vindicate the accessibility of the Absolute to thought, and to regard the unity within which finite selves are distinctions as that of an intelligence, so I gather, embodied in a "larger entirety" in which no differences are ultimate. As regards the position of thought in such a whole, the question that presses upon my mind is "What do you do with the judgment?" Truth and thought, as we commonly speak of them, are one with the judgment; and so far as this discursive thought is concerned, I think Mr. Bradley's analysis is irrefragable, according to which it points to a unity which it cannot realise. And it must be borne in mind that on this view the Absolute, though it cannot be experienced completely in detail, is intelligible and knowable in its general character. If, on the other hand, we speak of thought in some other sense, in which it can more readily be the principle of an individual whole, it may be doubted whether the difficulty of conceiving it through discursive knowledge must not in some degree recur. But I welcome the view according to which the unity becomes greater and the distinctions of less significance according as we approach the fuller types of experience.

* I call them visible even in a future life, so long as they are in principle a mere continuation of what we experience here.

The latter part of my paper has attracted no animadversion, either as attention or as criticism. Yet it involves considerations which might prove decisive in the discussion, and in any case had with me considerable weight. If I am right the discussion should not turn exclusively on the soul or self, but it should be remembered that the individual has a reality beyond either, first in the more immediate not-self—as, for instance, in his possessions and connexions, apart from which it is clear that he is not fully realised—and, secondly, in all that survives his temporal existence on earth. Is it, I am far from being the first to ask, a mere metaphor to say that Plato teaches us to-day through a thousand channels and influences? And if you say, "But can we take these biassed interpretations and impure traditions as Plato's authentic voice?" we should ask you to consider the misinterpretations and prejudices to which a great man is exposed in his lifetime, and to determine whether if in one sense he speaks less directly to-day, yet in another he does not speak to us more authentically and completely than he ever spoke to mankind before.

This seems to me a serious question in itself, and in many ways to affect our judgment on further issues of this discussion. I call attention to Professor Stout's attitude on the confluence of selves (p. 148), though I am not to claim his support for any thesis of my own on the problem. But I press the point. If Plato's voice addresses us through a hundred teachers to-day, and if often a great man has to wait generations or centuries before his genuine utterance is heard, is he in the first place not real and truly present where he is known, and, in the second place, not in inextricable combination and solution with the selves of those whom he has inspired? Then, going back from these conspicuous examples, about which Mr. Bradley has argued so strikingly in his study "What is the real Julius Cæsar?"*—going back from these to ordinary life, can we

* *Essays on Truth and Reality*, by F. H. Bradley, p. 409.

maintain the reciprocal exclusion of selves who in a similar way speak and act through each other at every moment?

But these are only illustrative applications of the idea of an extended reality, which is at least worth considering for its own sake. Is not the individual clearly real outside the temporal existence of his soul or self? But, if so, does not this affect the question of his having an adjectival existence as a character of reality within the Absolute? Of course the Absolute is never itself a subject or a predicate or a logical transparency, or a monad or an other or a spectator or a knower. It is always the whole, and it cannot be a part of itself, though divisions and conditions have relative being within it.

With reference to Professor Pringle-Pattison's appeal on p. 125, I have only to say that I hoped the true suggestion at the root of the doctrine of substance was the eternity of all beings in God and as sustained by the divine will, and not any conception which could support a pluralism or individualism. And this reference causes me to remark that the older doctrine of a future life centred in some intimate fruition of the divine while the discussion to-day treats of the widest possibilities—of survival on any conceivable terms and in any world whose existence analogy may suggest. The older doctrine may have symbolised something unimaginable, but it stood for an obvious value. Present ideas have gained in realism, but the presupposition from which the value sprang is surely gone.

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